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Abstract 
The topic of this thesis is a psychological perspective on political violence conducted 
by state-agents. In particular it focuses on one former Security Branch paliceman 
from South Africa, Paul Erasmus. The issue with which this thesis is concerned is 
how one can understand the motivations and intentions of perpetrators of political 
violence based on narrative accounts by the perpetrators themselves. Consequently 
this thesis is interpretive in nature. Previous academic literature on political violence 
is reviewed and a psychological model developed by Foster, Haupt and de Beer 
(2005) in Theatre of Violence is outlined. An available transcript relating to Paul 
Erasmus from the Amnesty Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) is analysed, as is a structured interview conducted with Erasmus at the time of 
the TRC by David Goodman (1999). Media representations of Erasmus are also 
considered. It is argued that these representations are not helpful in understanding the 
motivations and intentions of this perpetrator. A three-hour interview was therefore 
conducted with Paul Erasmus by the author and this interview is analysed using 
applied discourse analysis. The narrative is also examined in relation to the model set 
out by Foster et al (2005). It is found that Paul Erasmus locates his motivations and 
intentions in the context of the Cold War and the ideology prevailing amongst the 
Security Forces in South Africa at the time. He also refers to the downward spiral of 
events that drew him into the role that he later took on. Blame is often diffused onto 
colleagues or the victims themselves. It is also found that there is strong support for 
Foster et als' (2005) model, particularly with reference to the notions of entitlement 
and masculinity. 
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Introduction 
Political violence appears to be growing in both scale and intensity throughout the 
world. Often, the state allows atrocities to take place, and may even promote them. 
This was certainly the case in apartheid South Africa. The question is: how do we 
understand the behaviour of state-agents in South Africa who committed gross 
violations of human rights at this time? What were their motivations and intentions? 
How did they become perpetrators of political violence? 
A chapter on perpetrators in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) report made an initial attempt to answer these questions. Yet one of the 
critiques of the TRC was the way in which the narrative testimonies of perpetrators 
were limited as a result of 'quasi-judicial amnesty procedures' (Foster, Haupt & de 
Beer, 2005 :94). In an attempt to outline the potential causes and complexities 
involved in political violence, Foster et al (2005) collected nine narratives of 
perpetrators from different sides of the political divide, including two narratives from 
police operatives. Interviews collected in the period from 2000-2004 allowed, to the 
extent possible, these perpetrators to tell their own stories. 
There have been other attempts to obtain narratives of perpetrators from South 
Africa's apartheid days, such as Jacques Pauw's (1997) sensationalist book, Into the 
Heart of Darkness, and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela's more empathetic encounters 
with EuGene de Kock, in A Human Being Died that lVight. This Masters Mini-thesis 
\vill seek to add to the corpus of knowledge that surrounds political violence using, as 
a case study, the narrative of Paul Erasmus. Now that perpetrators feel more secure in 
telling their stories as their amnesties have been granted, and perpetrators have had 
time to reflect on their actions, it is vital to collect these narratives. There is a 
common misperception that to understand is to excuse. On the contrary, 
understanding can be a preventative measure and if the psychological causes of 
political violence can be understood then strategies can be implemented on a societal 
level to prevent future violence. 
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The topic of this Masters Mini-dissertation is a psychological perspective on political 
violence, with a specific focus on political violence committed by policemen, or state-
agents, under the apartheid regime. This thesis will analyse an in-depth interview 
(conducted by the author of this mini-thesis) with former Security Branch policeman, 
Paul Erasmus and use this, along with Paul's available amnesty transcripts from the 
TRC, a previous interview conducted at the time of the TRC by Goodman (1999) and 
media reports from that time, as a case study. The case study will be used as a means 
of understanding the intentions and motivations of political violence and the role that 
these things play in the propensity to commit acts of political violence, as Paul 
Erasmus sees them. This approach has the benefit of not imposing a prejudiced 
outside frame of reference. This thesis will also examine the extent to which this case 
study fits with a recent theoretical model of perpetrators of political violence put 
forward by Foster et al (2005). The study will consequently be interpretive in nature. 
The research questions for this thesis are thus as follows: 
• How can we understand Paul Erasmus' intentions and motivations for 
committing acts of political violence from other sources (the media, amnesty 
transcripts and an interview with Goodman in 1999) written at the time of the 
TRC? 
• 
• 
• 
What does Paul Erasmus cite as his intentions and motivations for committing 
acts of political violence in the current day based on the interview conducted 
with him? 
Based on Paul Erasmus' narrative, what are the psychological processes that 
played a role in the propensity to commit these acts? 
Does the narrative fit with Foster et als' (2005) relational model? 
The chapter structure will be as follows. Chapter 1 will give a basic introduction to 
the research topic by clarifying the key concepts (i.e. what we mean by the term 
'perpetrator' in relation to political violence) and by outlining various approaches 
towards the study of these perpetrators. Finally it will give a brief account of the 
amnesty process in South Africa as it relates to the subject of this thesis, Paul 
Erasmus. Chapter 2 will then examine what academic understandings of perpetrators 
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of political violence, in particular state-agents, have thus far contributed to this arena. 
Explanatory and interpretive accounts will be examined with particular attention paid 
to studies conducted in South Africa. Foster et ai's (2005) model will be detailed in 
full. Chapter 3 will outline the methodology of the interview and will deal with moral 
issues that arise from the study of perpetrators in General and the interview process in 
particular. Chapter 4 will then examine features of discourse and the method of 
discourse analysis to be used in this mini-thesis. It will look at whether a previous 
interview vvith Goodman (1999), Paul's available amnesty transcripts and media 
representations from the time provide useful clues towards answering the research 
questions in this thesis. The context of the recent interview will then be detailed and 
the interview analysed with reference to these research questions. I will then conclude 
this thesis by answering the research question and relating these answers to previously 
detailed literature, but particularly that of Foster et al (2005) since this literature forms 
part of the research questions of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Who, How and When? 
1.1 Clarification of Key Concepts 
Who exactly is a perpetrator of political violence? The TRC Act stated that 
perpetrators were people who had committed an act, omission or offense that could be 
considered a gross violation of human rights, with gross violations of human rights 
being "the violation of human rights through (a) the killing, abduction, torture or 
severe ill treatment of any person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, 
instigation, command or procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a), 
which emanated from conflicts of the past and which was committed during the 
period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994 within or outside the Republic, and the 
commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered by any 
person acting with a political motive.' (TRC Report, 1998: VI, Ch4, Para42) 
There are many problems with the narrow definition of gross human rights violations, 
such as the act not covering less severe injustices such as forced removals (Sarkin, 
1996), or addressing the systemic injustices of apartheid (Mamdani, 1998). 
Furthermore, there are problems with the definition of a perpetrator. Foster et al 
(2005) even prefer to use the term 'protagonist' in their book. 
The binary dichotomy of victim and perpetrator has been troublesome, especially for 
those who committed human rights violations on the side of the oppressed and thus 
saw their actions as legitimate. The definition given above applies to any perpetrator 
of human rights violations, yet some argued that human rights violations for the 
purposes of fighting apartheid could never be equated to those that furthered its end. 
One example of the resistance that met this definition was the ANC's response to the 
release of the TRC report (ANC Statements, 30/1 0/1998). Furthermore, victims may 
have become perpetrators and vice-versa. With groups retaliating in response to 
another, violence was often committed in relation to acts already perpetrated. It was 
the case in South Africa that some participants in the Amnesty Hearings refused to be 
labeled as a perpetrator. Since this term carries negative connotations, many felt that it 
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did not aptly describe their position. Whilst this is certainly a valid point for those 
who committed crimes on the side of the oppressed (yet still debatable depending on 
the gravity of the crime), South Africa needed to investigate all human rights 
violations, to the extent possible, for the purposes of maintaining an element of justice 
through acknowledgement of victims' pain. 
The definition, whilst being broad in that it covered those on all sides of the struggle, 
the term was equally problematic in its constraints. The term perpetrator does not 
cover wider aspects of political violence, such as those that did not commit atrocities 
but enabled them (e.g. through supplying information). It was unclear from definition 
how accidents 9such as the bombing of innocent civilians) were to be dealt with. Did 
that still make one a perpetrator of political violence? The definition also did not 
extend to acts committed outside the Republic of South Africa. Given this, the SADF 
discouraged many members from applying for amnesty for acts committed outside its 
borders (Fullard and Rouseau, 2003: 199). Furthermore, applications for amnesty 
tended to focus on specific incidents rather than General trends. Yet some perpetrators 
may have not remembered certain incidents. This also detracted from a more 
complete picture of the violations and motivations for these violations that occurred 
under apartheid. 
For my purposes I restrict my analysis to that of a state agent (as opposed to a non-
state agent) who did fall into the TRC's definition of a perpetrator. Political violence 
in this context thus refers to gross human rights violations committed with a political 
objective and political affiliation. I use the term perpetrator rather than protagonist 
since it is my belief that state agents who prolonged apartheid deserve to be labeled 
with a term that has negative connotations. 
1.2 Approaches to Studying Perpetrators 
There are four main approaches to understanding political violence. There is firstly 
that of the media and public representation. This approach has often been extreme in 
the use of othering discourses, portraying a perpetrator as a monster, a 'sadistic 
criminal', a psychopath or on the other end of the spectrum minimising their actions. 
This kind of depiction is not useful, however, camouflaging the real reasons behind 
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the perpetration of gross human rights violations as \ve \vill see later when examining 
the portrayal of Paul in the Mail & Guardian at the time of the TRe. 
A second approach is that of theoretical understanding, which draws from laboratory 
experiments or detailed analysis of perpetrator actions for example. This approach 
normally follows a positivist line of thought. The problem with laboratory 
experiments is that these can be hard to Generalise to outside the laboratory - there 
may be factors in the real world that are untestable in a lab, or an interaction of factors 
that cannot be separated. Analyses stemming from the actions of perpetrators may 
also be inaccurate to some extent such as reflecting an author bias, or only offering a 
limited explanation since words do not always fully express underlying motivation. 
For example, Browning (1992) has noted, in his analysis of Police Reserve Battalion 
101 in Poland at the time of Nazi rule in Germany, that his analysis was limited at 
points because the information he got was dependent on questions asked by 
interrogators at the Nuremberg Trials, which were related specifically to certain 
cnmes. 
The third approach to the study of perpetrators is the use of stockpiling. Stockpiling 
gives a statistical, factual account of atrocities; it outlines how often atrocities have 
occurred and where. Yet such an approach simply gives us numbers, and does not 
explain why these acts were committed. It masks the part played by structural 
processes and other actors in the political arena and, in the South African case, 
reflected only those who applied for amnesty, rather than the true numbers of 
perpetrators. Indeed, the majority of applications for amnesty in South Africa were 
from ordinary criminals trying to depict their actions politically related (Fullard & 
Rousseau (2003: 199). It is therefore necessary to combine these facts with a 
storytelling, or narrative approach, which contrasts with, yet is complementary to, the 
use of stockpiling (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo, 2002). 
A storytelling approach uses narratives from perpetrators to enhance an understanding 
of behaviours and motivations of perpetrator actions as they see them. Whilst the truth 
in these accounts is debatable due to the limitations of language, and whilst stories are 
told the way that the perpetrator in question wishes them to be told (i.e. a "negotiated 
version' of reality as described by Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005:274), there is still 
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information that can be of use in outlining the contributing elements of gross 
violations of human rights. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that some perpetrators 
may still deny certain atrocities and even if they do acknowledge them their 
descriptions may be influenced by their own (possibly unconscious) psychological 
processes of responsibility displacement or diffusion, or a redefinition of themselves. 
In other words, perpetrators of state-supportive violence may have faulty or selective 
memories. Furthermore, these studies cannot ever provide an explanation of these 
actions per se, but only an understanding. 
This study will be, on the most part a factual or descriptive study, drawing on 
storytelling methodologies. I approach this topic from an interpretive/hermeneutical 
angle. This approach is also 'concerned with morality, arguing that '''what is' and 
what 'should be' are closely intertwined and cannot be artificially split" (Foster et ai, 
2005: 89). Hovvever other approaches will also be considered, as will their usefulness. 
Firstly the stockpiling approach will be explored in that the statistics from the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission relating to Paul will be detailed. Academic literature 
will be examined and it will be argued that Foster et also (2005) model is most 
appropriate in understanding perpetrators. However other academic literature from the 
positivist line of thinking is not without merit. Media and literary representation that 
relate to Paul Erasmus will also be looked at and scrutinised since these 
representations are not particularly useful, often portraying him in othering discourse. 
1.3 Brief Context of the Amnestv Process 
A quick background of the amnesty process that occurred in South Africa is necessary 
to provide the context of how 'perpetrators' were dealt with by the TRC and how this 
affected Paul Erasmus and his self-image as a 'perpetrator'. I do not wish to go into 
the history of apartheid in South Africa since this has been greatly detailed elsewhere. 
However, for a nice analysis of how the ideological heritage of white supremacy was 
carried throughout apartheid see Steyn (2001). 
Amnesty was an element of the negotiated political settlement between the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP), and was part of the 1993 
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interim Constitution. Unlike many countries in Latin America this amnesty was not a 
blanket amnesty but a conditional amnesty that allovved freedom in exchange for 
truth. The Amnesty Committee was set up as part of the larger' victim-centred' TRC. 
Other parts of the TRC included the Reparations and Rehabilitations Committee and 
the Committee for Human Rights Violations. 
The tension between amnesty and justice means that some have criticised the extent to 
which the TRC achieved this ideal. Bizos (2003: 30) aptly describes this tension by 
outlining the choice between 'the silence of perpetrators without justice being done 
and learning the truth without perfect justice being done.' 
A blanket amnesty would have undermined the principles of individual accountability 
and would have added salt to the wounds of victims by not acknowledging their pain. 
However by attaching too many conditions to the granting of amnesty the TRC might 
have provoked a backlash from perpetrators that could have damaged the fragile 
transition to democracy. Thus a compromise was vital. Furthermore, the Interim 
Constitution placed an emphasis on reconciliation and national unity. The post amble 
to the 1993 Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) stated that a foundation would be 
laid 
'to transcend the divisions and strife of the past which Generated gross violations of 
human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and the 
legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that 
there is need for understanding but not vengeance, a need for reparation but not for 
retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not victimisation.' 
Whilst there has been a fair amount of literature covering the TRC, there has not been 
much analysis of amnesty procedures themselves (Foster, 2006:80). Sarkin (2004) has 
therefore written a highly critical review of the amnesty hearings based on 2500 
amnesty cases, interviews and legislations. As Foster (2006:83) notes, the hugest 
limitation of the Amnesty Committee is the small number of perpetrators who actually 
came forward. As a result Sarkin (2004) makes a superb case for prosecution. 
Q 
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The first amnesty hearings were held in April 1996. Perpetrators, as described by the 
TRC in the previous section, were required to fully disclose any politically motivated 
crimes committed between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994. Amnesty was granted to 
those that filled these two criteria along with a third - proportionality, which held that 
acts had to be proportional to politically stated objectives. The Amnesty Committee 
originally started with just five members but grew in size as increasing numbers of 
amnesty applications were received. Amnesty hearings were public and televised in 
order to give a greater sense of transparency and accountability. Decisions were made 
by a three-person panel, one of whom was a judge. If amnesty was not granted, 
prosecution could follow. Unfortunately, the 'stick' of prosecution has not been a 
strong enough threat to the 'carrot' of amnesty and very few prosecutions have 
followed. The apparent lack of threat arguably derives from both a lack of polital will 
and/or lack of resources with which to prosecute individuals (see Sarkin, 2004). A 
five-volume TRe report was completed in 1998 but because the amnesty process was 
not completed, two more volumes (including the Amnesty Committee's report) were 
finished in 2003. 
Paul Erasmus was one of 293 state and security personnel that applied for amnesty 
from a total reported figure of 7 115 applicants from all political affiliations (TRC 
report, 2003, vol. 6). Of all these applications only 1 674 had met requirements 
(Foster, Haupt & de Beer, 2005:13). In total, 229 applicants for amnesty came from 
the Security Branch Sector that Paul had been part of, and 31 applicants from the 
South African Defence Force (SADF). 48% of these applications were from lower 
ranking personnel (Foster et aI, 2005: 15) like Paul, who started his career as a 
Warrant Officer. 
These statistics however camouflage the real numbers of atrocities that occurred and 
by whom. They also do not provide an insight as to why these atrocities occurred. In 
1998 the TRe report attempted to address a grave question (Volume 4, chapter 7): 
"What are the causes, motives and perspectives of those responsible for gross human 
rights violations?" The TRC report has been criticised for the version of truth it 
provided. Despite the TRC report (TRe Report, Vol. 1: 103-134) distinguishing 
between four notions of truth (factual, personal, social and restorative), these 
distinctions were often controversial and not at all straightforward. Ignatieff (quoted 
o 
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by Posel, 2002: 167) argues that' All that a truth commission can achieve is to reduce 
the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse.' However 
given the limited time frame and lack of resources for investigation, it has been 
argued that 
'the sheer power of the public testimonies of victims and perpetrators, coupled 
as they were with the drama of catharsis and the rhetoric of forgiveness, created neat, 
emotionally charged 'sound bites' of truth, and seemed to remove the need to 
penetrate the background or look beyond specific testimony (Posel & Simpson, 
2002:8). 
Furthermore the 'quasi-judicial' nature of the Amnesty Committee meant that it did 
not allow full examination of the afore-mentioned question through a perpetrator's 
eyes. Perpetrators were instructed to answer questions by the panel but often did not 
elaborate more than they needed to. Because the act had to be politically motivated 
actions were often framed in the context of anti-Communist thinking rather than in 
terms of racism, and the procedure did not allow an understanding of why these acts 
were committed. 
Given that the chapter of the TRe Report and the statistics mentioned above do not 
provide an adequate answer to the question of a perpetrators motives and intentions, 
this research report seeks to address this issue through the eyes of a perpetrator as 
defined by the TRe. 
1.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has outlined the key concepts and approaches and addressed the context 
of the amnesty process as it applies to Paul Erasmus. It has argued that the TRC was 
unable to fully look at the motivations and intentions of perpetrators of political 
violence due in part to the nature of the amnesty hearings. Furthermore, whilst the 
statistics given by the TRC do provide some information yet these figures often 
camouflage the reality behind the picture such as who committed what and why. The 
1{\ 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Amanda Lucey 
next chapter will look at broader academic understandings of political violence that 
appear in the literature and examine to what extent the academic lens so far provides a 
useful look at political violence. 
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Chapter 2 
Academic Literature 
Since the controversial Milgram experiments in the 1960s, a fair amount of research 
has been conducted on perpetrators of political violence, often arguing that they are 
ordinary people caught up in a highly influential situation. Originally most of this 
research has come from a positivist line of thought but more recently there have been 
a few attempts to obtain narrative accounts by perpetrators themselves. This chapter 
will examine what research already exists on perpetrators of political violence and to 
what extent this research can thus far enhance an understanding of the motivations 
behind political violence. It will finally detail a model put forward by Foster, Haupt & 
de Beer (2005) so that the interview conducted with Paul Erasmus can be analysed in 
relation to this model. 
2.1 The Banality of Evil 
The widely used phrase 'the banality of evil' was coined by Hannah Arendt (1977) in 
her book on the legal trial of Adolf Eichmann, Eichmann in Jerusalem. For Arendt 
(1977), Eichmann was nothing more than what he claimed to be: an ambitious 
bureaucrat, certified by half a dozen psychiatrists as normal. Arendt argues that most 
Nazis were not criminals or psychopaths (an antisocial personality disorder, defined 
by the inability to feel guilt) but people from all walks of society, and it is this 
normality that makes understanding perpetrators all the more challenging. 
The notion that many perpetrators are ordinary men has been Generally concurred by 
scholars, Goldhagen (1996) being the most notable exception. Despite Miale & 
Selzers' (1975) findings that Rorschach data (a test which analyses how subjects 
responded to inkblots in order to infer psychological characteristics) showed fifteen 
out of the sixteen Nazi Criminals to be psychopathic to varying degrees, Borofsky & 
Brand (1980) examined in detail studies concerning the Roschach records of the 
Nuremberg War Criminals. They concluded that overall, there seemed to be no 
significant differences between the psychological functioning of the Nuremberg War 
Criminals compared to that of other groups used as a control. 
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Furthering this perspective on banality, others have suggested that modernity itself 
has great implications for the pervasiveness of violence. In looking at the Holocaust, 
Bauman (1989) has argued that through division of labour, technical rather than moral 
responsibility and dehumanisation of people, atrocities became easier to commit. He 
states (1989: 13) that "Modern civilization was not the Holocaust's sufficient 
condition; it was, however, most certainly its necessary condition .... it was the rational 
world of modern civilization that made the Holocaust thinkable." For Bauman, of 
paramount importance at the time of the Holocaust were the technological 
advancements and organizational achievements of German society and an elite that 
were preoccupied with ideology and power. 
According to Bauman (1989), modernization spurned on Holocaust in two major 
ways. Firstly the effects of hierarchical and functional divisions of labour meant that 
people were distanced from the end result both physically and mentally. In other 
words, people did not know the full consequences of their actions, but rather focused 
on their functionality. Another effect was that technical responsibility allowed a 
substitution of moral responsibility. By concentrating on the task at hand, moral 
standards became unimportant. Furthermore, the dehumanisation of bureaucratic 
objects (whereby objects became quantitative statistics, rather than people who had a 
life value) was also a significant factor at play. 
Genocides, such as the case of Rwanda, have been possible without the same level of 
bureaucratisation and administration suggesting that modernity is not necessary for 
genocide. Other factors most certainly play a role. Furthermore, whilst 
bureaucratisation and technology may have aided the Holocaust, Bauman's thesis 
cannot account for the root causes of political violence. Nevertheless, analyses of 
torturers from other parts of the world have also placed an emphasis on the banality of 
perpetrators of political violence, suggesting this idea is not one that is restricted to 
the Holocaust (e.g. Haritos-Fatouros, 2003). Others have gone further and in South 
Africa, Gobodo-Madikizela demonstrated the humanity of EuGene de Kock, a man 
dubbed 'Prime Evil' (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003). 
11 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Amanda Lucey 
Lifton (1986) extended the normality thesis by suggesting than an extraordinary 
environment and subculture can activate personality characteristics that would not 
have manifested themselves in other situations. Lifton (1986) argues that one of the 
keys to understanding perpetrators is a psychological process called 'doubling' where 
the self is divided into two separate wholes. This process may allow people to act in a 
manner that may not concur with their moral values. It is in some ways a kind of 
psychological survival, allowing an avoidance of guilt by a transfer of conscience to 
the other self. Lifton (1986) applied the concept of doubling to the Nazi doctors, 
whom he interviewed, concluding that doctors may Generally be more prone to this 
phenomenon than others. Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo, (2002) add weight 
to this hypothesis in their analysis of Brazilian torturers, suggesting perpetrators 
linguistically divided themselves into personal and business sides. 
2.2 Situationism 
The situationist approach emphasises the powerful influence of a person's 
environment rather than personal dispositions on an individual's behaviour. Much 
positivist research has followed in the line of the situationist approach. Nisbett & Ross 
(1980) have demonstrated that in many instances we tend to attribute behaviour to 
personal characteristics rather than situational effects, termed the 'fundamental 
attribution error.' In terms of political atrocity, many people have argued that the 
importance of situational factors is downplayed when attempting to understand state-
supportive political violence. It is to these situational factors that I will now tum. 
2.2.1 Obedience to Authority 
Milgram (1963, 1974) created huge controversy when he conducted experiments that 
suggested the power of obedience to authority by measuring how far a subject would 
go before refusing to obey an experimenter's instructions. A 'leamer' who happened 
to be a stooge was strapped to a chair with electrodes at his wrist in another room, 
whilst the subject became the 'teacher.' The subject was told to shock the learner 
every time the learner made a mistake with word pairs at increasingly large voltage 
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levels. On average, around 65% of subjects vvould proceed to the last shock despite 
the learner showing immense signs of distress. There were many permutations and 
variations of the experiment, which I will not go into in this thesis, mainly because 
they are not all relevant to the topic in question. However, for a detailed review of 
these experiments and criticisms on methodology and ethics, see Miller (1986) and 
Blass (2000). It is worth noting that studies conducted all over the world have yielded 
the same results (Blass, 2000) showing the universality of obedience to authority. 
Milgram (1974) likened the laboratory effects of obedience to authority to that of 
obedience in the Nazi regime, proposing that when people see themselves as carrying 
out orders and therefore no longer being responsible for their actions, a 'critical shift 
of viewpoint' has occurred. Moreover Milgram (1974) argues that the power of the 
experimenter would be less than that of for example, a General in a real life situation. 
Milgram (1974) also proposes that, as with the pursuit of ideologies in real life 
political conflict, the subjects believe that they are engaging in a good cause for 
society, in his experiments this being the pursuit of scientific truth. 
Why do we have this need to obey? Milgram explains this from an evolutionary 
perspective. Social organization is helpful to survival, and through defining our 
positions in a hierarchy, conflict is minimalised. We therefore have an instinct to 
obey. An 'agentic shift' occurs when a person no longer sees himself as acting for 
self-directed reasons, but rather as an agent performing the wishes of another. Gilbert 
(1981) has proposed that pertinent to Milgram's (1974) experiment is the "foot in the 
door phenomenon". In other words, once a subject has agreed to a trivial request they 
are more likely to comply with further requests at a later stage. Why is this? Gilbert 
(1981) has argued that there is a change in self-perception as a result of initial small-
scale behaviour. Compliance is then likely because self-perception has changed to fit 
with the action. In other words, the subjects get caught up in the precedents they have 
previously set for themselves before they realise the impact of their actions. This can 
make it harder to quit the experiment. This indeed may be the case in political 
situations. Sabini & Silver (1980) have also argued that by denying the moral 
legitimacy of the step the subject is about to take is to deny the moral legitimacy of 
the step the subject has just taken, thereby undermining the subject's position. They 
furthermore apply this idea to Nazi perpetrators. 
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These experiments have been met with accusations that they cannot be applied to 
reality. However, Miller (1986) has maintained that the emotional strain experienced 
by subjects in Milgrams' (1974) experiments demonstrate the realism of the 
experiments. Obedience to authority may therefore not just be a laboratory 
phenomenon but something that can be related to the perpetrators of state-supportive 
atrocities. Yet whilst obedience to authority may be an antecedent condition to 
inciting state-supportive violence or a factor that maintains it, but not a sufficient 
factor in itself for a person to commit gross human rights violations (Haritos-
Fatouros, 2003). 
2.2.2 Conformity 
Following from the influences of Milgram (1974) and Solomon Asch (1952), the 
Stanford Prison Experiment outlined not so much how people comply with demands 
by an unjust authority but how conformity can play a central role in influencing 
violent atrocities (Zimbardo, Maslach and Haney, 2000). In an experiment lasting 6 
days and nights (originally planned to last two weeks) subjects were randomly divided 
into mock prisoners and mock guards, with the guards being told to maintain law and 
order and to use their clubs as symbolic weapons only. Guards were allowed to select 
their own uniforms from shops, but they had to be identical. There was no General 
authority, but rather a remote presence. Unlike Milgram"s (1974) experiments, 
however, the set-up of the experiment itself allowed the victims to be degraded 
(Sabini & Silver, 1980). By the second day, there was a protest against the rules and 
restraints were imposed on prisoners who tried to individuate themselves by ripping 
off their prisoner numbers or who made fun of the guards. Over the next few days, the 
guards increased coercive and aggressive tactics, humiliated and dehumanised the 
prisoners and only refrained after advice from the research team. Things got so severe 
that the study was stopped prior to the planned date. 
Zimbardo et al (2000) draw several conclusions from this experiment. Firstly, the 
situational effect is most extreme in novel situations with no previous guidelines to 
follow and therefore personality variables have little predictive use. Ambiguity of role 
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boundaries also makes these effects more salient. Through role-playing, private 
attitudes are altered to fit with the role played (dissonance theory). Zimbardo (2004) 
expanded this theory claiming that ideology, and the 'foot-in-the-door' phenomenon 
are necessities that induce changes in behaviour. All these previously mentioned 
factors, according to Zimbardo (2004) can turn most people into perpetrators of 
political violence, particularly state-agents. 
Browning (1992) outlines the pressure of conformity in a real life situation faced by 
Reserve Police Battalion 101. His historical examination of a historical incident in 
Poland showed that only 12 out of 500 men responded to a General's offer to step 
forward and refuse to take part in the mass murder to come. Why was this number so 
small? Browning (1992) explains this by the suddenness of the decision and answer, 
but also by the pressure to conform. Browning (1992) states how uniforms served to 
give the men the feeling of camaraderie. Some of the soldiers did not want to admit 
that they were too weak or too cowardly to commit such atrocities. 
Why do people conform? There are two reasons suggested by research (Foster et aI, 
2005). The first of these is ambiguity over information (informational influence) so 
that a group norm provides information or validation of the person's response and the 
second is to gain approval from others (normative influence) due to the fact that 
people want to maintain a positive self-image (Foster, 1991). Sabini & Silver (1980) 
concur with the relevance of informational influence, drawing on an experiment by 
Sherif (1935) where the ambiguity of a light movement was greatly affected by 
others' judgements. They liken this to situations in the Holocaust, where the absence 
of' good guards' to emulate meant that there was an absence of group norms in terms 
of right and wrong and enforced regulations. Thus conformity appears to be a relevant 
factor in understanding the motives and perspectives of perpetrators involved in state-
supportive violence. It cannot, however, explain acts of political violence initiated by 
individuals in the absence of group support. 
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2.3 Dispositional Approaches 
The situationist view has its merits and may suggest some influences for perpetrators 
in their propensity towards political violence. Ho\vever, whilst it is vital to understand 
the role of the lower status perpetrators, what about the people who gave the orders 
and were at the top of the hierarchy? Furthermore, situational factors may not explain 
all behaviours demonstrated by perpetrators of state-supportive political atrocities, 
such as initiating killings, and individual dispositions may be wrongly neglected 
(Berkowitz, 1999). The situationist approach to understanding perpetrators produced 
some notable critics (e.g. Goldhagen, 1996). 
Steiner (1980) has outlined the concept of a 'sleeper,' a violence-prone individual 
whose personal characteristics lie dormant until activated by certain circumstances or 
events. Steiner (1980), in light of interviews with SS members suggests that there is a 
self-selection process that operates with state-agents, whereby individuals choose 
their careers due to enjoyment of military roles, economic reasons, identification with 
the ideology or the desire to become a soldier. Many also had few alternatives. Katz 
(1993) has agreed with this perspective going on to describe how many SS officers 
were notorious for their individual methods of cruelty. 
It is therefore worth questioning, given that some people play more of an active role 
in the perpetration of atrocities, what factors make the decision to harm another 
possible? Some scholars have attempted to explain violence as a result of aggression. 
But it has long been refuted that there is a biologically determined force that produces 
aggressive behaviour (Haritos-Fatouros, 2003). 
2.3.1. The Authoritarian Personality 
The idea of the authoritarian personality, a potentially fascist individual and someone 
likely to be involved in political violence, was put forward by Adorno, Brunswick, 
Levinson & Sanford (1950). Suggesting that people differed in their susceptibility to 
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antidemocratic propaganda, and therefore their personalities (personalities being a 
person's readiness for response), Adorno et al (1950) compiled various scales for 
measuring different kinds of personality. An analysis of these scales produced the F-
scale, a measure of Fascism. It was argued that an authoritarian would feel aggression 
towards out groups as he/she is not able to vent frustration with in groups. 
Authoritarians are also more prone to obeying orders. 
This study was highly influential and much research on the notion of prejudice has 
followed. However, many studies have been highly critical of Adorno et als' (1950) 
methodology, such as the study ignoring authoritarians on the Left, and the scale 
being biased towards responding positively (Staub, 1989). Haritos-Fatouros (2003) 
has also argued that men showing elements of a pre-Fascist identity were in fact the 
men who failed to be selected as regular torturers as they did not have enough self-
control. Nevertheless, the concept of an authoritarian personality still continues to be 
debated. In independent research, Dicks (1972) also created an F -scale, finding that 
the dispositions of German soldiers in his study produced high F -scores. Duckitt 
(1992: 193-215) provides an extensive review of the literature following from Adorno 
et al (1950) and furthermore has conducted more methodologically sound research in 
South Africa in order to ascertain whether individual attributes or social processes 
playa larger role in the formation of prejudice. Duckitt (1992:246) found that social 
and individual factors are complementary rather than interactive and that both are 
equally important in the determination of prejudice. 
Whilst there still may be elements of personality which increase the likelihood that 
someone will be aggressive, and differences in the way people respond to authority 
(Staub, 1989), it is unlikely that there is a Fascist personality as such. There is often a 
big difference in the way that people think, and what they actually do. Furthermore, it 
appears from recent research that both individual dispositions and social factors playa 
role in creating prejudice. 
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2.3.2 Virulent Ideology 
Goldhagen (1996) has argued that situational perspectives cannot account for a 
variety of behaviours that were demonstrated in Nazi Germany, such as excessive 
torture and individually initiated killings. For Goldhagen (1996: 1 06) anti-Semitism 
"more or less governed the ideational life of civil society" and Nazi perpetrators were 
wilful actors, who consciously chose to act in a manner complementing pre-existing 
values and beliefs. Ideology has not only been a predominant factor in Germany. It 
played a large role in apartheid South Africa (Foster, Haupt & de Beer, 2005), 
Rwanda (Staub, 2003) and many other countries engaged in political violence. Yet as 
a cause in itself in inciting political violence, ideology is necessary but not sufficient 
and it has been argued that Goldhagen's theory is oversimplistic and monocausal 
(Hinton, 1998). 
Furthermore, Dicks (1972) has pointed out that it was not only Jews that were 
subjected to gross violations of human rights but other minority groups as well, 
suggesting Anti-Semitism was not the sole cause of Nazi abuses. Arendt (1977) has 
also portrayed Eichmann as someone who was not initially interested in ideology-he 
had never read Mein Kampf, nor did he know the Nazi party ideology when he 
became a member. 
2.3.3 "Needs as the Roots of Evil: The Violence Prone Individual 
Staub (2003, 1989) has suggested that although there are Genetic predispositions 
toward aggression, these dispositions shaped by socialization and culture to create 
actual dispositions. For Staub (1989), the anti-social, violence-prone individual has 
certain characteristics including an anti-social value orientation, where harming others 
becomes a value in itself, aggressive behaviours learnt from childhood, an inclination 
to obey authority as a result of one's upbringing, a lack of self-a\vareness, an attitude 
that morals are inapplicable to outside groups and a shaky self image. As we will see 
later, it is in fact a positive self-image that has the potential for violence, so Staub 
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(1989) may not be correct in his thesis. Staub (2003) argues that circumstances are an 
insufficient explanation of aggression; we need to also consider cultural influences as 
they may determine how difficult life conditions are fulfilled by reacting to outgroups. 
Not only this, but Staub also has proposed that aggression can be a habitual way of 
behaving. Staub (1989) argues that a monolithic culture hinders moral development. 
According to Staub (1989) there are a variety of human needs make us more prone to 
violence if we feel they are threatened. These needs are only a starting point, but do 
make certain actions more likely. Whilst his approach is General, and relates to all 
kinds of violence, he does link this to political violence conducted by agents of the 
State, particularly in Rwanda. The first of these needs is security, and involves feeling 
free from harm and able to obtain food. It also applies to other things than enable us to 
survive. The fact that we have 'flight or fight' responses, according to Staub (1989) is 
evidence for this. The second need is for effectiveness and control, believing that we 
can lead purposeful lives and achieve what we wish to do. The third need is to have a 
positive identity, and the fourth to have a positive connection and to belong. The final 
need is a comprehension of reality, the understanding of which then shapes our 
interaction with the world. On top of these fundamental needs, Staub (2003, 1989) 
also argues that we have a need for autonomy or identity, transcendence of the self, 
and a need for long-term satisfaction. These needs can coexist together and are not 
hierarchical, but may also be in opposition. 
Staub (2003, 1989) argues that difficult life conditions, such as economic and social 
problems, may mean that these needs are not fulfilled. Individuals may react by 
blaming an outgroup for their problems, and by agreeing with ideologies that may 
outline what they desire. By feeling that one's group has been victimised, and by 
devaluing other groups, political violence may be more likely. Baumeister (1997) has 
also proposed that violence may originate from a frustration of basic needs, and in this 
way violence is simply a means to an end. 
How can this apply to top-down perpetrators? It can be argued that after World War I, 
the Germans had undergone a huge recession and were suffering from a negative self-
image. They felt threatened by the Jews and decided to take action. In South Africa, 
the Afrikaners may have also felt threatened by the other. But is this enough to kill? 
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There is huge poverty all over the world, yet not everyone who has difficult life 
conditions commits atrocities. Staub (2003) proposes that such actions are much more 
likely depending on the wayan individual was raised. If a child has been brought up 
suffering from neglect or abusively, they may begin to believe that aggression will 
fulfil their needs. They are also more likely to interpret another's behaviour as hostile. 
Staub's (2003, 1989) theory therefore has considerable weight in contributing to our 
understanding of the psychological factors influencing political violence, but it can be 
argued that the theory, whilst linked by Staub (2003) to all forms of violence may 
really be more applicable to bottom-up theories of political violence than those that 
are top-down. 
2.4 Perspectives of Victim and Perpetrator 
2.4.1 The Alagnitude Gap 
Moving towards a relational approach is the concept of Baumeister's (1997) 
magnitude gap. Baumeister (1997) states that evil is subjective and that most 
perpetrators do not see that what they are doing is wrong. He points out that if soldiers 
were too concerned with morality and human sympathy, it would be too stressful for 
them to carry out their duties. Indeed, many accounts of perpetrators have outlined 
hmv sensitive perpetrators often suffer from many symptoms of stress, including 
nightmares, anxiety attacks and guilt (Baumeister, 1997, Foster et aI, 2005). 
Baumeister talks of a 'magnitude gap' where what takes place is of more importance 
to the victim than the perpetrator. The perpetrator may often have less emotion about 
their acts, considering it a small thing. Whereas victims see things in black and white, 
perpetrators see a grey area, bracketed in time. It is in this way that perpetrators may 
see their acts as almost inconsequential, and may feel less responsibility as a result. 
The memory of their actions lasts a short while, whilst for the victims the trauma they 
have experienced may remain an indelible print on their memories. 
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2.4.2 jI,;foral Disengagement 
Moving on from this concept, there appear to be a variety of mechanisms that enable 
perpetrators of political violence to see their actions as lesser evils. Bandura (1999) 
argues that through socialization, people learn moral standards that they use as self-
regulatory guides to modify their conduct and achieve a sense of self worth. Yet these 
self-regulating mechanisms need to be activated, and there are a number of ways to 
ensure that these processes do not come into play. The first of these is moral 
justification, where people undergo a cognitive reconstruction of the behaviour and 
see themselves as fighting against the oppressed and protecting themselves. Such 
justifications have been documented by Huggins et al (2002) in the case of Brazilian 
torturers. 
The second mechanism for moral disengagement is that of euphemistic labelling. 
Language can 'sanitize' actions and detract from one's sense of responsibility. For 
example the killing of civilians may be seen as 'collateral damage,' or soldiers 'take 
someone out' rather than kill them. This kind of language hides the atrocity of the 
action by changing thought patterns. Baumeister (1997) explains how language can be 
a smoke screen allowing perpetrators to conceal their guilt. By using passive terms, a 
perpetrator can avoid responsibility and may find it easier to address the problem. 
A third mechanism, according to Bandura (1999) is that of advantageous comparison. 
Comparing one's behaviour to others (such as state-agents seeing themselves as 
martyrs compared with the perceived oppression inflicted by others upon them) takes 
on a utilitarian outlook - that an individual's actions are better than the potential threat 
of others. Such a mechanism, as with the previous two mentioned, are particularly 
dangerous as they allow people to feel proud of their actions. This pride is made 
apparent by Arendt (1977) who makes the point that despite evidence of the Nazi 
atrocities being published years before the Nuremberg Trials, most of the 'Eichmann 
Commando' did not feel that they needed to live under an assumed name. 
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Bandura (1999) also outlines various other mechanisms such as displacement of 
responsibility by justifications such as "I was only following orders" and diffusion of 
responsibility through a division of labour, as I have discussed previously. Kelman 
(1989: 16) terms the displacement of following orders as authorization, whereby when 
violent acts are "explicitly ordered, implicitly encouraged, tacitly approved, or at least 
permitted by legitimate authorities, people's readiness to commit or condone them is 
enhanced." Kelman (1989) argues that because these acts are authorized there seems 
to be automatic justification for them." Kelman also uses the term routinization where 
people have agreed to an action and reduce their moral qualms by making the action 
routine, mechanical, and highly programmed. Furthermore, Duntley & Bass (2004) 
have argued that in order to be free of guilt, people attend to details rather than the 
broader context - what they refer to as 'low-level thinking.' 
The final act of moral disengagement is that of dehumanisation. By stripping people 
of their human qualities, people may be seen as sub-human. Even in the laboratory 
people may devalue others. Milgram (1974) outlined how subjects often devalued the 
subject when shocking him. "He was so stupid and stubborn he deserved to get 
shocked" were common comments. In real life we see many examples of outgroups 
being devalued. Upon questioning Stangle, one of the men who set up the 
concentration camps, Sereny (1974:101) asked what the point of the humiliation and 
cruelty was. Stangle's response confirms this aspect of moral disengagement by 
answering that it was "To condition those who actually had to carry out the policies. 
To make it possible for them to do what they did." He also described seeing the Jews 
as cargo. In many accounts of Nazi Germany, Jews were portrayed as "dirty', and 
African colonial discourses often refer to natives as 'savages' and so on. All serve to 
dehumanise victims of political atrocity. An analysis of Captain Paul Grueninger, a 
chief of police in Nazi Germany who saved refugees, shows the strength of 
humanization. Rochat & Modigliani (2000) describe how by regularly visiting the 
Swiss border and meeting refugees face to face, Grueninger may have had too many 
visual cues to dehumanise victims, and therefore felt great empathy towards them. 
Moral disengagement thus provides many clues as to hovv perpetrators of political 
violence ease their consciences. 
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In order to understand perpetrators' actions it is useful to understand the different 
perspectives of victim and perpetrator. This also makes way for a relational approach 
since this approach considers 'the constellation ofrelations between persons, groups, 
ideologies and juxtaposed positionings which eventually emanate in the 'toxic mix' 
(Foster et ai, 2005:66). 
2.5 Narrative Approaches 
Situational and dispositional accounts have Generally stemmed from positivist 
interpretations. However, narrative accounts are slowly becoming the predominant 
way of understanding how people become perpetrators of political violence. Whilst 
these accounts acknowledge that such methods do not enable an explanation of this 
violence, they can achieve an understanding. Narrative interviews have been 
conducted in many countries around the world. Gitta Sereny (1974:9-10) spent 70 
hours talking to Franz Stangle, commandant of an extermination camp in Nazi 
Germany feeling it essential to evaluate his background, childhood and adult 
motivations 'as he saVl' them, rather than as we wished or prejudiced them to be.' 
Rosenberg (1992) extended this approach to an examination of perpetrators of South 
America, including Columbia, Peru, and Argentina and by spending time with these 
people, came to conclusions about how the different contexts in South America 
contributed to different forms of violence, whether it ,vas political, or merely 
criminal. Schirmer (1998) interviewed members from the Guatemalan military in 
order to better understand the transitional process occurring there and the hindrances 
to democratisation. Yet this research cannot be related to the context of South Africa 
without difficulty for a variety of reasons. South Africa's history and the whole 
context leading up to apartheid is different to any other place in the world and these 
socio-historical situations have led to some actions being considered more legitimate 
than others and to different organisational factors that may play a role in the 
propensity towards violence. 
It is therefore useful that other research has examined the South African context. A 
book by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) focussed on her experience of 
interviewing EuGene de Kock, commanding officer of South Africa's death squads, 
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and dealt with her personal issues of forgiveness and trauma. EuGene de Kock (1998) 
has even written his own autobiography, A Long Night's Damage into Day, with a 
foreword by Jeremy Gordin. Gordin (1998, p.302) comes to the conclusion that 'De 
Kock was a product of the system in which he grew up.' He acknowledges that 
distinguishing between environmental influence and personal responsibility are 
complex, but this is as far as he goes. Jacques Pauw (1997) has produced a somewhat 
sensationalist book titled Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's 
Assassins. However, he does not try to analyse these perpetrators of political violence 
from a psychological perspective. 
Of utmost relevance to this project is Theatre of Violence by Foster, Haupt & de Beer 
(2005). Their relational approach has several advantages. Whilst placing a larger 
emphasis on agency than situational models, which are too passive in explanation, 
political violence is understood as multi-sided and does not seek to explain actions 
through the dispositions of the perpetrator alone, but rather through the relations 
between people, groups and ideologies. Ideologies not only place people in specific 
positions, but also shape the way that both victims and perpetrators see themselves. 
Feldman (1991: 1) has suggested that political violence is 'predicated on self-
reflexive, interpretive framings of power which are embedded not only in language 
but in relational sequences of action.' I will now examine Foster et al's (2005) model 
in more detail. 
2.5.1 Entitlement 
Central to Foster et aI's (2005) model is the notion of entitlement. Whilst agreeing 
that perpetrators are ordinary in that they are not psychopaths, Foster et al (2005) 
argue that people become 'other than ordinary' (p.68) through a feeling of 
entitlement. Entitlement comes from the belief that one is deserving. It is relational in 
that it requires of the other respect and acceptance of the person' s rights. Yet there is a 
difference between healthy and exaggerated entitlement. Entitlement becomes 
exaggerated when people also possess a sense of superiority (demonstrated by an 
expectance for a right over others' bodies or spatial freedoms) and show very little, or 
selective empathy towards others (Foster et aI, 2005:69). Entitlement is in some way 
an identity, and further provoked by ideologies. In the narratives analysed by the 
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authors, entitlement is demonstrated by a sense of frustration and a comparison to 
others. It may even involve a 'touch of buried shame' (Foster et aI, 2005 :278). More 
subtle elements of entitlement include demonstrations of pride and enjoyment in one's 
work. Foster et al (2005:70) also apply this notion of entitlement to oppressed people 
as a 'sense of righteous demands for equality' due to inequalities in power, status and 
resources. 
Adding weight to the concept of entitlement are studies conducted by Baumeister 
(2004, 1997), which demonstrate on the basis of much evidence that, contrary to long-
held views, it is not those with low self-esteem that are prone to violence, but rather 
those with high self-esteem. Egotism and revenge are therefore some of the elements 
contributing to political violence because one's pride has been threatened. Moreover, 
empirical research by Kernis, Granneman & Barclay (1989) has suggested that it is in 
fact the instability of a person's self-esteem that is conducive to violence. 
Nevertheless, this experiment did not induce anger but only measured anger ln 
GeneraL which may have convoluted the results. 
Bushman & Baumeister (1998) take this notion of entitlement further. They 
investigated the effects of narcissism on aggression where narcissism is 'less a matter 
of having a firm conviction about one's overall goodness (which is self-esteem in a 
literal sense) than a matter of being emotionally invested in establishing one's 
superiority. (p.220)' They found that, rather than self-esteem being a predictor of 
experimentally induced aggression, narcissists demonstrated aggression towards those 
who threatened their egos. Aggression was not directed towards those who praised 
them, showing narcissists' selectivity in aggression. In relation to political violence, 
this may be similar to Foster et aI's (2005) description of entitlement, and moreover, 
may provide some experimental evidence for the violent effects of conspiracy 
mentalities, which I will discuss later. 
How does entitlement apply to groups? Foster et al (2005) draw on Tajfel's (1981) 
Social Identity Theory, which posits that superior groups, if unthreatened produce no 
aggression towards others, but if their status is challenged, they find new 
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justifications, such as ideology, for increased repression against the outgroup. Foster 
et al (2005) extend this theory to account for oppressed people too, yet for the 
purposes of this thesis will the focus remains on state-agents. 
2.5.2 Afultiple Subjectivities 
Foster et al (2005) have proposed that the second core construct of their relational 
model for explaining political violence is the interlocking of multiple subjectivities. In 
other words, some aspects of our selves become more salient in certain situations and 
when certain combinations of different types of identity connect, there is a 'potent 
mix' (p.70), which makes the probability of violence higher. For example, a 
policeman may have violent tendencies, which only become apparent when he/she is 
allowed to use force. If they instead had become a restaurant owner for example these 
violent tendencies may not become obvious. 
The most significant processes that interact here are ideology, the construction of 
identity and the construction of the other. For Foster et al (2005), ideology creates 
different kinds of domination, principally through language, which shapes a person's 
view on what is good or bad. Language not only creates an identity, but furthermore 
modifies the way we see others. Language also enables people to feel that they are not 
the agents of their crimes (Bandura, 1999) and serves as a bonding factor (Haritos-
Fatouros, 2003). The construction of one's identity through ideology can be an active 
process, allowing people to take up subjectivities that they relate to. However, 
ideology also allows people to view others in a negative light who might be seen as 
threats. Nevertheless, in this model described by Foster et al (2005) it is not just any 
ideology, but a dangerous combination of some ideologies that create the potential for 
political violence. For example a mix of Christian Nationalism, racism and 
masculinity may produce a potentially violent male. It is worth noting that this 
construct of multiple subjectivities can apply to any form of discourse including that 
of liberation movements. These counter-discourses are, however, not the focus of this 
paper. 
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2.5.3 Special Organisations 
Some perpetrators do not have a strong ideology so how can their motives and 
perspectives of political atrocities be accounted for? Special organisations appear to 
playa role in the perpetration of atrocities, especially those involved in political 
violence and can explain the more immediate influences on political violence. Foster 
et al (2005) claim that there are three reasons for this. Firstly, secrecy is highly 
conducive to political violence, secondly that the people who are highly involved in 
such organizations are a particular type of person, and thirdly that these organisations 
promote a climate of secrecy. 
Haritos-Fatouros (2003) and Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo (2002) have 
done extensive studies on Greek and Brazilian torturers and have outlined how these 
groups of people are split into specialised autonomous groups that keep them split off 
from the rest of the world. They even begin to produce specialized language forms 
relating to their activities. Huggins et al (2002) claim that the relationships formed 
between torturers compelled them to feel that secrets must be heavily guarded, and 
through being rewarded these men came to feel that they were in unique groups where 
no one else could appreciate what they were doing. They lived in separate moral 
universes where victims were blamed for their actions, and the torturers believed they 
were fighting a just cause, or merely being professional. In other words, these state 
organizations allowed a more extreme form of moral disengagement. 
Not only do certain types of people get involved in secret organizations, but the 
culture promoted by these organizations can also change the way that people view 
their actions and how they behave. Ainsworth (1995) has described initiation 
ceremonies in police training that seek to remove the oversensitive recruit and 
Huggins et al (2002) have also outlined the way that Brazilian recruits were degraded 
and dehumanised at initiation ceremonies. They were called 'beasts' by the older 
policemen and given a number and a war name. This served to bolster the group 
mentality and desensitise the new recruits. Foster et als' (2005) police narratives all 
demonstrated pride in connection with an organisation. For example, Foster et al 
(2005:285) note how state security discourses used the term ·professional' to describe 
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their \-vork. The narratives also emphasised the legitimating role of these organisations 
by referring to organisational aims, which they claim shaped their actions. 
Masculinity has often been neglected by scholars studying political violence, yet in 
the majority of reports on political atrocities, acts have mainly been committed by 
men (Foster et aI, 2005; Baumeister, 1997). The studies that do approach the topic of 
masculinity Generally acknowledge that it is a factor however. (An exception is 
Goldblatt & Meintjes (1998) who claim that women perpetrators are so because 
society has taught them that cruelty is necessary.) Theweleit (1987) has suggested that 
it was masculinity that was a major factor in the Freikorps in Germany. Staub (2003) 
also suggests that, historically, men have tended to be strong, tough and powerful, but 
life conditions can make it hard to fulfil these roles thus contributing to violence. In 
South Africa conscription into the army may have been a factor. 
The most major analyses of masculinity in relation to political violence are those by 
Huggins et al (2002) and Haritos-Fatouros (2003). Huggins et al (2002) have argued 
that notions of Western patriarchy encourage men to dominate some men and all 
women. The men involved in these Brazilian organisations are taught to require 
respect, be competitive and degrade others, which makes the threshold for instigating 
violence lower. Huggins et al (2002) came up with three kinds of masculinity 
prevalent in the organizations involved in Brazilian torture. 
People with a "personalistic masculinity" believe that they are improving society and 
blame the victims for their actions. They demand respect, are proud of their work and 
frequently make references to being their own boss. Another kind of masculinity, 
"bureaucratizing masculinity", is reflected in people who describe themselves as part 
of a larger system where their masculinity is linked to the security system and the 
state. In their minds, the system is responsible for making sure that violence is not 
excessive, and teamwork is more important than personal attributes. The third type of 
masculinity is "blended masculinity" where people alternate between showing 
elements of "personalistic masculinity" when not talking about work and 
"bureaucratizing masculinity" when discussing tasks required by the organization. 
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Ains\vorth (1995) has put forward the notion that attitudes like toughness and lack of 
feeling are encouraged by male dominated cultures involved in police organisations, 
which may promote the likelihood of violence. Foster et al (2005) also have remarked 
on the emphasis placed on masculinity in the police narratives they collected, such as 
references to male bonding, patriarchal images and control. It seems therefore, that 
masculinity is a factor that cannot be ignored when it comes to understanding the 
motives and perspectives of perpetrators involved in political violence. However, 
Foster et al (2005) stress that masculinity is not a personality trait in itself, but 
something that men strive towards, particularly in certain organisations. 
2.5. -I Sequences 
A final element of Foster et aI's (2005) model is the way that events evolve in small 
steps, in both macro and micro levels. Toch (1996) has argued with reference to 
police organisations that a person is more likely to use political violence once they 
have already committed an act of violence. Previously discussed was the notion of the 
"foot-in-the-door phenomenon' and many scholars have concurred with this notion 
when examining perpetrators. 
Whatever the processes are that enable the continuation of political violence, it is vital 
to remember that the time process involved in the sequences of political violence is 
not linear (Foster et aI, 2005) but rather a spiral of events-reactions by the other, such 
as protests, result in responses to these actions. Foster & Skinner (1990) thus refer to 
these cycles of revenge as a 'dialogue of violence.' Of particular importance, noted 
by Foster et al (2005) is how conspiracy mentalities can severely increase the 
likelihood of violence. A belief that an oppressed group of people is trying to 
overthrow the government, allows those involved in state-supportive violence to feel 
particularly justified in their actions. In South Africa, this was especially noticeable. 
In an interview with one of the main perpetrators working for Koevoet, Alan Cowell 
(2005) reports that the perpetrator stated "My motivation was that we, the security 
forces, were REACTING to a communist and a terrorist threat, and not that THEY 
were reacting to an unfair political dispensation." Again, this ties in with the notion of 
entitlement. 
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2.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has examined the way in which preVIOUS academic research has 
enhanced our understanding of perpetrators. As described above, neither situational 
nor dispositional accounts are satisfactory in accounting for the factors affecting the 
propensity towards political violence. Situationist views cannot explain people nearer 
the top of the hierarchy who actually give the orders. Furthermore this approach is 
insufficient in explaining certain behaviours such as initiated killings. Dispositional 
accounts, on the other hand, tend too be too simplistic and neglect any element of 
situationism. 
Some authors have focussed on the perspectives of victim and perpetrator and have 
sho\vn not only how both perspectives differ, but also how perpetrators can be 
disengaged from their actions through a variety of mechanisms. This allows them to 
see their actions as less significant. This makes way for the new relational approach 
adopted by Foster et al (2005). 
A large proportion of this afore-mentioned research comes from a positivist line of 
thought. Yet narrative approaches are increasingly becoming another way to examine 
the psychological factors that may affect the propensity towards political violence. 
These accounts cannot explain political violence, but they can allow a glimpse of 
understanding as to the intentions and motivations of the perpetrator of political 
violence. Many of these studies however cannot be related to the South African 
context, as the socio-historical context can greatly shape behaviours. On the other 
hand a few narrative accounts have been recorded in South Africa. Of most relevance 
to this topic is Theatre of Violence where Foster et al (2005) have collected several 
narratives from perpetrators on all sides of the political divide. Through analysis of 
these accounts these authors created a model that has several advantages over 
previous accounts. A larger emphasis on agency counters the passivity of situationist 
accounts, yet the relational emphasis allows a multi-sided understanding of political 
violence. 
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Nevertheless, the accounts collected were at the time of the TRC before certain 
amnesties were granted. There were also only a few accounts, with only two police 
narratives. By and large, the amnesty process is now over and perpetrators may feel 
more secure in telling their stories. They may also have had time to reflect on their 
actions. Therefore this thesis seeks to add to these narrative accounts by providing a 
case study of an ex-Security Branch policeman whose narrative comes in 2006, many 
years after the whole TRC process. The next chapter will detail the methodology 
involved in this case study. The case study will partly be analysed with reference to 
the model set out by Foster et al (2005). 
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3.1 General Methodology 
Chapter 3 
Methodologv 
As previously mentioned, this mini-thesis approaches the topic from an 
interpretive/constructionist angle, drawing on several texts. The previous section of 
this thesis looked at more General understandings of perpetrators as cited in the 
academic literature. The analysis of this thesis will draw on some of this literature, 
namely Foster, Haupt & de Beers' (2005) relational approach but it is also necessary 
to consider specific representations of Paul from various perspectives other than 
academic understandings. 
The first perspective that I will analyse is that of the media. I will look at the way in 
which Paul has been portrayed and whether his actions have been justified or 
condoned. Unlike the majority of perpetrators in South Africa, Paul was frequently in 
the media at the time of the transition and did a series of expos with the Mail and 
Guardian. All of these texts will be used to examine whether othering discourses were 
used that allowed the public to distance themselves from Paurs actions or whether 
Paul's actions were simply shown as acceptable given the context of apartheid. 
I 'ivill also examme how Paul is portrayed in any other published material. 
Unfortunately a series made by Max du Preez and containing interviews with Paul has 
proved to be difficult to get hold of and thus cannot be used in the analysis. I will 
however be using David Goodman's (1999) book Fault Lines that devotes a chapter 
to Paul based on an interview he conducted with him. I will analyse whether this 
chapter provides a useful understanding of Paul's motivations and intentions and what 
purpose the text serves. 
Another perspective will use the available transcripts of Paul's amnesty hearings and 
the details of his amnesty applications. This 'factual' or 'forensic' voice may provide 
some objective facts concerning Paul but due to the 'quasi-judicial' nature of the 
amnesty hearings the bulk of information will relate to the facts of one specific 
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incident, the bombing of the Alexandra Health Clinic, rather than providing a full 
understanding of Paul's motivations and intentions for committing such an act. Some 
information may be gleaned however. The bombing of the Alexandra Health Clinic 
was one of many incidents for which Paul applied for amnesty but is the only incident 
for which a transcript is readily available. 
Most importantly, the final perspective that I will consider is that of Paul in the 
present day (i.e. the interview that was conducted and the events leading up to the 
interview). This will be the predominant but not the only focus of my analysis. 
Critical analysis of these different perspectives will allow a more complex and 
unbiased examination of the complexities of political violence. I will detail the 
methodology of the interview and the context of the interview below. I will then detail 
the methodology of the discourse analysis that will be used in the next chapter. 
3.2 Methodologv of the Interview 
Because the intention of the interview was to gain as open and self-Generated a 
narrative as possible, ranging from childhood to the present day, a list of questions 
was devised spanning several General areas. These questions are not necessary, but 
acted as prompts during the interview towards certain areas, or kept the momentum of 
the interview going. 
These General areas included: 
• life history (such as early years, adolescence, career choices, important life 
events, present day) 
• questions steering towards issues of personal and group identity, dynamics of 
the police force, violent acts and intentions/motivations for this, the role of 
superiors and the effect of their actions (i.e. psychological functioning) 
• the TRC process 
• Paul's view of justice, forgiveness and reconciliation. 
I got into contact with Paul Erasmus through my father, who was one of Paul's targets 
in the 1970s and 1980s. At the time of the TRC Paul came forward and through Paul's 
amnesty applications, my father came to learn of exactly what Paul had been doing. 
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The t\VO of them have reconciled and met for the first time in a documentary called 
Stopping the JI/usic. Since then they have kept in contact by travelling to Turkey 
amongst other places to talk about forgiveness. I had never met Paul, but emailed him, 
explaining who I was and arranged an interview on his fann in Blanco, just outside of 
George. 
The intervievv' lasted just under three hours and was audio-recorded and transcribed. 
Impressions of Paul and his fann were also recorded in a notebook. I cannot ignore 
how my identity affects the interviewing process and thus I note that my identity 
played out in three ways: as a white female South African, as my father's daughter 
and as a Masters student. The interview was conducted in English. 
Concerning the research ethics of the interview, the interview was consensual as was 
the audio recording. When Paul requested the recording to be stopped, I did so. Paul 
Erasmus has given me permission to use his real name rather than a pseudonym and 
should he want a copy of the interview and/or a copy of the thesis this will be 
provided. 
I personally transcribed the interview in a manner most appropriate to the analysis. 
Pauses in the transcript are denoted by full stops, italics represent a word that has been 
emphasised and laughing is written in brackets. I will detail the methodology of this 
discourse analysis in the forthcoming section. For nmv a quick word is required on 
morals as an interpretive/hermeneutical approach is 'concerned with morality, arguing 
that "'what is' and what 'should be' are closely intertwined and cannot be artificially 
split" (Foster, Haupt & de Beer, 2005: 89). 
3.3 Morals 
There are two moral dilemmas that arise from this mini-thesis appropriate to the study 
of perpetrators. Whilst these dilemmas are not easily resolved, they are worth 
mentioning since they are moral issues that had to be grappled with for the purposes 
of this study. The first dilemma concerns the study of perpetrators in General whilst 
the second is specific to the interviewing of perpetrators of political violence. 
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The study of perpetrators is a contentious one. On the one hand an understanding of 
the underlying factors that contribute to political violence may help prevent the 
likelihood that people will commit these acts. The study of perpetrators themselves is 
the best way to do this. However, as noted by Foster et al (2005:89) such a focus may 
diminish attention to victims and allow an overly sympathetic reaction towards 
perpetrators. Many scholars have wrestled with this dilemma (see Browning, 1992: 
xx). Foster et al (2005:92) somewhat resolve this moral quandary by taking a 
relational approach. This model goes beyond binaries of victim and perpetrator and 
argues for both agency and structure hopefully allowing a critical viewpoint to be 
retained. A multi-perspectival approach also allows different angles to be examined 
without believing one perspective entirely. This is the approach this thesis takes. 
The second moral predicament concerns the interview process and the way in which 
researchers listen to perpetrator accounts. Critical self-examination by a researcher is 
necessary since the way in which information is gained is partly dependent on the 
exchange by interviewer and interviewee. Perpetrator accounts may therefore reflect 
an interviewer bias. Whilst there is no ethically definitive way of proceeding, it is 
worth examining the processes that may have played a role in the main interview 
considered in this thesis. 
Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo (2002: 45-62) argue that a perpetrator of 
political violence is a bearer of secrets. They identify four principal elements involved 
in the 'secrecy exchange' between interviewer and interviewee that relate to this 
thesis. The first element relates to initial security measures and the power that the 
interviewee holds. The demonstration of this power can take a variety of forms. The 
perpetrator may for example refuse to be interviewed at all, or may pick out other 
colleagues who they argue can reveal more. Whilst this did not occur with Paul 
Erasmus, there was a point when he asked for the tape recorder to be turned off and 
revealed information relating to his present day point of view. Furthermore, initially 
Paul invited his eighteen year old son, Dylan, to join us and engaged in social chat. It 
was only when Dylan left the room that darker secrets were revealed. 
The second element, espionage, relates to the way in which an intervie'vver attempts to 
find a way to exchange something for more information from the perpetrator. Because 
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money is not an option, other forms of 'symbolic capital' must be found (Huggins et 
aI, 2002: 55). One subtle way that is pointed out is to allow long digressions. 
Although these digressions seem to be moving away from important information they 
can. on the contrary, actually reveal a close proximity to the secret. When asked about 
interrogations for example Paul moved on to talking about the border, thus 
minimising his actions and creating a more acceptable context. He says 'Personally I 
could never torture ... not a white person you know. I s'pose the border was a different 
thing again. ' 
The third element involved in secrecy exchange is entrusted disclosure. Entrusted 
disclosure is most apparent at the beginning of the interview when ground rules and 
the contextualisation of the interview are established. Not only does the interviewer 
attempt to gain a useful background to the perpetrator accounts, but the interviewee 
also aims to set the terms of the interview. This then allows information to be revealed 
in a way that maintains the value of these secrets. Secrets are consequently not ever 
revealed as a whole, metaphors are used, violence is often legitimated and 
responsibility is denied. This will be apparent in the analysis of the interview. 
The final element involved in secrecy exchange is that of post hoc-security where the 
perpetrator attempts to involve the interviewer in such a way that the perpetrator is 
able to maintain a positive self-image. The way that information is neutralised can be 
through blame of higher-up officials or through by placing the interviewer in a 'helper 
role.' Paul constantly referred to his post-traumatic stress disorder and described 
reconciliation as a 'fantastic process' because of 'the mere fact that you are sitting in 
this house' considering the hatred he had for my father. 
Despite all the elements involved in secrecy exchange, it is still asserted that useful 
information was obtained in the interview and that this information can greatly 
enhance an understanding of the motivations and intentions for political violence. 
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3.4 Context of the Interview 
It is necessary to give a quick context of the narrative obtained in the interview with 
Paul. Firstly, the interview was conducted in the beginning of 2006. The TRe had 
officially ended many years prior but there was much talk during that time of the 
reopening of amnesty cases. Paul himself admitted that he was nervous of the 
reopening of amnesty cases with the possibility of prosecution. It is perhaps for this 
reason that Paul never gave full acknowledgment of his wrong-doings. In South 
Africa at this time the apartheid regime has been unquestionably discredited and 
placed firmly in the past. For this reason Paul may have been wary of showing strong 
support or approval of the previous regime. 
I met Paul at his farm in Blanco, just outside of George. His son, Dylan, who is 
currently 18 years old, greeted me as I pulled up. Paul took me into his living room 
and invited both me and his son to sit down. I wondered whether this was an attempt 
to gain sympathy from me, to show me that he was an ordinary person, or whether 
this was an opportunity to boast to his son over things he was proud of. It was clear 
that Dylan had heard these stories before which left me doubting Paul's remorse. 
However Dylan soon left us to talk alone. 
Paul was wearing a blue-collared shirt, shorts, flip-flops and had a cross around his 
neck. Apart from the long-hair and earrings Paul did not look out of the ordinary in 
any way. Pictures on the walls reflected farming achievements and family life. 
However a shotgun hung on the rack. I noticed a shrine sitting by one of the sofas 
with a prayer inscribed. It stated 'I expect to pass through life but once. If therefore, 
there can be any kindness I can allow or any good thing I can do to a fellow human 
being, let me do it now and do not defer or neglect, as I shall not pass this way again.' 
I found this somewhat ironic given Paul's history. The interview lasted approximately 
three hours. I will now detail some defining elements of discourse and describe the 
way in which the interview was analysed 
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3.5 Features of Discourse 
What do we know about discourse? Parker (1992:5) defines a discourse as a 'system 
of statements which constructs an object'. He asserts that there are certain features 
that all discourses contain. For my purposes it is useful to consider some of these 
features with respect to my analysis. Parker (1992:6) firstly states that discourse 
works through text. He defines a text as a delimited aspect of meaning in any form 
that can be interpreted in some way. Thus a text can be anything from a bus ticket to 
non-verbal behaviour. For my purposes the text I will be analysing contains primarily 
the transcription of the interview with Paul and events leading up to the interview, 
though I will also be using an interview conducted by David Goodman, transcripts 
from his amnesty applications and media representations at the time of the TRC to aid 
further analysis. 
Parker (1992:8-9) asserts that a discourse necessarily contains subjects and objects. It 
is recognized that 'a discourse makes available a space for particular selves to step in' 
(p.9) There are many subjects in the text that I will be examining, with Paul being one 
of them. There are of course other subjects in the text such as EuGene de Kock, his 
superiors, judges from the TRC and so on. As Paul broaches different topics 
throughout his narrative many selves become apparent. On the surface there is Paul as 
a remorseful being reflecting on his past. At other times his narrative becomes framed 
in extremely masculine institutionalised language, in particular that of police 
discourse. He uses, for example, phrases such a 'terr' to describe the enemy and it is 
interesting that although he comes from an English speaking background he often 
uses Afrikaans slang such as 'babalas' or 'skinner,.i He uses familial discourse when 
he talks about his ex-wife and son, religious discourse at a few points in time and also 
frames his thoughts in a discourse acceptable to the new South Africa. The main 
object that Paul is consistently referring to throughout the text is his life experience. 
Parker (1992: 1 0) also argues that discourse is a coherent system of meanings such 
that statements are regulated to constitute reality. In my analysis Paul tries to explain 
how he got embroiled in a violent career path as a consequence of the apartheid 
system at the time. His discourse moves from being called-up into the police force to 
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brainwashing propaganda to volunteering to go to the border because everyone else 
did. He often reflects on his discourse through various devices. He uses denial of his 
position for example "I'm not saying that I'm a good guy or something like that' and 
moves sometimes to extreme agonizing over how he never realized the implications 
of his actions in terms of morality. 
Parker (1992: 11) states that a discourse is historically located. This is certainly true 
for Paul's discourse, which is situated against the backdrop of the apartheid regime 
and notions of white supremacy growing out of firstly colonialism and secondly white 
political domination over the course of the 1990s. However, Paul's discourse extends 
past the system that he grew up in to the transition to democracy in which the 
institution that he worked for became increasingly illegitimate. Parker (1992:12) 
proposes that discourses also refer to other discourses. Paul's narrative therefore 
refers to other historically located discourses, such as Communist discourse, the 
discourse of liberation movements and the transitional discourse that prevailed in 
South Africa from 1994 onwards concerning debates which considered whether 
perpetrators should be prosecuted or punished and their changing status in society. 
I now tum to examine Thompson (1984) who provides a useful analytical framework 
for understanding ideological discourse in particular. However, Larrain (1979:26) 
shows that not all ideas are ideological, and this is the case in my analysis. On the 
other hand, much of Paul's narrative is ideological - in particular that of Afrikaner 
Nationalist discourse and policing discourse. The major advantage of Thompson's 
(1984) approach comes from his keeping alive the link between ideology and critiques 
of domination. As du Toit (1994:112) points out, ideology originally served to 
demonstrate the ways in which meaning was mobilized in the interests of the 
dominant groups by misrepresenting social contradictions. For the purposes of my 
analysis, this critical conception of ideology is in tune with the notion of ideological 
discourse as invoked by Paul. Therefore I agree with Thompson (1984: 130) that for 
this thesis 'to study ideology is to study ways in which meaning serves to sustain 
relations of domination.' I do not wish to delve into deeper philosophical notions of 
how this critical perspective can be applied elsewhere (see du Toit, 1994 for an in-
depth analysis on how critical perspectives apply to non-ideological discourse such as 
liberation movements). 
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Thompson (1984: 132) argues that these relations of domination are' sustained by a 
mobilization of meaning which legitimates, dissimulates or reifies an existing state of 
affairs' (Thompson's emphasis). By legitimation he means the way that language 
serves to show domination as rational, traditional or charismatic. By dissimulation 
Thompson means the way that relations of domination are hidden so that they seem 
something they are not. Reification refers to the way in which this state of affairs 
seems permanent rather than transitory. 
Thompson (1984: 127) states that 'The concept of ideology cannot be considered in 
isolation, but must be situated within the framework of a General social theory.' He 
provides three levels of abstraction relating to action and structure in which ideology 
can be located and analysed. Whilst I follow Wetherell and Potter (1992:105) in 
arguing that these stages are 'entirely intertwined' and thus cannot be conveniently 
separated for the purposes of my analysis and furthermore are all interpretive, I do 
agree that Thompson (1984) provides an identifiable and practical way of focusing on 
the concept of ideology. 
I thus wish to outline these stages briefly for further clarification. The first is that of 
social analysis and examines the context of action, institutions and structural elements 
that constrain institutions. At the next level, discursive analysis, the focus is on 
articulated structure in language, the argumentative structure of language, and 
syntactic structure. The final stage is interpretation. 
Discourse analysis does not have one homogenous fixed method. Whilst the basic 
concepts and assumptions hold for any analysis, the methodology that must be used 
depends on the particular topic. For the purposes of this thesis, I draw on 
methodologies suggested by Thompson (1984 ), Fairclough (1992, 1989) and 
Wetherell and Potter (1992). Discourse analysis tries to unravel the taken-for-granted 
versions of reality and their contributions towards power relations (Foster et aI, 2005: 
275). The underlying aim of discourse analysis then, given that ideological discourse 
is the mobilisation of meaning, is to ask "for what purpose is this meaning mobilised?' 
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The framework that I follow is similar to that of Foster et al (2005) and will serve to 
answer each research question of my thesis accordingly. Since the first question of my 
thesis relates to how Paul views his intentions and motivations for committing acts of 
political violence and the context that may have played a role in him becoming a 
perpetrator of political violence, I first look at the non-reasons that he gives and the 
reasons. Given his limited acknowledgement of responsibility I then look at devices 
that allO\v him to deflect blame, either on to the victims or to other policemen and 
Generals. I then examine his discourse with respect to the main elements of Foster et 
als' (2005) model of political violence, namely the role of the organisation, 
masculinity and finally entitlement. It is worth stating that Paul's narrative does not 
differ strikingly from this model. Finally, I look at the way that Paul's narrative has 
elements of the New South African discourse that has emerged. However first I wish 
to examine other representations of Paul Erasmus from the time of the transition to 
give a background to this interview and allow an additional critical angle to be 
examined. 
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4.1 Media Representation: 
Chapter 4 
Analysis and Reflection 
In Theatre of Violence Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005:33) describe how the time 
period of 1960-1990 was 'largely characterized by silences regarding "those 
responsible" for violence' and attribute this partly to media restrictions and distorted 
information given by the government and security forces. The period from 1990 
onwards at first suggested a promising start of many investigations into finding those 
responsible for the violence. It was hoped that the TRC would unveil many hidden 
truths. However these investigations often did not amount to anything substantial. 
These authors suggest that by and large perpetrators were largely unknown in the 
media (Foster et aI, 2005:44). When this was not the case, either 'othering' discourses 
were used that portrayed perpetrators of political violence as few and far between and 
as sadistic monsters or a discourse was used that justified the actions of these 
perpetrators. This allows the reader to distance oneself from examining the possibility 
that we could all potentially be perpetrators of political violence. 
What did the media say about Paul Erasmus at the time of the transition and 
throughout the TRC process? The majority of newspapers around this time are silent 
about Paul. However the A1ail & Guardian that produced a series of expos resulting 
from intervievvs with Paul in 1995. Later articles related primarily to Stratcom. ii The 
reports often suggest that cover-ups within the Security Branch at the time were 
ongoing and that Paul was the one of the few to voluntarily disclose information and 
come forward. The reason why Paul may have been prepared to talk publicly may 
have had something to do with the fact that Paul had already 'spilled the beans' at the 
Goldstone Commission a few years prior, even though this commission had been too 
short of hard evidence to make any damning conclusions. 
How is Paul portrayed in the Mail & Guardian? The first thing to be noted from these 
reports is that the reasons given for committing these acts of political violence are 
often unstated. Paul is not portrayed as a bloodthirsty psychopath, but rather on the 
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contrary his actions are often justified in terms of his opposition to Communism. In an 
article titled 'Front Company is still in business' the aim of an undercover Stratcom 
company is given as 'countering the revolutionary threat' Uviail & Guardian, 
23/06/1995). In an excerpt from Paul's book that was published by the Mail & 
Guardian on 07/07/1995 (the book itself remains to be published) Paul describes my 
father as someone who at the time he believed was "just another 'red' who had to be 
stopped." 
On the other hand, despite the silence over reasons for committing acts of political 
violence Paul is portrayed with a strong sense of agency in all of these articles, both in 
terms of his acts of violence and in terms of coming forward with information. 
Relating to this latter sense of agency we are told that' A draft document for Lamont 
was given to the Mail & Guardian by Erasmus' for example (Alail & Guardian, 
23/06/1995). This passive use of the verb suggests the voluntaristic nature of the 
information disclosed by Paul. Later the article also describes how Paul disputed the 
claims of other intelligence operatives that Stratcom had been disbanded. These 
sentences suggest implicitly that Paul is telling the truth whereas other colleagues 
vvere lying and puts Paul is a position of power. This point is emphasized particularly 
in an article dealing with Frank Chikane. iii The article details how Chikane had stated 
"As you know, I am one of those few South Africans who are prepared to forgive 
those who are responsible for hideous acts, but this must go with the willingness to 
voluntarily disclose the said acts as well as an indication of remorse on the part of the 
perpetrators ... Failure to do so should open (them) to prosecution and punishment" 
Vviail & Guardian, 30/06/1995). Paul called Chikane to ask for forgiveness two days 
later even though he had not been the person to plant the poison. He had nevertheless 
been part of scouting operations that led to this. We are told that Erasmus knows who 
that man is but would not disclose this information preferring him to come forward 
voluntarily. This then demonstrates how Paul is in a powerful position by being the 
bearer of secrets. 
In the same article the Mail & Guardian (published 30/06/1995) quotes Chikane as 
saying "I hope there are more people who will join him for the sake of the country. 
We are all prisoners and victims." Thus Paul is also portrayed as a victim of 
circumstance, a rational ordinary man caught up in the system at the time who is 
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deserving of forgiveness. He is also described as having 'made peace' with Chikane 
again suggesting a strong sense of agency. This active voice implies that Paul is 
responsible for making the peace and detracts from the way that he destroyed the 
peace to begin with. The portrayal of Paul as an ordinary professional man is 
bolstered by a quotation by F.W. De Klerk published in an article from the same day 
(3010611995) stating "we are likely to see a great many more 'revelations' of the kind 
that figures like Paul Erasmus had made ... " 
Over the course of time the Mail & Guardian describes Paul in a more sceptical 
manner. This may have something to do with the change of author, but also with 
growing scepticism over the TRC process. On 14/0811998 Paul is described as 
coming forward in an amnesty application with a name for a fake news agency set up 
by Stratcom. Yet we are told that the name 'rang few bells with journalists, suggesting 
it was singularly ineffective as a means of intelligence gathering or disinformation.' 
Furthermore, Raymond Louw (described as a 'prominent' journalist) is quoted as 
saying "I think [the former security branch] are now trying to create the impression 
they ran a massive disinformation campaign." This discourse undermines Paul's 
credibility and his effectiveness. 
Overall, media representation does not provide a useful understanding of Paul's 
actions. Whilst he is not portrayed as a sadistic monster. thus giving the impression 
that he is an ordinary person (concurred by the Milgram (1974) experiments) the 
nature of the articles is such that Paul's actions are almost condoned. 
4.2 Literarv Representation 
If media representations do not provide a useful understanding of the causes of 
political violence, what can we learn from the representation of Paul in David 
Goodman's book Fault Lines? Goodman's (1999) book is a somewhat journalistic 
look at reconciliation in South Africa. It focuses on Paul and one of his victims, Frank 
Chikane and examines their journeys towards reconciliation in the new South Africa 
at the time of the transition. Paul was involved in targeting Chikane who was, at the 
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time, the leader of the South African Council of Churches. However Paul claims that 
he was not directly involved in Chikanes attempted poisoning. 
The chapter in the book devoted to Paul confirms many of the background details 
surrounding Paul's life that were obtained in the interview by the author of this thesis. 
These will be outlined later. We learn, for example, that Paul joined the police force 
in Potchefstroom so that he would be able to still see his girlfriend at the time. 
Furthermore, the book also gives descriptions of Paul's victims and specific dates of 
important events in Paul's life. Nevertheless, the chapter in the book relating to Paul 
is highly stereotypical. Goodman (1999: 106) states that 'To hear Paul Erasmus tell it, 
he's an innocent bystander while bad things have happened around him.' Goodman 
(1999) takes a different view. He describes Paul's voluntarism, such as with going to 
the border where 'he jumped at the chance to go.' Goodman (1999) portrays Paul as a 
sadistic psychopath, rather than an ordinary person. Whether the portrayal of Paul as a 
monster is in order to make the story of reconciliation with Chikane all the more 
incredible or whether this is simply Goodman's style is debatable. The end result is 
that an intricate understanding of Paul's motivations and intentions is not achieved. 
Hook (2003:6) finds in his study of students' assignments on the Norwood killer that 
there are three consistent tendencies that relate to the production of stereotypes. These 
stereotypes are readily apparent in Goodman's study. Of direct relevance are 
sensationalisation (the use of macabre details to 'de-normalise' the narrative) and 
sentimentality (where over-stated descriptive terms are used to create a stereotypical 
response). 
With regards to sensationalisation there are many instances of gruesome details being 
given that portray Paul as a monster and therefore allow the reader to distance oneself 
from the fact that perpetrators are more often than not somewhat ordinary. 
Unnecessary details are included that make Paul's actions seem all the more 
extraordinary. For example, Goodman (1999:98) describes an incident of torture in 
Namibia saying 
'In a sudden and swift motion, Paul Erasmus thrust the hot brand into her face. 
She let out a blood-curdling shriek, her son's sobs could be heard in the distance. The 
sickening smell of burning flesh hung limply in the night air.' 
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In describing the first time Paul killed someone, Goodman (1999: 94) describes how 
Paul's friends insisted they pose for photos. We are told that Paul 'grinned manically, 
like a trophy hunter gloating over his prize kill. He was flush with the excitement of 
the hunt.' Perhaps most shocking is the description of electric shocks for the purpose 
of torture (Goodman, 1999: 100). 
'Suddenly a searing hot flash of electricity ripped through Rosavita's body. 
She bit down so hard on her tongue that the end fell off. Blood spurted from her 
mouth. Erasmus roared with laughter." 
These details do not bring us any closer to an understanding of Paul's motivations and 
intentions. They simply make Paul seem an aberration from the norm. In a similar 
vein, Goodman's writing also shows many instances of sentimentality. He states for 
example (1999:78) 
'But there was something unsettling about him. Maybe it was his Fu Manchu 
mustache that dropped in a permanent scowl. Or maybe it was that penetrating gaze, 
like the stare of a predatory animal, that always made you feel like you were being 
sized up for the kill.' 
The Security Branch are described as 'the James Bonds of the South African Police' 
who 'had an unsettling cocksure air, like lawmen from the Wild West who answered 
to no-one' (Goodman, 1999: 89). Whilst this may indeed be true, the style of the text 
is such that it is unclear what facts are embellished and what are true. It seems that the 
text is written through Paul's eyes and yet some of the descriptions seem unlikely to 
have come from Paul himself. One instance of this is when Goodman writes 'Erasmus 
felt the veins tighten at the insolence of this kaffir.' Since people often wish to portray 
themselves in a positive image, it is unlikely that Paul would have used this word and 
it appears that its usage is simply to shock. This makes the accuracy of the text 
debatable. 
Goodman's (1999) portrayal of Paul is therefore also not particularly useful in 
understanding the causes of political violence. Whilst it confirms details and events 
from the present day interview it once again gives a stereotypical image of Paul that 
detracts from our understanding of his motivations and intentions for committing acts 
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of political violence. One useful description in the chapter hmvever sums up the way 
that Paul portrays himself in the neyv South Africa. Goodman (1999: 107) says 
'Erasmus's half-hearted confessions are typical of many former security police 
operatives. They are at once eager to enhance their image by saying that they were 
key players, but keen to distance themselves from the worst atrocities. They find 
themselves in a curious bind: their only cachet is their notoriety, which could form the 
basis of their post-apartheid careers ... But if he didn't do anything bad, no one (such 
as foreign journalists or publishers) is interested in him.' 
Furthermore, some ideological statements can help to confirm the potent mix of 
multiple subjectivities analysed later on in relation to the present day interview, but 
these statements are only useful when Paul's direct speech is given in Goodman's 
(1999) text. His Christian Nationalism, combined with anti-Communist thinking is 
demonstrated for example when Paul states that a Communist was 'anti-Christian and 
therefore satanic' (Goodman, 1999: 104). Paul also admits to being racist by stating 
that his father had 'a depth of feeling for the blacks which rubbed off on his other 
children. But definitely not on his youngest son' (Goodman, 1999: 80). As will be 
seen later, Paul in the present day hides his racist sentiment under anti-Communist 
mentality. 
4.3 The Amnestv Process and Representation 
Given that the media and literary representations of Paul are not entirely useful; in 
understanding Paul's motivations and intentions, to what extent does the available 
amnesty transcript concerning Paul provide some light on the situation? Unfortunately 
the only obtainable transcript regarding Paul's amnesty applications refers to the 
bombing of Alexandra Health Clinic. Paul applied for many other incidents but none 
of these transcripts are available. In the available transcript it is not clear who else is 
implicated. The transcript instead is restricted to Paul's testimony and that of the 
witnesses. Paul is also careful not to implicate others. The jargon is typical of the 
amnesty hearings from the TRC; the format is framed in a 'Question and Answer' 
style, using semi-legal terminology. The transcript is also concerned with minor 
technical details. For example Paul's lawyer, Mr. Van Zyl addresses the Chairperson 
saymg 
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'As it pleases you Madam Chair. It's clearly a typing error and he said now it 
should be January 1975. That is all that I wish to amend and I think he can confirm it, 
Madam Chair.' 
This focus on incidents and facts is exemplified by Judge de Jager's question: 
'Mr Erasmus, the question was: "What did you do?" Listen to the question. 
What did you invent to harass them? What did you yourself, we don't want at this 
stage to hear about other people, you might be asked about that afterwards or even 
later in the hearing, but please listen to the question and try to stick to and answer, in 
answering that question.' 
As can be seen from the outset the transcript does not allow much revelation of Paul's 
motivations and intentions. Most of the transcript is concerned with the details of 
particular incidents i.e. Paul did X on this particular day. It is only at the beginning of 
the transcript that a few reasons are divulged by Paul. Paul describes his thinking as 
typical of many policemen where 'because as a Christian, we were, as a Christian at 
that time, it was our duty to fight Communism. Communism was at the root of this 
evil that was going to rip our country to pieces.' By appealing to religious discourse 
Paul attempts to place his actions in morally legitimate terms and justify any actions 
taken. He is silent on the issue of racism however. 
Nevertheless, as is shown in analysis of the interview later, Paul's discourse also 
suggests an element of excitement and masculinity. Paul says 
'it was something to which I could commit myself, this crusade against 
godless, satanic communism, as we were taught, and then I would be something of a 
James Bond type of character and lead this exciting life dealing with very important 
Issues. 
There is also some element of pride and superiority, couched in policing discourse, 
that is demonstrated when Paul states 
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'you had a license to break the law on a scale which we knew if we performed 
the most outrageous things and we certainly worked hard to outdo each other, we 
became very inventive. I certainly flourished in this environment, I suppose because 
I've always tried to be a lateral thinker, I was innovative, I developed in my own right 
and I have admitted it before in these forums, I developed new techniques of 
harassment and more bizarre ways, which in some ways were more effective than 
some of my colleagues or Commanding Officers could ever have dreamed of.' 
Paul therefore claims superiority over not only his colleagues but also those in charge 
of him. He uses words with positive connotations such as 'innovative' and 
'flourished' that implicitly portray him in a positive light, and by using words such as 
'effective' Paul also seeks to define himself as a professional. This also minimises his 
actions by using a distancing device. 
Paul often places the blame on others stating that he was simply following orders. For 
example when questioned by his lawyer 'So you fell into line with this total 
indoctrination that took place?' he replies 
'Absolutely. I not only fell into line with it, it was almost a staggering concept 
that here as a member of the police, you had very much a licence to break the law on a 
scale which \ve knew if we performed the most outrageous things and we certainly 
worked very hard to outdo each other, we became very inventive.' 
He also blames his actions on stress and says' With the benefit of hindsight, looking 
back, I think it impaired my judgement in many, many situations which affect me to 
this day, most definitely.' 
Due to the quasi-legal nature of the hearing and the fact that there is only one amnesty 
transcript there is limited usefulness in analysing Paul's amnesty representation as a 
means of understanding his actions. As described in the first chapter, the Amnesty 
Committee hearings were framed in a "factual" quasi-judicial layout that focused on 
incidents rather than motivations. Nevertheless, there are a few paragraphs that begin 
to demonstrate Paul's motivations and intentions. As will be seen later, elements of 
masculinity, pride and superiority all follow the model set out by Foster et al (2005). 
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4.4 General Outline of the Interview 
Throughout the narrative questions were as open-ended as possible and infrequent as 
possible to elicit as much information as possible from Paul's perspective. Paul's style 
is often informal, using my name often throughout the interview and making jokes. 
This is presumably to build a feeling of solidarity and to show himself as a likeable 
person. It is worth questioning who he believes the intended audience to be -
presumably academics and my father - this may affect the way he wished to be 
portrayed. Paul's narrative begins in a fairly chronological fashion, starting with when 
he received his call-up papers in 1975. He does not speak much of his childhood or 
schooling other than to describe his mother and father. He does however frequently 
compare himself to his father who he claims was a pilot and also suffered from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Paul says of his father 'But I never started to understand 
him until I started to understand myself.' This comparison then extends to Paul stating 
'before the war he was a loving, decent, sensitive guy.' This use of three positive 
adjectives alludes to the fact that Paul may believe that he also shares these attributes. 
Paul also claims that his father wrote some of the legislation governing the old Pass 
Laws. It is not clear in what capacity this was, nor is it clear which of the two jobs his 
dad did or when he did them. 
The questions throughout the interview were somewhat open-ended starting with 
'Where did it all begin?' and it appears that Paul does not find much relevance from 
his childhood in how he ended up where he did. He describes his life after leaving 
school as that of a typical white male that was not sure what he wanted to do with his 
life. He says, for example '1 came out of Police College on the 3rd of December '75 
and then 1 thought I would stick it out until the end of the following year.' This is 
somewhat at odds from what can be seen in the TRC transcript of the bombing of the 
Alexandra Health Clinic where Paul places a larger emphasis on his desire to practice 
art: 'My idea of what 1 wanted to do with my life, apart from compulsory 
conscription, was that 1 wanted to practice art.' The turning point in Paul's life (this 
time in accord with the TRC transcript), came on June 16th 1975 the day of the 
Soweto riots as 'it was the first sort of dead people I have really seen, a real trauma. 
But I think that's what made me decide to stay, you know, in the cops. ,iv We know 
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from his narrative and other interviews (Goodman, 1999) that he joined the Security 
Branch in January 1977 and went on Intelligence courses the year after. In 1981 he 
volunteered to go to the border, even though 'the border was an entirely voluntary 
thing'. For Paul, the border greatly affected his outlook and he states that 'I took a 
knock, I think everybody did. Just the scale and the propensity and the horror.' He 
found it hard to adjust to ordinary life when he returned but met his wife, Linda, in 
1982 and married in 1983. 
Paul started officially working for Stratcom at the end of the 1980s although he had 
previously been involved in some of their operations, such as designing posters. Until 
this time Paul had remained as part of the Security Branch. Paul does not speak much 
of his time at Stratcom apart from hinting at the pride with which he undertook his 
operations. I propose that this silence over activities at Stratcom is because in Paul's 
words' Proof in the pudding is that all those years up until the IRC never one arrest 
or conviction of any third force.' It may be that he does not want to implicate himself 
and others should these cases reopen. In this way Paul retains power over the 
interview by being the bearer of secrets. 
Paul suffered increasingly from post-traumatic stress (according to his statements) in 
the early 1990s but feared leaving the Security Branch because he knew too much. 
Another concern was that he needed to pay his son Dylan's (who has cerebral palsy) 
medical bills. It is common knowledge that Paul was one of the first to go to the 
Goldstone Commission in 1994. According to Paul he applied for amnesty for 527 
incidents at the Iruth and Reconciliation Commission and got amnesty for all except 
22. However, the IRC report on its website suggests this is more in the region of 86. 
According to Paul, the IRC failed in the case of EuGene de Kock and P.W. Botha. v 
Paul says 'justice might have been better served if they charged Botha.' Nevertheless, 
he believes that 'to not have had a IRC would have prolonged the hatred.' Paul is 
positive about the future of South Africa. He currently grows the African potato to 
make beauty products. 
In some \vays Paul's narrative starts off like a planned autobiography, almost like an 
adventure novel (which is maybe because he is currently writing his autobiography). 
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As the narrative progresses, it becomes less chronological and begins to jump back 
and forth in time. There is very little mention of violence throughout the narrative, 
and \-vhen the issue of violence arises Paul often begins to refer to the psychological 
problems that he began to face in the police force. This may be a way of avoiding 
blame for his actions, as he was not psychologically fit to make decisions. The fact 
that 1 am a female may have also contributed to the lack of graphic detail surrounding 
his actions and indeed in his interview with Goodman (1999) these details are more 
apparent. It may also be that over time Paul perceives this language to be less and less 
appropriate. 
Paul is also quick to state that it was impossible to go for counselling within the 
Security Branch. He says that '1 literally went under a false name because 1 wasn't 
coping' to further emphasize the point that he did not have much of a choice in trying 
to sort out his problems and had to continue in his job. Despite the latter part of the 
narrative being less sequenced, there are a number of themes that keep recurring other 
than his psychological problems. Paul makes frequent references to his intelligence 
and commendations in the police force, presumably to make himself seem reasonable 
and make his actions seem more justified in that he did not make rash or stupid 
decisions. He often speaks with pride about EuGene de Kock and I believe that 
Thompson (1984: 136) is correct in stating that in narratives 'Stories are told which 
glorify those in power and seek to justify the status quo'. Whilst EuGene was not in 
power he was in charge of Vlakplaas and for Paul, EuGene might be the closest 
person higher up the ladder. 
According to Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005:277), narratives are often demarcated 
along lines of power, gender and racialisation. With respect to racialisation Paul's 
narrative, being that of a white state-security agent, unsurprisingly shows a normal 
schooling process and a call-up to the police, as was then customary. Little mention is 
made concerning black oppression or hardship, and Paul for the most part neglects his 
privileged status other than the concept of sheltered employment for many people 
working for the police. His narrative is often gendered and masculine; this will be 
analysed in more detail later. Along the povver axis Paul's narrative shows a similar 
sense of continuity demonstrated by the security personnel in Theatre of Violence 
(2005). After leaving school he got his call-up papers and went to Pretoria 'which was 
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just down the road" and enabled him to carryon his relationship with his new 
girlfriend at the time. After the police he then volunteered to go to the border. He 
states 'I threatened to resign if they didn't let me go.' 
Paul never fully acknowledges his wrongdoing. His discourse is intertwined with 
excuses and justifications, never fully accepting responsibility for his actions. Even 
when describing how his wife typed his amnesty application and how she stated she 
'didn't know that she was married to a monster' Paul then goes on to say 'look, it 
even horrified me because these things were over a scale of 18 years and all of a 
sudden ... ' His attempt to distance himself through the passage of time is some form 
of justification. Paul however does at some point argue that 'I never said and will say 
"Don't blame me, 1 was simply following orders'" thus showing partial 
acknowledgement. 
4.4.1 iVan-reasons 
Paul's narrative often outlines what he was not involved with and reflects on the way 
in which events unfolded and spiralled into something else other than what he 
originally intended. This is one of the elements of Foster, Haupt & de Beer's (2005) 
relational modeL where people are drawn in and having crossed one line are able to 
cross many more. Despite Paul's father writing 'many of the legislation governing, 
you know, the old Pass Laws' Paul maintains that he and his siblings were not 
'politicised as kids. ,vi He did not know what he wanted to do with his life and states 
'Well I certainly didn't think that I would end up where I was.' The emphasis on the 
word 'certainly' is an example of strong affinity modality. This strong affinity with 
not knowing serves to distance himself away from the possibility of choice in his life. 
This is bolstered by his argument that there was 'no money to go to varsity. A career 
in the police offered an opportunity for him to do something other than office work. 
He states 'I didn't want to sit behind a desk' and adds 'you know ... office work and 
just being stuck in an environment.' The word 'stuck' has a negative connotation 
which then allows police work to be seen in a positive light. A few paragraphs later 
Paul says 'But 1 still had no idea what I wanted to do with my life. But anyway, I 
stuck it out with a view to leaving at the end of the year.' The repetition of the word 
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'stuck' once again adds to the notion of Paul" s career not being one of choice in any 
situation, but something that he got caught up in unintentionally. This is a way of 
diffusing blame. 
Ironically, despite the policies of apartheid Paul insists that racism did not playa 
central role in his thinking saying 'we were never brought up as racists. That is honest 
to god.' He later adds further justification to this by stating that 'What the government 
did "vas a classic thing, everybody that was an enemy of the state was 
compartmentalized into this one thing, Communism.' However at the end of his 
narrative Paul concedes that 'People believe and react in ways that they have been 
conditioned to. I mean I would probably never have a black girlfriend, I might, but 
why?' 
Paul also deflects responsibility with ignorance as an explanation. 'None of us really 
realized the things that were going on you know, all that was going on.' He often 
refers to the "need-to-know principle." Paul also says 'I never saw myself as a hero. I 
just didn't have a choice.' These two sentences are contradictory and confusing. The 
implication is that if Paul did have a choice then he would have been a hero. In this 
way his actions are legitimized through suggesting that either he didn't have a choice 
or that if he did he would have been doing something good and moral. 
4.4.2 Reasons 
What actual reasons are then possible to find according to Paul? These reasons were 
somewhat more ambiguous. 'We saw it in a different way, if you didn't get them to 
speak out you were costing someone their life, urn or you were costing lives because 
if you didn't get them to talk you wouldn't know who else to go and arrest or shoot or 
kill or whatever.' Yet the hesitation followed by repetition hints that Paul is not so 
convinced of this himself. When referring to violence, Paul often used distancing 
devices such as a shift to the passive voice and the use of collective pronouns. When 
talking about the first time he interrogated someone Paul states 'No, no I was bored. 
We had shock machines and that was it. Urn, just, ja, that's the way it worked.' This 
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language minimizes the actual content of what he did. He also used euphemisms such 
as 'Well 1 took a guy out' meaning that he killed him. 
Paul describes his turning point to be that of the Soweto riots. He says "But then of 
course there was Wednesday June the 16th which 1 think changed my life and changed 
everybody's' lives. This whole country changed.' This threefold repetition 
emphasizes the impact of the Soweto riots and by showing the impact on every person 
there is an implicit suggestion that Paul had no choice but to get involved. It also 
diffuses the responsibility to extend to everyone. He also describes his lack of 
enjoyment at the whole event but only in material rather than moral terms stating 'No 
winter clothing, I mean it was freezing cold, no bloody food and we sat in a parade 
with hundreds and hundreds of policemen'. Further to this he describes how some 
men still had the price tag hanging on their rifles, perhaps as an attempt to show the 
lack of aggression on the part of the police. This is contrasted with the opposing side. 
He says 'we had no inkling what trouble was coming.' This use of the word 'trouble' 
seems a bit odd to describe the Soweto riots. It undermines the morality of the stand 
taken and places the behaviour in the same category as a child or a criminal. This then 
serves to sustain relations of domination. 
Paul cites ideology as an integral part of his thinking. 'I was an ideologue 1 suppose, I 
believed wholly and solely.' He often describes the training he went through and the 
effect it had on his thinking. Paul says 'I suppose we were propagandised a lot.' Paul 
is also quick to defend this position. He refers to the notes that he made on 
interrogation (one of the things that he was trained in) and says • And there is no doubt 
firstly that these notes are genuine, I mean they can be subject to testing' as if to 
emphasise how strongly they manipulated his thinking. Perhaps Paul's insistence on 
the genuineness of these notes is related the incidents which occurred at the time of 
the Goldstone Commission. Paul came forward with information which was then 
refuted by many of the Generals serving above him. Nevertheless, Paul's attention to 
the truth or falsity of his statements detracts from examination of the extent to which 
the actual content of these notes had a psychological effect on those that studied it. 
The underlying premise is that because these notes are true there is proof that people 
acted according to what they were taught. It is also interesting that none of this 
training is described as racist. 
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'I mean I hated communism more than anything. But I never sa\v things in a 
black and white type of stuff. That to me was part and parcel of the whole thing, that 
the poor masses of black, oppressed masses of the country were being used as cannon 
fodder by the Commies. The whole thing was a cold war thing.' 
Paul's use of the words 'poor' and 'oppressed' in this instance serve to reinforce his 
argument by showing that he was (and is) rational and evenhanded towards other 
races. The metaphor of cannon fodder for the black masses dehumanizes them and 
also diminishes their importance. It legitimates his discourse by hinting that the police 
knew what was best for the masses. 
Paul often refers to the way in which the real problem was that of white people 
fighting against the regime. He states 
'I was on the so-called white desk and that sort of gave me more hatred for 
people like your dad because why couldn't they see the light? I mean these people 
were left-wingers or communists or whatever.' 
The low affinity demonstrated by the use of the words 'sort of suggest that Paul is 
not convinced by his argument. He also puts left-wingers and communists and 
'whatever' into the same category which implicitly puts forward the idea that any 
person fighting against the regime fell into the same category. Because communism is 
now refuted, by placing left-wingers in the same category Paul is also refuting the 
legitimacy of left-wing discourse in the present day. Paul describes working on white 
suspects, white organizations and churches as 'a big thorn in the backside.' This 
metaphor sustains relations of domination by giving the image that these people were 
a big irritation but nonetheless nothing that could not be removed. 
Thus the majority of Paul's reasoning is justified by the context of the Cold War and 
consequently war is frequently embedded in his discourse. Sometimes Paul actually 
says as much. At other times however he says things like 'we were fighting a losing 
battle hey. I mean, we had minor victories' which implicitly make these suggestions. 
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4.4.3 Breaching scripts or norms 
As noted by Foster et al (2005 :281), narratives often set up implied norms which are 
then used to demonstrate the agency of the individual 'in the form of dissent against 
the script/norm.' According to these authors, this serves two purposes. It firstly puts 
the narrator in a positive light and secondly enables the normative group to be the one 
that can be blamed, rather than the narrator. This device can be commonly noted in 
Paul's narrative. He criticizes others for the killing of David Webster and poisoning of 
Frank Chikane saying 
'I just didn't want to, none of us, well a lot of the guys that J knew, but for 
myself 1 didn't want blood on my hands again. vii Once again, different things. This 
guy with an AK-47 there with a limpet mine 1 would have shot and gone home quite 
happily, you know, and enjoyed the rest of my life. But yirrah, not an academic like 
David Webster, Frank Chikane .... ' 
The implicit suggestion is that there were a few 'bad eggs' that targeted these kinds of 
people but that Paul was rational and able to differentiate between what was a 
legitimate killing and what was not. This then justifies his actions. Yet when denying 
all knowledge of Neil Agget's interrogation Paul concedes that he has still got photos 
of him hanging. viii This implicitly suggests approval of the actions of others and a lack 
of respect for human life, and therefore contradicts his other statements. 
From the beginning of his narrative Paul sets himself up against others. Regarding 
Paul's friends from school, he mentions that 'they went to work in banks, stand for six 
days taking peoples' money and 1 thought 'god 1 am not cut out for this.' This is a 
way of putting down the job choices of his friends and makes a career in the police 
appear more attractive and acceptable. 
Again putting himself in a positive light, Paul states '1 followed Gene incidentally, 1 
never took bribes. One of the cops that never did but anyway, 1 am proud of it. 
Everybody was taking them.' ix This is an attempt to legitimate his discourse, to show 
Paul as a reasonable person who did his job properly. He also says '1 think 1 was more 
committed. For a lot of them it was just another job.' Even regarding his amnesty 
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application Paul argues 'I don't know what makes me different from the others but the 
abuse didn't catch me like it caught a lot of the other guys.' 
Paul describes the Security Branch as a 
'cut above the rest of your normal uniformed police.' Stating how the police 
force only required a standard six he says 'there were some fantastic people, some 
trashy types as well, you know, low-lives ... um ... it was sheltered employment. The 
intellectual side just fell out the window. I saw that from day one - I was regarded as, 
urn, a bloody Engelsman, groot bek, smart ideas, too big for my boots.' 
In this way it is made to appear that Paul was capable of making intelligent and 
rational choices. Furthermore, it suggests that extreme immoral acts by the police 
were committed by these individuals rather than Paul. This may also aid in making his 
story more plausible. 
Paul doesn't only shift the blame towards colleagues; he also deflects responsibility 
up\vards at his bosses and at politicians. When he was working at Stratcom Paul 
describes his boss as 'so totally stupid. You know, I went berserk, he was a 
body builder.' This is compared to Paul's achievement in getting propaganda material 
into John Major's hands.x This sets up Paul as seeming intelligent and implicitly 
suggests that faults arose not from himself, but from others higher up in the chain. 
Paul also makes an interesting analogy that allows him to diffuse responsibility for 
apartheid across the population as a whole. He talks of a book by Lord Russell of 
Liverpool (1954) called the 'Scourge of the Swastika' (although Paul calls uses the 
term 'purge' rather than 'Scourge') stating 'And what Lord Russell attacked was the 
question of accountability of the German people as a whole.' He says a few sentences 
later 'The sheer immensity and the scope of the way that people were disappearing 
and the camps, it gets bigger, bigger and bigger.' In this way he is suggesting that it 
was not only those working for the State that were responsible for the atrocities that 
occurred during apartheid but that bystanders played a role as well. This then allows 
Paul to somewhat reject his responsibility. 
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-I. -I. -I Them and liS: Victim-blaming 
Breaching scripts allows the blame to be placed sidevvays on colleagues and upwards 
to politicians. Victim-blaming on the other hand places blame downwards on victims 
by comparing the actions of both parties. Paul often phrases his actions in a passive 
voice whilst describing the victims of his actions in active terms. He says, for example 
'he was shot through the thigh to describe a 'terr' they had caught.' When describing 
the first time he killed someone he says 'the bugger made a run for if as if it was the 
man's fault for wanting to run away. The reaction by the man's family is described in 
dehumanized terms as Paul states that they 'don't.. .didn't react like a human reacted. 
It was just all these kids and you know that sort of typical Ovambo black kraal type of 
stuff, looking at us in horror but there was no sign of emotion.' He states about two 
sentences later again that 'it was just like, they aren't human, they aren't like us. You 
know, it's like a cultural thing, you know.xi , This reifies the power relations of white 
domination in the way described by Thompson (1984). In this paragraph Paul 
alternates between the past and present tense. This implies that Paul still believes that 
these people don't react like humans and reifies power relations by presenting things 
as a permanent state of affairs. 
This dehumanization of victims frequently happens throughout the text. At one point 
Paul describes how he did not know who his bullets were hitting in the Soweto Riots. 
He says he shot 'everything that breathed, moved, barked, walked.' Is this to imply 
that the rioters were like dogs? 
Paul uses an extreme case example to shift the blame onto his former enemies when 
he mentions that 'But let me tell you - they were savages as well; I saw things that 
SWAPO did that were even more horrendous. I mean, I suppose that's the nature of 
war.,xii The authoritative tone taken up by saying 'let me tell you' suggests that what 
is said is the absolute and final truth and suggests that any other judgment would be 
ignorant. Furthermore, there are two functions gained by setting up the enemy in a 
more horrific light than Paul and his colleagues and then adding that this is the nature 
of war. Firstly, it makes Paul appear understanding and sympathetic. What it also 
provides is a form of justification for committing the acts that he did i.e. that his acts 
were also committed in the context of war. Paul goes further to assert that 
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'Personally, I could never torture, not a white person you know, I s'pose you 
see the border was a different thing again. There was a kind of savagery that was 
different to locally. Ag, I would balk at the idea of torturing to a point where I killed 
them.' 
This narrative form of war talk is an attempt to legitimate the power relations held at 
the time by appealing to rational grounds i.e. that of a just war. 
On the day of the Soweto riots, Paul recounts how the mineworkers 'started to, you 
know, come up in arms as well. Not so much on the side of the comrades, they were 
trying to, some of them, stop it in sorts, settle this thing, you know, it was just 
butchery.' The metaphor of a butcher is significant. It suggests that life was worth 
nothing more than an animal's, a piece of meat. By suggesting that the mineworkers 
were not on the side of the comrades the implicit proposition is that the Soweto riots 
were not rationaL and neither were they justified. This dissimulation is an attempt to 
conceal police interests at the time. 
4.4.5 Central Role ofthe Organisation 
An integral part of Paul's reasoning for his actions lies within the context of his 
organization. His actions are often legitimized by the organization and the job he was 
required to do. When Paul describes the growing realization that the government was 
about to change, he tells of the pep talks that were given to himself and his colleagues 
where they were told 'there will always be an intelligence system and we will work 
under his new government because first and foremost we are cops and our oath of 
loyalty. la, at the end of the day they left us canned for what they then did.' Put this 
way Paul was, to some extent just doing his job, and cannot be placed in the same 
category as the decision makers. By talking about the oath of loyalty, a deeper 
analysis might suggest that Paul is reifying the legitimacy of the police force and his 
previous commitment to the police. While Paul states that following orders is not an 
excuse, he then describes how refusal to follow orders meant that 'some people got 
sidelined into an office job' which for Paul is something that he really did not want to 
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do. If unhappy with an order, Paul recounts the next course of action. 'Afterwards 
they must submit in writing why they are unhappy and they have got to give them to 
(listen to this) the person that gave them that order before they give it to a person of 
higher authority.' When describing the action of his superiors and the issue of 
permanent removals from society he says' I mean who the hell were we to question 
anyway?' to emphasise that the organization was legitimate and that to question it 
would have been wrong. 
Often linked to these organizational dynamics is an element of pride attached to the 
organization. The Security Branch was 'like this brotherhood' that was 'certainly a 
cut above the rest of your normal uniformed police.' Whilst higher up officials and 
certain other members may have gone above the call of duty, Paul puts himself in a 
professional light. He says 'I was pretty committed hey, I mean I was. I was a bloody 
good cop.' This repetition highlights his point further and also divides his 
organizational purpose from his political one. As proof of these statements Paul 
mentions how he 'got nine commendations as a security cop which is some sort of 
record, I did a job well.' 
It is interesting to note that Paul relates his stress problems to his pride over how hard 
he worked. He links this to the stress problems still felt in the police today. This 
serves to demonstrate that it is the job itself that creates this mindset. By comparing 
the past police service with the new one Paul is legitimating the old police force. He is 
also putting himself above the rest of his colleagues to allow blame to be placed 
sidewards. Paul says about his colleagues' Most of them weren °t affected. They came 
to work at eight 0' clock in the morning and buggered off at four 0' clock.' He then 
adds' one of the problems, and we hear this in the police today, is that the more you 
do, the more shit you do, the less time you've got for yourself.' 
Yet the central role of the organization has also led to anger given that many of Paul's 
superiors did not go through the TRC process or in any way take responsibility for his 
actions. He uses EuGene de Kock as an example. 
'But no, no. I still carry that hatred today - mention Botha's name ... um, and 
all the Generals, I mean where the fuck? I don't think, I don't condone Gene as an 
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example, he was just the fall guy. I think if the TRC and the justice system failed 
dismally it \vas certainly in his case, you know. Someone· s got to take account for 
that.' He even says 'Who could have foreseen anything but chaos' when he describes 
how EuGene was given' An almost blank cheque, a staff of sixteen, a farm and 
vehicles and everything like that and carries on Koevoet inside the country. ,xiii 
4.4.6 Masculinitv 
On closer analysis Paul's narrative shows strong elements of masculinity. His 
language is couched in masculine terms such as giving images of his promotions and 
commendations, as mentioned above. Male bonding is frequently referred to, such as 
the war songs they sang at the pub in Ovamboland. There is an emphasis on 
camaraderie, particularly during his time on the border. He describes sitting under the 
trees 'everyone with babalases of course' praying. The mention of a prayer brings in 
religious discourse that seems to add a religious tone to this 'brotherhood'. Paul 
volunteered to go to the border and laughs as he says 'I wanted to go to the border so 
badly I threatened to resign if they didn't let me go! Simply because half the guys that 
I had worked with had all been up there. You hadn't sort of, you weren't accepted 
totally unless you had gone to the border.' Again there is this notion of male bonding 
that also feeds into a sense of superiority. Paul states that 'Once you had been to the 
border it was like you had your final sort of like colours' giving further imagery of 
these ideas. However, this masculinity only becomes prevalent at certain times. At 
other times other identities become more salient. 'It was that macho thing, but you 
knmv, I mean when you're on your own at night and you close your eyes ... ' 
Paul goes as far as to describe the relationship he had with some others as 
affectionate: 'Well they used my info, it was this affectionate thing whereas guys in a 
higher rank than me were treated like 'Good morning Captain, or Colonel or 
something like that. ' 
Paul tells war stories of himself, but also of others. Paul describes how he wanted to 
make an ornament out of a skull and bones but tones this imagery down by saying 
·Only years later Amanda it sort of dawned on me just how depraved and 
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desensitized ... I don't know the right words for something like that. but it was 
unbelievable.' The informal use of my name is an attempt to build solidarity and the 
fact that Paul does know the right words suggests a framing of his old stories in a new 
discourse, concealing the real intention behind this statement. It seems as though 
Paul's narrative is torn between trying to make himself appear like an ordinary 
intelligent guy, with emotions and regrets over his past actions whilst at the same time 
being incredibly proud of what he did. This is emphasized when he depicts his partner 
at the Security Branch, Nani, as 'a true hero' despite committing atrocious acts such 
as bombings. 
Paul's narrative is laced with hierarchical imagery and the men that he looked up to. 
He says of EuGene de Kock 'He was probably one of the best policemen that ever 
walked the ... uniformed policemen in this country, beyond corruption, absolutely 
fearless, I mean that man never had a scared hair on his head, he was extremely, 
extremely intelligent.' This image became one that Paul aspired to. 'He was a pretty 
tough guy so secretly the word was out - we need guys like de Kock, you know, no 
fear.' It is evident that Paul holds EuGene in high regard. He does not question the 
morality of de Kock' s actions, and only describes de Kock in terms of performing 
what his job required of him. When he tells of a particular story he describes how 
'He'd knocked the hell out of this whole lot, gangsters, wanted criminals and 1 don't 
know what' in a shebeen. Paul focuses on those committing illegal crimes but is 
unspecific as to who 'this whole lot' actually entailed. Again there is a silence over 
racism and the fact that everybody is lumped together in one category again is a 
means of sustaining power relations. It is almost as if any people in a shebeen are all 
criminal types. This may also be an attempt to create a new South African discourse 
that reflects on his actions as that of a policeman doing his job, rather than someone 
doing something morally illegitimate. It is surprising, nevertheless to see such respect 
for a man who in South Africa has been called 'Prime Evil.' Paul says 'de Kock was 
just amazing, his reputation preceded him.' To show himself as someone who was 
well-read and prepared to consider other points of view, Paul says of de Kock '1 read 
Marx, Lenin but de Kock was like that and 1 think he valued that in me. I certainly 
appreciated it in him.' 
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The hierarchical imagery that Paul uses to describe others that he worked with show 
conflicting elements of pride and shame at the same time. Even when Paul describes 
Ferdi Barnard as someone who he was scared of and someone vvho was 'a hectic 
person' he also describes him as 'fearsome, awesome guy' who out of boredom would 
'knock the hell out of the bar.'XlV Paul describes the people that he thinks were 'in the 
category of disturbed people that wanted to carry on' as 'real all-time action heroes.' 
This has a positive connotation. He talks of Ferdi saying 'Ja, a guy like him was 
capable of killing somebody, definitely, I mean he was earmarked for it, done it 
before, he had the right persona, the right physical attributes.' Thus there is a 
contradiction by Paul evaluating Ferdi negatively whilst using positive words such as 
'right' . 
There is little reference to women throughout the narrative, furthering this notion of 
masculinity. Even vvhen he does mention his ex wife, Linda, Paul is the dominant one. 
'1 had been awake for three solid days and 1 came home and she smelt alcohol 
on my breath and we had a fight that night, I nearly killed her. When 1 came to my 
senses, I was on top of her and I had this gun pressed against her.' 
Foster et al (2005 :287) found that there were two different types of masculinity that 
became prevalent in the narratives they collected. These included a 'military-
bureaucratic' form which places an emphasis on the organisational structures, 
hierarchy, discipline and rules and an 'action man' form of masculinity which is more 
linked to notions of excitement and fighting. Paul shows elements of both. The 
military-bureaucratic form of masculinity is demonstrated as mentioned above in the 
context of obeying orders. However, the 'action man' type of masculinity is perhaps 
more prevalent, especially when Paul refers to his experiences on the border. Paul 
even mentions the word gung-ho: 'It was half past eight in the morning, we were 
already drinking. We had this slapgat attitude that was gung ho.' A few sentences 
later again Paul repeats himself, strengthening this notion 'it was very much like, ja, 
like a gung-ho type. 'xv Showing little evidence of emotion, but rather laughing about 
his experiences, Paul describes how 'One bugger got drunk and jumped into a pool 
and got eaten by a crocodile.' All these ideas link back to a strongly salient masculine 
identity. 
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4.4.7 Entitlement 
How does entitlement apply to this narrative? Exaggerated entitlement consists of a 
sense of superiority which may manifest itself in the assumption of right of access to 
another's body or spatial freedom, and inattention to others' reactions according to 
Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005: 69) With the notion of entitlement comes the idea of 
the intertwining of multiple subjectivities, that is when some identities become more 
salient in certain situations. Ideology can create certain identities both for the person 
and of the other (Foster et aI, 2005: 71). In other words, not only does a certain 
identity become more salient for the perpetrator, but it also sets up an identity of 'the 
other' as the enemy. It is a certain mix of ideologies that create exaggerated 
entitlement. 
In the case of Paul there are several ideologies that appear to have created this potent 
mix. Despite his denials of racism, there are many racist assumptions that Paul makes 
throughout his narrative such as 'I mean, I would probably never have a black 
girlfriend, I might, but why? It was the way we were brought up.' Paul also 
demonstrates elements of Christian Nationalism, although he claims to have never 
discussed religion with his partner, Nani. Paul says of Nani 'But he said to me the one 
day "You know Paul, through all of that we never talked about Christianity.'" Yet on 
the day of the intervie\v he wore a cross around his neck and talked of how he often 
attended Church. As previously described, Goodman's (1999) description of Paul and 
Paul's own testimony to the Amnesty Committee also demonstrate elements of this 
religiousness. These ideologies, combined with an anti-Communist ideology and 
masculinity, may have led to Paul's sense of entitlement. 
Paul's sense of superiority is prevalent throughout the narrative, as an intelligent guy 
who knew what he was doing. 'I always regarded myself as being intellectually 
superior.' The idea of exaggerated entitlement becomes prevalent later in Paul's 
narrative in several instances. He says, of his return to South Africa after the border 'I 
wanted to take out the traffic cop, which was hysterical, the guy was whimpering, I 
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had a gun like this, I said to him "How dare you come and try and take ... " This 
exaggerated superiority is also often reflected in the choice of phrase' license to kill'. 
The phrase is applied to Paul himself and EuGene de Kock. By comparing himself to 
James Bond, Paul depicts himself in a positive light and as someone doing the best for 
his country. It suggests that he is one of the best and that he was able to judge what 
action was appropriate for the circumstances. 
As Foster et al (2005:288) note, the idea of exaggerated entitlement becomes evident 
through a sense of frustration. Paul even says his job was 'a lot of excitement. A lot of 
frustration as well.' Entitlement that has become exaggerated also includes an element 
of shame. Being English speaking, Paul 'always had this hang-up about speaking 
Afrikaans' and victimization at his police college may have led to a need to prove 
himself. 
'Having a matric with distinctions like I had was quite amazing .... not that it 
ever helped me because that actually worked against me because I couldn't pass 
information exams in the police. There was a secret promotion system if you weren't 
the right type, that you didn't belong to the right organization, or you had the wrong 
family connections. Uh, things counted against you type of stuff.' 
It is evident from this paragraph that Paul felt a kind of shame for being English-
speaking vvhich he then tried to make up for in other ways. This shame is also 
apparent at a later stage in the narrative. The first time Paul killed someone the others 
teased him saying 'if you find yourself a terr, don't kill old men' and this 'worried 
him'. As Paul looked up to de Kock, he may have tried to bury this shame by acting in 
a similar fashion. 
Foster et al (2005:289) add two more elements that make entitlement more likely to 
occur. The first of these is if one acts in a familiar territory. Certainly at the border, 
Paul felt so at home that when he returned he 'couldn't adjust at all, and I think it was 
about three days; I walked into his office, I said ''I'm going back to Koevoet 
permanently.'" The second element that makes entitlement more likely is the notion 
of power, and Paul demonstrates this when he says 'You literally had license to kill.' 
These characteristics are coupled together when he says' I got home and I walked into 
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this - from that totally lawless society.' The notion of a lawless society not only serves 
to legitimate Paul's actions on the border but also gives the apartheid regime 
legitimacy by contrasting it with Ovamboland. 
The above-mentioned characteristics are the more obvious workings of entitlement, 
but there are other less obvious pointers as well according to Foster et al (2005: 289). 
Pride can demonstrate entitlement, and Paul's pride for himself and his work comes 
across very strongly. Paul is extremely proud that he got into the Security Branch 
'which was almost impossible' and even more so about Stratcom. 'There was only 
this little handful that became the Stratcom component.' Within his work, Paul is 
proud of his achievements. He states 'Lots of things that I was the architect of were 
pretty well thought out, effective, ja, I was making a name for myself.' Paul mentions 
how he learnt to forge cheques, something that was not required in his job, and even is 
proud of this. 'Everybody thought this was fucking amazing, you know, it's the type 
of shit you read about in books.' Again entitlement, as it is a relational concept, is 
further demonstrated by his comparison with others. He gladly acknowledges the 
actions that he alone did. 'But the one thing I am proud of, I never pushed the blame 
down.' 
Another more subtle element of entitlement is that of enjoyment in one's work. Paul 
says that 'being in the Security Branch was I suppose if anything never boring.' He 
also attributes his being one of the first people at Stratcom to his artistic side. He 
states 'yirrah, I was one of the first people that got involved in Stratcom, urn, simply 
because I always had this love of art.' The sentence is almost contradictory because of 
the emphasis and pride he places on being one of the first people at Stratcom whilst 
nevertheless putting this 'simply' down to having a love of art. This disguises the 
immoral side of Stratcom activities whilst still demonstrating enjoyment. 
As mentioned previously, a part of the workings of entitlement comes from the 
intertwining of multiple subjectivities and previous analysis showed how 
organizational and masculine elements became more prevalent in certain situations. 
Ideology also plays a role, however. Anti-communist thinking is most apparent in 
Paul's narrative, and the training he went though in police college seems to have 
made strengthened this ideology. Paul describes his Crime and Ethnology textbook as 
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states how 'Now if you've got a Standard Six education and you knew fuck-all about 
life and here is a fact told to you like that, obviously, you know ... that is the way that 
policemen were trained' to justity how people thought.' Paul finds it surprising that as 
a person who did not know what he wanted to do with his life 'seven, six years after 
that I was shooting people at the border and going to celebrate it afterwards by 
drinking. ' 
As entitlement is not fixed, but can be 'changed and reconfigured' Foster et al 
(2005 :291) argue that entitlement acts as a defense mechanism, and when the feeling 
of entitlement goes then a person is exposed to a flooding of negative emotions. This 
may be why Paul increasingly suffered from post-traumatic stress and was 
hospitalized after his amnesty applications. 
4.4.8 A NevI' South African discourse 
Much of Paul's narrative is framed in a discourse that appears more acceptable in 
South Africa at the present time. It is worth pointing out that initially Paul says that he 
is from an English background and only when was asked if both parents were English 
does he describe his dad as Afrikaans and 'more conservative'. This may be because 
he feels that in the new South Africa people look more kindly upon white people of an 
English background as there is a perception that these people are less responsible than 
those of an Afrikaans background. He portrays his family as being fairly liberal, 
especially his mother who was also a 'joller. ,xvi Paul also describes colleagues as 
'more conservative' to portray his family in a more positive light. 
Paul's defense of his thinking is in terms of Communism, as has been mentioned 
above. Because Communism has by and large failed across the world, by emphasizing 
the struggle against Communism rather than racism (which is still considered 
unacceptable in the world today) Paul makes his actions seem more rational. Paul says 
'The commies were going to rape the women and turn the Churches into bloody 
squats, that type of stuff, so ja, I think in that sense, I still say that we weren't 
politicized, I didn't come from any more than an average white South African 
family.' The religious reference attempts to legitimate these fears in moral terms. The 
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\yay that Paul sets his family as not politicized but portrays these assumptions as facts 
by the use of the word 'were' is also an attempt to make this seem like common sense 
and sets up his image as an ordinary man in the context of South Africa. Wetherell 
and Potter (1992: 185) argue that people tend to portray the past as characteristic of 
history. By placing things firmly in the past it is assumed that things have improved 
and therefore the status quo is justified. Thus by making reference to the 'usual' way 
of thinking that has since changed, Paul is able to portray himself as a reasonable 
person in the New South Africa. 
There is a huge silence on the issue of racism and Paul makes references to black 
friends throughout the text. He describes 'a Xhosa buddy who was a black Namibian 
South West cop behind us, wonderful guy, god but he was bloodthirsty.' Paul makes 
sure that he mentions the man's race to portray himself as a non-racist yet quickly 
defines the man as bloodthirsty. This shows an attempt to seem unbiased but also to 
portray this man in a more negative light than Paul himself. 
The most notable aspect in which Paul's narrative can be seen as being framed in a 
more acceptable discourse is with regards to the TRe. Paul says 'I knew it was 
coming and in a bizarre way I possibly helped father the TRe. With Goldstone those 
cases were crapped out. They drew up a report which was an agreement by de Klerk 
and Nelson Mandela, and you've got to read that. It's horrendous. And I quote him: 
"Reading through Erasmus's casebooks is a depressing ... '" The sense of superiority 
that is prevalent throughout Paul's narrative is still apparent. even in the context of the 
present day. It is impossible that Paul could ever be described as one of the fathers of 
the TRC and yet Paul suggests that his involvement actually instigated what followed 
in South Africa. This discourse legitimates his actions and sustains power relations by 
suggesting that he knew the best way forward for South Africa at the time of the 
transition. It suggests that Paul is a rational person and that everything he previously 
did was in the context of what was going on in South Africa at the time. 
Even so, Paul still undermines the TRC process, portraying it as ridiculous and legally 
incompetent. He states that he got amnesty except for 22 incidents 
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'which freaked me out because the non-amnesty thing was for being part of 
the surveillance system. I mean I was a year old vvhen that all came out the postal 
interceptions and telephones. And now it's only recently I sort of got to why this 
phenomena happened, I mean how the hell can they ever hold me responsible for 
that? Simply the TRC didn't have the legal weight to give me amnesty on those 
things. But there is another little sting in that as well that if those cases are ever 
opened again I would certainly be charged or used as a state-witness against the 
people that might have been responsible. The one thing was I stole flowerpots and 
they didn't give me amnesty because they found out it was for personal gain, you 
know, it was ridi .. .1 thought it was pretty (laugh) ... flowerpots!' 
The TRC mandate was to deal only with politically motivated crimes and the decision 
not to grant amnesty for stealing flowerpots is therefore totally justified. By placing 
the emphasis on the nature of the crime rather than the mandate of the TRC Paul is 
diminishing the validity of the TRC. He even gloats that 'Proof in the pudding is that 
in all those years up until the TRC, never one arrest or conviction of any third force.' 
Paul also undermines the essence of the struggle against apartheid stating 
, ... the country won its freedom, but at what cost? It's all... you know the last 
forty years of history in this country has been a senseless waste. I take it from my life 
sort of, where I saw things ... .1 took an oath that this guy, my son, will never carry a 
gun. I mean guns, we live on a farm but. .. but with great circumstances. But to put on 
a uniform, never. I dunno, you know I watched those planes fly into the towers and I 
had a rethink on that, I dunno, it's the old question of violence and non-violence, the 
oldjust and unjust war theory.' 
Firstly Paul suggests that the cost of freedom does not outweigh the benefits of 
apartheid. This again legitimates his actions under the old regime by portraying this 
regime in a positive light. By saying that he took his life from where he saw things 
Paul is placing in actions in the context of the previous regime and legitimating his 
actions further. By comparing the struggle to terrorism Paul is implying that liberation 
movements are similar to terrorist movements. He justifies his past actions in terms of 
the current 'acceptable' status quo and links his actions to age-old moral debates. This 
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insinuates that there was a moral element behind his actions and therefore allows him 
to evade responsibility. 
Paul remains optimistic about the future. He says 'We all fought for this bloody old 
place so let's make a go of it. I'm very positive. I had to rebuild my life, I was on 
drugs, I was hospitalized 14 times for stress, I'm not complaining there, I mean I'm 
here running a business, providing employment for people.' Paul attempts to show 
himself as rational and now inclusive towards all by saying 'we all fought' yet by 
mentioning that he provides employment Paul is still portraying himself as superior 
and thus sustaining relations of domination. 
4.9 Concluding remarks: 
So what do we know from this analysis? As is described in Foster, Haupt & de Beer's 
(2005) model, Paul describes his life as one where he got slowly sucked in to a series 
of events. As Foster et al (2005 :78) point out a special case of dialogical spiraling is a 
conspiracy mentality. This occurs when a threatened group blames a minority group, 
suggesting that they wish to overthrow the social order. This is certainly apparent in 
Paul's narrative with regards to Communism. The reasons Paul gives for his actions 
are often linked to this notion and are placed in the context of the Cold War. Despite 
Paul's insistence on the importance of following orders throughout the TRC amnesty 
hearings, in the present day interview he says 'I never ever said and will say "Don't 
blame me, I was simply following orders'''. However, Paul is inconsistent on this 
issue and at other times claims that he acted on the basis of instructions. There may be 
some support therefore for Milgram's (1974) notion of obedience to authority, yet 
other factors are also at work throughout Paul"s narrative and there is a stronger sense 
of agency than situationist perspectives allow. 
Nevertheless, Paul often diffuses blame. He either shifts the blame onto his colleagues 
and to superiors or down towards victims. At best he gives partial acknowledgement 
of his immoral acts. Whilst trying to portray himself as reasonable, Paul nevertheless 
frequently slips into masculine language that demonstrates a sense of pride and a 
strong loyalty to the organization. Most importantly however, there is a sense of 
agency throughout the narrative that implies entitlement, often shown through 
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superiority. Entitlement is brought about through varIOUS ideologies and 
organizational factors and this is clear in Paul's narrative - the intersection of 
Christian-Nationalism, police discourse and masculinity all create a dangerous mix 
that leads to a sense of entitlement. 
There is therefore strong support for Foster, Haupt & de Beer's (2005) model of 
entitlement and Paul's narrative does not differ in any major way. The strong element 
of masculinity also concurs with the conceptions of masculinity described by Huggins 
et al (2002). It is sad to note that whilst Paul tries to frame his narrative in a now more 
socially acceptable discourse in South Africa, he still undermines the current regime 
and legitimates the apartheid regime and therefore still attempts to maintain relations 
of domination. 
7;\ 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Amanda Lucey 
Conclusion 
This thesis has been a psychological analysis of political violence. It has focussed 
predominantly on the narrative account of an (ex) state agent, Paul Erasmus. This 
thesis began by introducing the topic and reflecting the need for further research ten 
years after the TRC. Key concepts were clarified and the research questions were 
defined as follows. The first question was general and concerned how someone 
becomes a perpetrator of political violence. The remaining questions were specific to 
Paul Erasmus and asked how one can understand Paul's motivations and intentions 
for committing acts of political violence based on sources written at the time of the 
TRC and then based on the present day interview from his point of view. Further 
questions asked what psychological processes played a role in the propensity to 
commit acts of political violence and how these processes fitted in with the relational 
model set out by Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005). 
In order to begin answering the above research questions, Chapter 1 clarified key 
concepts and outlined the problems of varying approaches to studying perpetrators. It 
then described the amnesty process of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
claiming that the statistics and forensic truth provided by the TRC are inadequate for 
understanding Paul's motivations and intentions. Chapter 2 examined previous 
academic understandings of political violence. It argued that neither situational nor 
dispositional accounts could produce an adequate account of how someone becomes a 
perpetrator of political violence. It then went on to outline Foster et als' (2005) 
relational model arguing that this approach can best provide an understanding of 
political violence in South Africa but that more research was needed. Chapter 3 
therefore detailed the way in which this research was to be carried out. Chapter 4 first 
analysed the extent to which media representation concerning Paul provided an 
understanding of his motivations and intentions for committing acts of violence. An 
interview conducted with David Goodman (1999) was examined, as were the 
obtainable transcripts relating to Paul from the TRC. It was argued that these sources 
did not provide a useful understanding for a variety of reasons-the interview with 
Goodman was somewhat sensationalist, the media legitimated his actions and the 
amnesty transcript was specific to certain incidents and too legalistic. 
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Based on the interview the thesis then looked at Paul's reasons and non-reasons (i.e. 
the reasons that Paul cannot be blamed) for committing acts of political violence. 
Agreeing with Arendt (1977) to some extent, Paul came across as an ordinary, 
reasonable person who claimed to have been drawn into processes that were hard to 
get out of, rather like the 'foot-in-the-door' phenomenon and also akin to Foster et 
aI's (2005) claim of sequential spiralling. The ideological effects of anti-Communist 
thinking and the context of the Cold War were emphasised by Paul. Throughout the 
narrative blame was often deflected by blaming victims and colleagues. 
The narrative was not strikingly different from the relational model set out by Foster 
et al (2005). The same key themes were apparent, such as the undeniable role that the 
organisation, the Security Branch, played. Masculinity was also a large element of the 
narrative, relating most to Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardos' (2002) 
conception of blended masculinity. There was also strong support for the notion of 
entitlement. Sadly, Paul never took full responsibility for his actions. Blame was often 
deflected and his actions often legitimated through his discourse. 
This thesis has therefore contributed to the corpus of knowledge surrounding political 
violence. Whilst this case study cannot be generalised, it does strongly support Foster 
et also (2005) relational model and has provided an insight into the workings of a state 
agent. Future research should collect more of these narratives in order to provide a 
further understanding. This thesis has focussed on a policeman whose story is fairly 
well known. It would consequently be interesting to examine narratives from'lesser 
known' policemen. Furthermore it would be fascinating to see how narratives from 
perpetrators higher up the chain of command describe their experiences, particularly 
in relation to Foster et al\s (2005 model of entitlement. 
Despite Paul never taking full responsibility for his actions (in that he continues to 
diffuse blame onto others and excuses his behaviour in different ways), Erasmus has 
taken more responsibility than most. He spoke out as early as the Golstone 
Commision and has also made attempts at reconciliation. At such a point in South 
Africa's history it is sad that other perpetrators have not even done this. Forgiveness 
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by victims can only come once perpetrators have told the truth and show their 
remorse. 
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Appendix: Interview Transcript with Paul Erasmus 
Paul: Ag, I don't know, where did it all start? Well, I certainly didn't that I would end up where I was, 
but anyway .. ,. Normal South African upbringing, we had to go to the army or the police, no money to 
go to varsity .... (sigh) ... and (sigh) God, I got my call-up papers, like everybody, navy, navy, navy, 
navy and everybody tried to pull strings. My brother was lucky to get into the air force and in six 
months he got out of it. He never got called up for a camp or something like that. .. .Ja, matriculated in 
'74, my call-up was Potchefstroom, god forbid, (inaudible) .... But a friend of mine joined the police 
force and the big thing then was I had a girlfriend and when I found out about this he said "nah, you're 
crazy, go to Potch for 18 months and go to the cops in Pretoria which is just down the road" (I grew up 
in Jo'burg) and that's when it all started. 
Amanda: So you grew up in Jo'burg, in ... 
Paul: Bedfordview 
Amanda: In Bedfordview, ok ... 
Paul: English background 
Amanda: English background-both your parents? 
Paul: No, my dad worked for the government, he was I suppose more conservative. My father, in fact, 
wrote a lot of the, many of the legislation governing you know the old Pass laws. My mum was pretty 
liberal but I mean we weren't politicized as kids, I had older friends that went to Witts in 19 .... was it 
1973 there was a street uprising at Witts .... I used to hear all the skinner from them and there was all 
these jokes of John Vorster looking in the toilets, I mean kids looking into the toilets, and saying 
'excuse me, is that the Prime minister. .. ' (laughs) But I mean, I never took any of it seriously-we were 
very much sheltered. 
Amanda: And what were your parents like, did you get on well with them? 
Paul: Had a difficult relationship with my dad, um, my mum was amazing, she was a real, ajoler I 
suppose, you know very liberated, encouraged us to read, get into arts and stuff like that. My father 
didn't want any of it (inaudible) was a straight down the road, finish school, go work for the 
government, get a bursary, study, go to university, whatever, 
Amanda: Yeah, 
Paul: They always wanted me to be my dad also wanted me to be a lawyer because I had a pretty good 
school and my mum was against it-she wanted me to do art, everything was art, become an artist. 
Amanda: And you? Did you want to become an artist? 
Paul: Jesus, I don't know. I didn't want to sit behind a desk. Of course going to the police just 
hammered that point home. Most of my friends went to the army. (inaudible) And they all went to 
work, most of them go to varsity-that was the way life worked, they went to work in banks, stand for 
six days taking people's money and I thought 'god I am not cut out for this.' You know office work 
and just being stuck in an environment. I just always had this wanderlust and I think there the police 
was a vehicle where I could sort of. .. because you were never office bound. So ja, I went to the bloody 
police college in 1975 and I came out and I was going to leave straight away and then they started 
changing the laws. Coz at, when I joined the police you only had to do a year. They said in some sort of 
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emergency or if the situation warrants they can call you back at any time, and when I came out of 
police college in 75 (ja, the police riots were in 76) they changed it again. They said you can either do 
18 months, either a years service the uniformed branch in Cleve land or if you left now you had to come 
back in five years and do a three month camp 
But I still had no idea what I wanted to do with my life. But anyway, I stuck it out there with a view to 
leaving at the end of the year, that had made my mind up. 
Amanda: How did you find it when you first started? 
Paul: It was a lot of excitement. Um, a lot of frustration as well. I mean being English speaking at that 
point, I couldn't speak-I could read and write Afrikaans, so I always had this hang-up about speaking 
Afrikaans. It was a very Afrikaans world, I mean when I was at a police station there was only two 
English speaking guys, and the rest of the guys were really conservative, I mean real philistines you 
know? And then of course police college was totally anti-English, I think 1700 cops and only about 
120-150 English-speaking guys. So they were pretty much victimized a lot. But it was all, you know, 
everybody took it in their stride. I came out of Police College on the 3rd December 75 and then I 
thought I would stick it out until the end ofthe following year and I wouldn't have to do these camps. 
But then of course there was Wednesday June 16, which I think, changed my life and changed 
everybody's lives. This whole country changed. And 1 got up and went to work, and I mean there was 
no work in those years, Amanda (laughs), my job was a ... I had a motorbike with a radio on the back, 
and a helmet, I'd get about, I used to serve what they called 'Processed pieces'. I had to ride around the 
area, and serve warrants of arrest on people, parking tickets or serve summons, you know, this type of 
General ... and the whole job, I mean, the police force then was worse then what it is now. Nobody 
worked, [ mean everybody was ducking and diving, everybody had sideline interests so [ used to get 
up, I worked office hours, I would go to Cleveland police station in the morning (laughing), with my 
coffee, get my little heap of work that would take me some days half an hour. Some days [ had nothing. 
So I used to go home, take off my uniform (hearty laugh) and lie at the swimming pool, go visit my 
girlfriend, and then at about the middle of the day I would show my face, you know, go back there sit, 
the guys used to play poker, some of them drank and four 0' clock we would knock off. And 
Wednesday June 16 was no exception, none of us had the faintest, we had no inkling what trouble was 
coming. Got up in the morning, I had no work that day. I went to see an old girlfriend of mine from 
standard six and I was sitting drinking coffee with her and the radio was on in the background, in the 
kitchen in fact, and at about half past nine, nine 0 clock, it was early, she still had her night gown, or 
whatever, she came through, she said to me "Paul, there's bloody shit going on in Soweto.' I said 
'You're kidding' and [ still didn't worry about it, I just sat there. Remember what was going on in 
Soweto? And [don't know, I must have got back to the police station at about 10 o'clock,jus, I 
couldn't believe it. The guys were standing ... parade; it was like Police College again. Everybody 
was ... I didn't even carry a gun, I wore a soft belt. They were dishing out rifles and we were basically 
told, you know, there was trouble. Anyway, they divided half the guys up, half in Soweto, the other 
they were on standby at the police station, they drived us and then at five 0' clock they took us to John 
Vorster Square. No winter clothing, I mean it was freezing cold, no bloody food (laugh) and we sat in 
the parade with hundreds and hundreds of policemen. They gave us bags, as much ammunition as what 
70 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
To
wn
Amanda Lucey 
we could shove in your pockets, and those old tunics that we used to wear and our rifles. Still laugh at 
guys who went into Soweto with their tickets (hearty laugh), it's hysterical, you know, just bought it 
from the shop and the price ticket hanging on his rifle. Anyway, then I was in Soweto for. .. it was June 
the 16th .•• about two days and then trouble started in .... and the area that I was in had hospitals. The 
mineworkers started to, you know, come up in arms as well. Not so much on the side of the comrades, 
they were trying to, some of them, stop it in sorts, you know, settle this thing, you know, it was just 
butchery. I think that's what made, maybe made ... it was the first sort of dead people I have really seen, 
a real trauma. But I think that's what made me decide to stay, you know, in the cops. Although not in 
the uniformed guards. This friend of mine that had got me into it, his dad engineered that he got me 
into the Security Branch, which was almost impossible, it was like this brotherhood you know, so ja, 
started in the Security Branch in January 77 
Amanda: And was there training when you went in there? 
Paul: Ja, I think the following year, 78 I went to a six week Intelligence (contradiction in terms) laugh 
training course in Pretoria-back to the police college and that course was pretty hectic. Um, ag, I don't 
know I could keep you busy for hours, and tell you most of it, the whole spectrum of. .. in fact all my 
notes still exist, handwritten and radio that they gave us. It's quite fascinating and I have incorporated a 
lot of it into my book, um. The course leader was probably one of the top Broederbonders in this 
country, a brigadier, Hilston ... I mean this guy made Terreblanche look like a left-winger; he would 
rave and rant about Communism, threats and so on. Now his background was, I mean, he was a pro-
Nazi; there was a really strong Nazi element in the police. This emerged later of course when the 
A WB, you know, started to interfere. Half of the A WB was in the SAP. So, ja that was the training that 
we had and then for the next. ... . 
Amanda: Do you think that you ... how did you find the training? 
Paul: It was fascinating 
Amanda: Did it affect you? 
Paul: I suppose we were propogandised a lot, I mean when you left that course you wanted to have one 
thing in mind, to get out there and anyone that was an enemy of the state, that was a .... we were taught 
things and those notes exist to this day, like interrogation, I think the lectures on interrogation was two 
days. And There is no doubt firstly that those notes are genuine, I mean they can be subject to testing, 
I've kept them and a very interesting thing emerged there was, the guy that gave this side was one of 
the Security Branches top interrogators, a senior guy. In my notebooks you can see it actually 
highlighted was (Afrikaans ... ) 'You had to reduce the person that you were interrogating to a point 
where you controlled his life' and sleep deprivation, another interesting thing, sleep deprivation played 
a very big part in it. Anyway, I'm digressing there but years later all this was surface, all the deaths in 
detention, and sleep deprivation the effects of it, so ja. 
Amanda: And the people at the time, was that better for you when you went into the security branch? 
Paul: Well certainly a cut above the rest of your normal uniformed police. You must remember in those 
days you only needed a standard six to get into the police. Half of the officers only had standard six. 
Um, there was a lot of, there were some fantastic people, there were a lot of trashy types as well, you 
know, low lives. Um, it was sheltered employment; the intellectual side fell out the window. I saw that 
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from day 1,1 was regarded as, um a 'bloody Engelsman, groot bek, smart ideas, too big for my boots, 
Having a matric with distinctions like I had was quite amazing (pride), not that it ever helped me 
because that actually worked against me because I couldn't pass information exams in the police. There 
was a secret promotion system if you weren't the right type, that you didn't belong to the right 
organization, or you had the wrong family connections. Uh, things counted against you, type of stuff. 
And in fact that's still the case in the police today, with the whole thing about post-traumatic stress and 
these murders and stuff. We saw that talk was it last night or the night before ... 
Amanda: Not sure 
Paul: Last night. If a guy feels like he needs counseling or he has a stress problem or something like 
that in those years if you opened your mouth it went on your record and it counted against you. But 
least of all going to see a psychologist or a psychiatrist because immediately you were blacklisted, 
immediately. The only recourse that anybody ever had was to the Dominic and there were no English 
speaking Dominic in the police force any way so nobody ever bothered. But I mean I developed a 
stress problem, ja, jumping ahead, um ja for the next 16 years of the Security Branch at John Vorster 
Square. But ja in 1981 I volunteered to go to the border, I was ... Ovamboland was EuGene de Kock 
and that mob. 
Amanda: Ok, and what made you ... did you just want to get out... 
Paul: Yis, I wanted to go to the border so badly (laughing) I threatened to resign if they didn't let me 
go! Simply because half of the guys that I had worked with had all been up there. You hadn't sort of, 
you weren't accepted totally unless you had gone to the border, so ja, the police force, the border was 
an entirely voluntary thing, right through the police and the security branch. And ja, I took a knock, I 
think everybody did. Just the scale and the propensity and the horror, even having been in the Security 
Branch before that. Life just meant nothing, absolutely nothing, it was worthless. Often the guys that 
had been in the Security Branch used to get up every morning ... when we were in town for example, 
every morning we started the day off with a prayer. We'd have coffee, the whole staff would sit on this 
veranda under the bloody makalane palms, everybody with babalases of course but I was there about 
probably two weeks and um it took hours to get anything done, that was typical, the guys had to 
prepare the vehicles, and we were sent out on patrols, all this type of stuff. There was this box of 
rubbish that the guys had brought in or whatever, and I looked in this box out of boredom and here was 
a skeleton, I mean there was a human body in this box, and I took this thing out and I said ... I actually 
wanted to bring it back to make an ornament out of it, with the skull and a couple of the bones. And 
you know, only many years later Amanda, it sort of dawned on me just how depraved and 
desensitized ... I don't know the right words for something like that, but it was unbelievable. And this 
guy once said to me "Ag it's ou kak, the guys picked it up in the veld. It's probably a ter that was shot 
you know' (Nervous laugh) Steal it a later stage and bring it home with me, post it out or what ever, 
which I didn't do. 
Amanda: So did they tell you to ... what kind of things did they tell you to do? 
Paul: Our job there, we were on the intelligence gathering side of things once again. We had a fighting 
unit, it was Koevoet, it was part of the Security Branch, effective, the very name Koevoet, comes from, 
it was the official codename, secret codenames operation K, unconventional fighting was a part of the 
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Security Branch, so it's members came from the Security Branch or from other areas where they had 
proved themselves-like de Kock's background which was amazing. He was probably one of the best 
policemen that ever walked the, uniformed policemen in this country, beyond corruption, absolutely 
fearless, I mean that man never had a scared hair on his head; he was extremely, extremely intelligent. 
He started his career with Basson at Boxford Police Station amongst all the Lebanese and all the cops 
there were taking bribes and arrives this bugger with his thick glasses from Police college in Pretoria 
and they posted him out in vans and I mean the East Rand then was controlled by all these Lebanese 
gangs and gambling and brothels and shebeens and this type of stuff. De Kock got stuck in and he 
knocked the hell out of these guys and eventually his own colleagues set him up on the circico 
(inaudible) They went to this house the one night (Dylan knows) and took this old guy in the van or 
whatever, there was this hell of a fight in the shebeen, there was a lot of dangerous guys involved, 
many on the run and his commander then said 'EuGene go sort it out' knowing that he probably 
wouldn't come out there alive. The story goes so old de Kock went in there, (small laugh) this guy sat 
he lit a cigarette and thought we will wait for half an hour and then call for back-up. And he heard this 
hell of a gunshots and windows breaking and the next de Kock started to drag the guys one by one. 
He'd knocked the hell out of this whole lot, gangsters, wanted criminals and I don't know what, he 
dragged them all out, his uniform was torn like a ... glasses broken, threw the guys in the back of the 
van. So with a reputation like that he started to get noticed and the rest as they say is history because 
fuck he joined the police just before I did. He was a pretty tough guy so secretly the word was out-we 
need guys like de Kock, you know, no fear. So what did they do, South Africa secretly, well openly but 
also secretly on another front, fighting then in Rhodesia, they send de Kock up-well he volunteered but 
he made his name in the Rhodesian war and also looked at the Scouts, this unconventional fighting 
group so when the other cops came back they said to me ... 'Learn what you can' and hence Koevoet 
Amanda: But you were in Intelligence gathering? 
Paul: Ja, which was the one army, we were an Intelligence and a fighting unit and Koevoet itself, they 
would take the so called Spoor and you know, run the guys down and kill them, klar. Ifany of them 
were caught alive you would do the interrogations and that was my job, so ja, quite hectic. 
Amanda: Hmm. What was it like when you first had to do it? Was that the first time you ever had to 
interrogate someone or..? 
Paul: Yirrah, No, no I was bored. We had shock machines and that was it. Um, just, ja, that's the way it 
worked. I was with EuGene and them the one day when, at a what do you call it, firefight scene and 
one of the ters was caught alive, and I mean there was no argument, he was shot through the thigh, 
some guys took a rifle, a bayonet and pushed it through the wound, pegged him to the ground and made 
him speak, and I mean I watched that guy die, so that was it, you know he didn't speak. We saw it in a 
different way, if you didn't get them to speak you were costing somebody their life, um, or you were 
costing lives because if you didn't get them to talk you wouldn't know who else to go and arrest or 
shoot or kill or whatever. And that would be the guys putting reprimands down or torturing or 
whatever. But let me tell you they were savages as well; I saw things that S W APO did that were even 
more horrendous. I mean, that's I suppose the nature of war. 
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Amanda: And I suppose it's hard to know ... in that situation you get quite a lot of leeway as well I 
suppose 
Paul: la, well I took a guy out, an old guy, I searched his kraal not far from oshakati, I mean he wasn't 
an active, we all knew that, he'd been lying in his cell. .. (inaudible) just clear the cell. What happened 
was, whoever it was had found (they had searched his kraal) and they had found a bottle of (another 
irony in this little story) Danish antibiotics, Danish penicillin, which was carried by SW APO, and on 
the strength of that and that alone, tossed him in the cell-he was a grandfather, in fact. The guy 
probably in his fifties and we took him out, put a bag over him, handcuffed him and chucked him in the 
vehicle and drove out this, myself, a white guy and a black guy, and the bugger made a run for it and I 
shot him there and then. You know (gasp) big excitement, first person for (inaudible) you know, got 
back to the base and there was my boss standing, you know, he saw the two bullets that had hit him 
nearly took his arm right off his body. He came out and he said to me 'Ag, yirrah, now if s more 
paperwork-what happened?' So I said, he said "man, bury the oke, go and dump him.' That afternoon 
preparing statements, (laugh) even up there the law had a Teutonic thoroughness. It was after all, a 
death in detention, and this cop, detective came in and said to me "What happened?' So I told him, 
we'd already revised the story just in case and he said Nee, ifs alright, rtl organise everything, like 
filled in the dockets, speak to the magistrate, you know ... war. 
Amanda: And was that the first time you shot someone? 
Paul: I had shot someone before but not dead, in 76 I mean who knows whose bullets hit who, you shot 
everything that breathed, moved, barked, walked. 
Amanda: And was it a bit of a shock to you or do you think you had already become so desensitized by 
that point? 
Paul: Do you know, I have never got over that hey, never, I don't know, you know it's just. .. I suppose 
I went through this (clears throat) whole moral thing, afterwards. I think it was a shock. It was a shock 
in that I knew it was me that did it. The second thing was I was in charge, um. The third thing was this 
was half past eight in the morning, we were already drinking. We had this slapgat attitude, that was 
gung ho. So we broken all the rules, the guy should never have been allowed to run to get him shot. No 
the whole thing was just wrong, you know, to be in that madness of it, I think. I hawk to think about 
how much alcohol we would go through each night. I mean that was just how life worked. So wherever 
we went everybody drank everyday, the whole day. For the regular cops and us I mean it was just a 
pretty poor show. In fact the same thing happened in Rhodesia in the SAP's record there, it was 38 
cops who killed in Rhodesia and I think probably 90% in alcohol related incidents, guys shooting each 
other. One bugger got drunk and jumped into a pool and got eaten by a crocodile, you know, this type 
of stuff. So it was very muck like, ja, like a gung-ho type (ag) 
Amanda: Yeah, do you think the alcohol impaired your judgement or do you think that it just made you 
not really care that much? 
Paul: It did impair my judgement; I mean we never allowed things like that to happen. But I made it, a 
hell ofa ... 1 misjudged the situation entirely just by virtue of the guy's age (clears throat) I mean it 
never even entered my mine he would run away. And when we stopped at this place, we weren't at the 
kraal-that was another thing where I think I was on good ground. As he ran, I don't speak the language 
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but we had a Xhosa buddy who was a black Namibian South West cop behind us, wonderful guy, god, 
but he was bloodthirsty, the suspects shouted 'Umba, umba, umba, umba' and I mean our training was 
we all hit the deck because I thought it was an ambush I mean, ja, we opened fire without question. 
Point is it shouldn't have happened. We shouldn't have stopped at that place, we weren't at his kraal, 
you got to work through interpreters, you know, it's a lack of communication, but ja, a lot of guilt, I 
mean he wasn't a terrorist you know. I wouldn't have had the same feeling if the guy had a gun in his 
hand. (Pause) But it worried me. In fact that night at the pub a lot of the guys had a go at me, they said 
'You're shooting innocent people you know' (hearty laugh) 
Amanda: Oh really? 
Paul: .... ifyou find you find yourself a ter don't kill old men! 
Amanda: I wouldn't have expected that reaction. 
Paul: la, life was cheap. 
Amanda: So did they feel that there were certain standards? 
Paul: It was more ajoke than anything. 
Amanda: Oh ok. 
Paul: la, to watch the guys after you had been into contact, everybody went into a state of, I don't 
know, I don't know enough about psychology, but I don't think you are normal after. ....... . 
(inaudible) In fact it never even came in for policemen, it came in for agents, the agents were 
psychometrically tested and right at the end of my career when I started to become crap with my 
commanders they turned the heat on me, they actually tried to kill me as well. My story started long 
ago. Not like some people would allege I am this turncoat, and the other one that I heard was that I was 
spying for the ANC from 1977 but right at the end of my career in fact. the last year that I left, I was 
taken from Mossel Bay, my last station with a total, almost total nervous breakdown, I was escorted, I 
was taken to Cape Town and I had to see the in-house police psychologist and fill in his monkey 
puzzles or whatever. And they rigged it, and the idea was then coz I was a threat to certain people they 
wanted to kick me out of the security branch coz I found out about a lot of corruption. I followed Gene 
incidentally, I never took bribes. One of the cops that never did (laugh) but anyway. I am proud of it. 
Everybody was taking them. You saw it from day one, the whole police force, it was rotten. I don't 
know if it's improved and I don't think so, just from our own experiences here in George, you know, 
free drinks here, cigarettes there, going up the scale to like serious corruption, coz either way, why? We 
were so badly paid, treated like shit, um, ill led, understaffed, the rest of it. 
Amanda: But I mean there must have been something that motivated you to stay? 
Paul: Well, I was pretty committed hey, I mean I was. I was a bloody good cop. I never took, like I 
said, I never took bribes. I got nine commendations as a security cop. which is some sort of record, um, 
I did ajob well. There was a lot of us, dedicated people in the Security Branch, like Nani. My partner 
died now a couple of years ago, it was terrible. He was unlike me never treated, never went to hospital, 
he was a bomb disposal expert, in my eyes a true hero. I mean this guy was decent all the way down 
the line. And so much so that at the end with all this madness, he was given instruction as a policeman 
to throw hand grenade into lo'burg radio controls thing, de Klerk and the media propaganda stuff 
against the ANC, and this snapped him. it finished Nani offhey. Nervous breakdown-19 years service 
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and seven months-he just walked in the one day and said 'Thar s it, cheers' So ja, there was never an 
outlet, I mean, I went secretly in 1988. I had, I literally went under a false name simply because I 
wasn't coping. I mean this little oke was a year old, he had massive medical problems (clears throat), it 
was doctor after doctor and I worked those years an 18-hour day everyday, day or night. And it didn't 
matter, you didn't get more money for it, they relied on loyalty and our loyalty was abused. But 
anyway, I went to see a psychiatrist in George, and he said to me, on a lighter note, he said to me 'My 
boy, you sit and complain about your feet when your shoes are the problem' and he said to me 'resign.' 
But go where? I needed the medical aid. 
Amanda: So when did you meet Dylan's mum, a long time ago? 
Paul: Hmm, 1983. Well met her in 82, married in 83 and ... ja. Went through a lot. .. together. She 
didn't know all of this but it was a bizarre lifestyle, I couldn't exactly tell her. ... 'honey what did you 
do at the office today?' 'No, busy planning to blow up this building in lo'burg (laugh). You know it's 
bizarre. 
Amanda: Did she ever ask you ... 
Paul: Uh, she knew quite a lot of things; obviously you don't know everything, not the whole picture. 
In fact my marriage went when she typed my amnesty application because then it all came down to, 
um, that was the last nail in the coffin. I mean there it was now like in a condensed version and I got 
divorced shortly afterwards. That was, um, well she said afterwards she didn't know that she was 
married to a monster (pause) I mean look it even horrified me because these things were over a scale of 
18 years and all of a sudden ... 
Amanda: '" to put it into that condensed form 
Paul: God, 527 incidents. It reads like Marquis de Sade 
Amanda: Wow, 527 incidents ... that's a lot. 
Paul (laughing): I dubiously hold the South African record for amnesty applications. It's horrendous 
hey? 
Amanda: But then obviously none of that was from Namibia? 
Paul: No, I did apply for amnesty for just that one incident. But I referred to it broadly. I didn't know at 
the time because (laugh) one of the guys my story came out quite quickly and I got into this slugging 
match with de Klerk and Botha, you know drove past his house this morning. I didn't know, [just went 
into that whole amnesty thing with 'I've got to be as honest as hell because irs only chance of getting 
out of there. Andthe second thing is Amanda, I kept all my casebooks. And the third thing was, I don't 
know what makes me different from the others but the abuse didn't catch me like it caught a lot of the 
other guys, uh, a lot of the Koevoet guys they couldn't even get a sensible statement out of them they 
were so buggered from drugs or booze, or Ferdi with cocaine. Even de Kock was totally offhis head, 
he was way out of it-an intelligent guy with his background, you know the wheels had come off 
everywhere. But you know, I had sat down, I think I hadn't touched a drink for two years, I had my 
case-books to rely on and I suppose a good memory so I could document stuff that many people had 
forgotten about. 
Amanda: Or that higher up officials had chosen to forget about? 
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Paul: Ja, and then I also didn't fit with other guys 'Let's keep quiet about this, nobody else knows 
about this,' I was totally isolated, no contact. I went under a witness protection programme. So, 
Anyway, it served me well at the end because I did get amnesty barring on 22 incidents, which freaked 
me out because the non-amnesty thing was for being part of the surveillance system. I mean I was a 
year old when that all came out, the postal interceptions and telephones. I mean it's only now recently I 
sort of got to why this phenomena happened, I mean how the hell can they ever hold me responsible for 
that? Simply, the TRC didn't have the legal weight to give me amnesty on those things. But there is 
another little sting in that as well that if those cases are ever opened again I would certainly either be 
charged or used as a state-witness against the people that might have been responsible. And then some 
of them just bizarre. The one thing was I stole flowerpots and they didn't give me amnesty because 
they found out it was for personal gain, you know it was ridi ... I thought it was pretty 
(laugh) .... flowerpots 
Amanda: I wouldn't mind going back to ... if you don't mind, 
Paul: Not at all 
Amanda: you were telling me about Namibia, how long were you there for? 
Paul: I think about nine months 
Amanda: And then you came back and what happened when you came back? 
Paul: Jesus, I arrived back to chaos. You know what they did, Amanda, they gave me seven days leave 
to recover in. I got home and I walked into this- from that totally lawless society, I walked into. I was 
still with my parents, it was two years before I got married and I thought what the hell am I doing back 
in Jo'burg? I went out that night, I hadn't bathed I think in two days and was wearing the same uniform 
and I went to the pub in Yeoville and I started ... two things happened, I got caught speeding, I wanted 
to take out the traffic cop, which was hysterical (laughing) the guy was whimpering, I had a gun like 
this, I said to him 'How dare you come and try and take ... ' Then I ended up in a hell of a bar fight. I 
don't know, it took me a long time to recover from that. About, I think it was a Friday or whatever, 
anyway, I had this official week's leave, seven days, I went back to work on the Monday, Tuesday. My 
boss said to me "what are you doing?' Jesus, and I moped around, moped around, I couldn't get back, I 
couldn't adjust at all and I think it was about three days I walked into his office, I said 'j'm going back 
to Koevoet permanently.' Jesus, And those OllS sat there moaning. He said to me 'Nah, stay here, you 
just need a break, why don't you take leave. But I mean I needed somebody to, I suppose I needed 
support. 
Amanda: And was it a big change? Did you come back with a lot of people or where you suddenly 
surrounded by men who had never been to the border? 
Paul: Uh, a lot of that and then getting back to this humdrum existence, I mean from all that excitement 
to lesser excitement. Because I mean being in the Security Branch was I suppose if anything, never 
boring, urn, most of the time I was my own boss or in charge of things, (pause) total freedom of 
movement, urn once again the best of everything, secrets, fun. That I applied for amnesty, well I didn't 
take bribes but I used government money unashamedly like there was no tomorrow, we all did. Long 
pause ... Ja, that was hectic, 
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Amanda: Did you find when you got back there was more guidance, they told you more what you 
could or couldn't do, or was it pretty much the same? 
Paul: Urn, ja, I think it was (pause, sigh) Once you've been to the border it was like you had your final 
sort of like colours, (Jy's mos'n ouman nou, die krens ... ???? ) Blah di blah di blah. I remember once 
telling my boss that I had shot a guy and he said to me 'What are you feeling bad about?' You know, 
that was the attitude, there was nobody to really talk to. I didn't have the sort of... my dad went 
through the war and he had post-traumatic stress as well. I only realized that way after his death; I 
mean he was up north as they used to say those years, three years. He was a pilot. And he hated us, my 
brother and I ever even questioning about what happened. But I never started to understand him until I 
started to understand myself. You know my dad had obviously, because he came back a different 
person. That I only know from his writings, when he met my mum six years before the war he was a 
loving, decent, sensitive guy. I never knew my father like that. But that thing ... I traced the family 
history because when he died I got everything from the love letter-the whole lots and irs amazing. 
Amanda: Was he quite strict with you when you were growing up? 
Paul (laugh, clears throat): Jesus, ja. Old man just looked at you boy, froze or you got a clout, one of 
the two, but I mean there was no explanations or whatever. He had a very quick temper. Thank god 
never drank, my dad. That would have been awful. Ifmy father had ever been a drinker, I think we 
would have gone through hell and it was only later years he mellowed out. I mean I came back from 
the war thinking ... I wanted to speak to my dad and say 'I've also been to like what you went through 
but it was this closed book and I couldn't get on with him at all. I think when I got back I hated my 
father, I don't know why? It was just my angst. 
Amanda: And your mum? 
Paul: My own mother died two years before that, it was my step-mom. But when I got back, I mean I 
went totally off the tracks, I mean (laugh) drove into the bedroom two 0' clock in the morning. My 
fathers fast asleep. Pissed as a coot. (Huge laugh) I mean I just went absolutely crazy until I met 
Dylan's mom, she sort of calmed me down I suppose. (Laugh) Marriage. 
Amanda: It would be nice to think that women do that, but they don't all the time ... (both laugh). 
Amanda: so you said you had one brother? 
Paul: Ja one brother and a sister, both older. 
Amanda: And what do they do? Did your paths diverge at an early age? 
Paul: My brother's 8 years older than me, he was always a bully, we sort of get on but don't get on, you 
know, all these years, just very different people. He did his national service and that was it. My sister I 
have always been close to. She got married ... 
(phone rings) 
Amanda: I was just thinking when you came back from Namibia do you think ideology was a huge 
factor or did politics playa role? Were you trained to think in that way? 
Paul: Ja, I think so. Definitely. You know Amanda, later years I started to realize, a lot of the guys that 
were more conservative than me, we all knew the writing was on the wall, you know, urn but as much 
as there were some of us that realised, a broad sort of mass, believed, followed the cause till the end of 
days. Being I suppose put in the Security Branch, and a cut above them, Stratcom, our boss who then 
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became the Head ofIntelligence told us in 1988 'In 10 years time this country's", .we had a meeting 
the one night, there were a lot of Generals there, the writing was already on the wall, I mean what do 
you say? Ja, I was an ideologue I suppose, I believed wholly and solely. 
Amanda: But that was less so from your parents than from your. .. 
Paul: You know the big thing was they got us to summarise this whole concept in a nutshell was 
communism. Because the one thing we were never brought up as racists. That is honest to god. You 
know that I have been asked that question so many times before like why did you do it? You look at 
my history in the Security Branch, I was on the so-called white desk and that sort of gave me more 
hatred for people like your dad because why couldn't see the light? I mean these people were left 
wingers or communists or whatever. But I mean what the government did was a classic thing, 
everybody that was an enemy of the state was compartmentalized into this one thing, communism. 
From Helen Suzman, the liberals, the progressives, you name it. These were the enemies of the state 
and the fact that they were white people was seen in a worse thing than a poor black or coloured person 
or whatever. These were the people 
That had an education and that they could go along with the communist ideology ... I mean I hated 
communism, (sigh) more than anything. But I never saw things in a black and white type of stuff. That 
to me was part and parcel of the whole thing, that the poor masses of black, oppressed masses of the 
country were being used as cannon fodder by the Commies. The whole thing was a cold war thing. And 
you know what rve done, just to digress, in my book I try to analyse this in depth, I mean, just the way 
we were educated in primary school. I remember our Standard 4 teacher who became headmaster, 
Derek Hull drawing on the black board and telling us about the Israeli war, 1967, about this whole 
global thing, my parents talking about it. It was cold war stuff. You know the Cape Sea route was this 
big thing, of course, and that picked up in this country the whole bastion, the Commies were going to 
rape the women and tum the Churches into bloody squats, that type of stuff, so ja, I think in that sense, 
I still say we weren't politicized, I didn't come from any more than an average white South African 
family. My grandmother was this old (inaudible) liberal, you know she used to sit and snipe at us, but 
that was party politics you know, the NATTE and the SAPPA. She was an old United party person to 
her death in 93, my dad was I don't know, probably a Nat. They used to sit and fight about party 
politics but I mean that was, ja, I suppose the cold war. 
Amanda: But, the way you thought about it then, was it that at all costs you had to do what you had to 
do or were you ever told there were things that you couldn't do, or was it just you could do anything 
you want to do? 
Paul: You know Amanda, this whole thing of the third force, which I was very involved in, well I 
started in the Security Branch first, not even two weeks my boss came to me, this colonel and he sat, 
closed the door, gave me a pep talk. And he said to me 'There's more than just a war here, these 
people, and you can't fight them through the cause.' And he said 'and you'll see, everything was the 
jong manne worked in this big group of young guys, most of us were junior ranks, sergeants or 
constables. He said 'these guys (now, he was testing me, actually, you know in retrospect) he said you 
know officially we worked office hours, he said and they go out at night, he said, you must put pressure 
on them, he said. And I say just white staff, racially divided, of blank personnel, just worked with white 
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suspects, same for Indians, same for coloureds, same for blacks. Then you had a terrorist tracing unit 
later type, that" s how the whole security branch was divided up so I worked on just white suspects, 
white organizations and churches, a big thorn in the backside. But I think I couldn't have been in the 
Sap more than a month, I went out to the first 'Nachterlucke escapade (nightly escapade) and sprayed 
these slogans on what was him name? Oh, anyway this house and cover his car with paint and ag make 
headlines the next day in the paper, which was fantastic. You know, I couldn't believe it, we were the 
cops, the cream of crop, famous, notorious, whatever. It was the Security Branch. You literally had 
license to kill and that type of stuff grew and grew and grew. Started off, in my experience it was paint 
bombs. Then it was petrol bombs and then eventually it heating up houses. And eventually, not 
eventually, it became official government policy. All the Stratcom operations. I mean you've got to see 
what was going on. Urn, one of the security courses, ag, Stratcom courses I went on eventually, urn the 
course leader actually talked about assassination as one of the alternative ... you know, they said it from 
a podium. There was no two ways about it. Proof in the pudding is that in all those years up until TRC 
never one arrest or conviction of any third force (inaudible) 
Amanda: So when did you start at Stratcom? 
Paul: yirrah, I was one of the first people that got involved in Stratcom, urn simply because I always 
had this love of art because my job to round about 1984 I started designing posters and doing artwork 
and posters appearing overnight across the country and so on. And they wanted to, I'd just got married. 
In fact, 1 came back from honeymoon and I sat did these drawings. They wanted to transfer me to 
Pretoria, the first official Stratcom unit-Stratcom prior to that was being practiced by the Army and 
National Intelligence and it's because of my ex that I didn't go. I just said look I'm prepared to do the 
artwork and that. So for the next couple of years informally I was involved, as was most of the security 
branch. I mean to stick up those bloody millions of posters. That was still a Mickey mouse type of stuff 
but towards the end of the 80s I was formally inducted into Stratcom and was there until the end of 
Stratcom (inaudible) And I mean it was at that time that Khotso House, COSA TU House, Khanye 
college (inaudible) were all part of Stratcom, the so-called secret war. 
Amanda: So how did you just how effective you were being at the time? 
Paul: We were fighting a losing battle, hey. I mean we had minor victories. I think after the second 
state of emergency, Amanda most of us were too scared to say, but most of us realized (inaudible) I can 
show you I got passports made, documents in my name and Linda's name just in case. And the whole 
time the state's response yirrah endless meetings like you cant believe, pep talks, 'don't you know even 
if the worst happens we will always be, especially after Nelson, uh, there will always be an intelligence 
system and we will work under his new government because first and foremost we are cops and our 
oath of loyalty. la, at the end of the day they left us canned for what they then did. 
Amanda: Did you feel disappointed with the way things turned out? I know certainly in de Kock's book 
he talks about his disappointment with de Klerk. 
Paul: la, because I actually wanted to shoot de Klerk, came very close to it. Not because of anything 
else but I never saw him as a traitor who had sold the country down the river but the Nats certainly sold 
out people. But no, no, I still carry that hatred today-mention Botha's name, urn, and all the Generals, I 
mean where the fuck? I don't think, I don't condone using Gene as an example, he was just the fall 
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guy. I think if the TRC and the justice system failed dismally it was certainly in his case (inaudible) 
you know, someone's got to take account for that. I think if you look at the whole thing in it's entirety, 
I mean look at Gene's story, when they took him out of Koevoet and they started Vlakplaas that guy 
was not normal. Who could have foreseen anything apart from chaos-a guy like that after four, five 
years in Ovamboland almost uninterrupted with a license to kill that created mayhem on a scale I 
couldn't have even foreseen. But bringing him back to South Africa, an almost blank cheque, a staff of 
sixteen, a farm and vehicles and everything like that and carries on Koevoet inside the country, that's 
all that happened. And I think getting back to the point that I want to make 
(tape ends, states that EuGene alone cannot be blamed) 
Paul: So ja, things, none of us really realized the things that were going on, you know all that was 
going on. In fact there were guys in the Security branch who never knew bloody anything that was 
going on. I mean, we went out at night, the whole thing was ... when we did all these little jobs the only 
people that knew about it was those that had to know or had a need to know about it, you know, the 
'need to know principle.' What happened at the end of all this was the guys that sanctioned all of this 
came out with these denials, permanent removal from society. I mean, bullshit! They knew damn well, 
they can wash it away with semantics or whatever, but they were clever enough to use phraseology 
where if they ever had to stand and it had to be accounted for like my ex-boss, General 10han Coetzee, 
he sat in front of the TRC with this Afrikaans dictionary about the term 'permanent removal from 
society.' And when I saw his submission on that I felt absolutely sick. Although when I first heard that 
word, Amanda, I suspected as much but I wasn't sure. And I mean who the hell were we to question it 
anyway? I really believed at that time that they were up to something but not killing people, I thought 
once again in that sort of thing that, um, under emergency regulations they had set-up some sort of 
cone ... like Guantanamo Bay, I suppose, you know, that was the picture that I formulated. Tony asked 
me how I would have felt if they had come like happened that fateful day a guy coming into my office 
and saying 'we are drawing up a list of people we would now like to kill, assassinate, um, I don't think 
I would have gone along with it. I'm not saying I'm a good guy or something like that but it maybe 
took me a couple of years after that shooting incident in Ovamboland to understand ... I just didn't want 
to, none of us, well a lot of the guys that 1 knew, but for myself, I didn't want blood on my hands again. 
Once again, different things, this guy with an AK-47 there with a limpet mine I would have shot to 
pieces and gone home quite happily, you know and enjoyed the rest of my life. But yirrah, not an 
academic like David Webster, Frank Chikane ... so 
Amanda: So when you had to interrogate people, for example, did you think to yourself that you had to 
go as far as you could but you didn't want to actually kill them, you didn't want blood on your hands, 
so to go to the limit to get the information was required, how did you think about that? 
Paul: Personally, I could never torture, not a white person you know, I 'spose you see the border was a 
different thing again. There was like a savagery that was different to locally. Ag, I would balk at the 
idea of torturing to a point where I killed them, um. I was involved in the death of Neil Aggett, I was 
involved in the investigation. And I only heard, all those years later, I didn't know that right up until 
quite recently .... to the best of my knowledge viewed Neil's interrogation as house-friendly. A hand 
was never laid on him. And I have actually got photos of him, or had (inaudible) ... hanging from the 
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cell. .. killed himself, but I mean. Now you've got to define a line betvveen driven to doing it or he was 
left no alternative than to kill himself or somebody walking in with a gun and shooting him. (sigh and 
pause) No. I couldn't have done that, I couldn't have done that. I think, to maybe just quantify that we 
had a million opportunities to (reverk) people. I mean, horrible. My partner's told me this, died now a 
couple of months ago, Nani and I would go out and shotgun somebody's house and their cars and we 
would make damn certain they were not there. I don't think, I can honestly say, as close as what I was 
to him, it was an unspoken about thing between us. He didn't want to do it and I didn't want to do it. 
Um once again, these were the suspects, they were involved in underground politics, they weren't 
carrying limpet mines or whatever. It was a tacit support that they were giving. I would have felt 
differently if they, my boss said to me 'There's a ter with a container who was sitting in a boat, got a 
limpet mine in the back, I mean sure enough, a different thing. So I think ja, given the circumstances. 
Amanda: Do you think that there was a shift in your thinking when you came back from Namibia? 
Paul: Secretly ja. I started to suffer from insomnia when I came back from Ovamboland and 
nightmares, terrible. I mean I was pretty much disturbed, took me years to get past that thing. And um, 
you know I played these like mind games. This guy was a grandfather you know, think of my 
grandfather and how I loved him. (Pause) You know after that shooting thing, he was diving into the 
kraal. That was another thing that freaked me out, Amanda, was they don't ... didn't react like a human 
reacted. It was just all these kids and you know that sort of typical Ovambo black kraal type of stuff, 
looking at us was like horror but there was no sign of emotion. And when we picked this guy up and 
we tossed him in the back of this vehicle, it had like this buckle on the back, arming the gun on the 
side, these women came out that were crying, ululating, hysterical, everything like that, I mean it was 
probably his daughters. But they packed thorn brushes over where the blood was lying. You know that 
it was just like 'They aren't human, they aren't like us. You know it's like, obviously it's a cultural 
thing, you know. So ja, I racked my brains one way or the other, um, I don't know, 1just couldn't kill 
somebody. 
(Long pause) 
Ja but you know after all this was over, this friend of mine that died I mean we sat hundreds of hours 
(inaudible) ... He never had the benefit of a maybe cathartic process that I went through, but it killed 
him eventually. His wife now says openly, Nani carrying that, still living in the past. ... 
But he said to me the one day "You know Paul, through all of that we never talked about Christianity' 
or something like that. I mean he became very religious the last few years. He said to me 'I mean I am 
horrified at what we were actually involved in and how those bastards misled us because ... .' (sigh) 
what I can say to you from my side, up until I started in the Security Branch, I never ever believed that 
the police force of this country could be involved in shit like we were involved in. But it's almost like 
we got sucked into this whole thing, you know and that it got worse and worse and worse. I mean, I left 
school, I had vague ideas about getting some sort of job where I could be creative. You know, no fixed 
ideas. Seven years, six years after that I was shooting people at the border and going to celebrate it 
afterwards by drinking. I don't know. 
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Amanda: When you say that you celebrated afterwards, was that part of being in a group and just the 
macho appearance that you had to portray? How did you really feel, or was it that there was so much 
excitement? 
Paul: It was that macho thing, but you know, I mean you're on you own at night and you close your 
eyes, I remember that, that night. It was like any other night with one exception. You know I had killed 
somebody. And I suppose maybe my face or my demeanor gave it away, I was like quite deep in 
thought and here was old Piks, you know, this hectic guy saying "all, fok, let's have another one.' All 
singing our war song, war songs. But I remember getting into bed that night, jesus, I had crossed this 
divide (pause) ... 1 read accounts, 1 had always been into military history, those guys that dropped the 
atomic bomb, the bomber, you know this guy went and imagined, you know .... so 1 was aware of that 
type of stuff, you know, that phenomenon, like, but you sort of accepted the responsibility, got to deal 
with it, you know-where do you go now, do you do it again? You know, 1 said at one point, you know, 
1 think for a lot of guys once you've done it once, or been in a fire-fight once and shot peop Ie, I felt that 
was the line up there. It got easier and easier, like EuGene de Kock. 1 mean he was absolutely ruthless, 
but he wasn't like that when he first, the type of guy in the uniformed branch. From what 1 know, 1 
didn't know him at that time, but the guys that worked with him or whatever, he was a no nonsense guy 
sure enough but not a natural born killer, you know, um. I suppose now we are getting into another 
debate, you know, what came first: is one born to this or is it things that make you become like this ... J 
don't believe that he was born to this ... circumstances, but um, I don't know, it's a timeless debate, 1 
don't think anyone has really got the answer. 
Amanda: 1 don't think so. 
Paul: it's just war shit. You know my own father flew an aeroplane and at some point pushed a button 
and a bomb fell out of the bottom of it, people to pieces, I mean. Fuck, if s hectic but anyway. 
Amanda: But going back to this macho idea, did it make you feel better about things? 
Paul: Oh absolutely, it's a group identity. 
Amanda: So did the feeling of community help? 
Paul: Absolutely. Absolutely. 
Amanda: Do you think you had to be that way to get places, you had to show a certain persona? 
Paul: You know that was a big thing in the police force but it was a major thing in the Security Branch. 
You had wheels within wheels. The so-called naughty boys were C-sectioned at various times, known 
under different names, Vlakplaas ... these were the guys, once you made a name for yourself, and a lot 
of us, like me, aspired to this-you were capable of carrying out the dirty little things, breaking into 
somebody's house, cutting the break cables of the car, this type of stuff, you know, were like favoured 
and I think in a lot of cases guys were promoted and given extra, you were treated by the big guys who 
knew all of this. Like going to head office, I mean 1 had this reputation for. .. (inaudible) Paul, you 
know, but this is from a Colonel or Brigadier or something. Well they used my info, it was this 
affectionate thing whereas guys who had been in a higher rank then me were treated like 'Good 
morning, Captain, or Colonel' or something like this. And it was just this little core, you know that, 
Jacques Pauw eventually referred to-I called it the 'Heart of the Whore' and he used that publicly, but 
anyway, that was what it was like. There was only this little handful, that, that became the Stratcom 
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component, um, it was almost like we were trustees of the big shots you know, myself, Nani Beyers, 
the guys on the out section. We were the guys-they didn't just at the morning coffee table say to a staff 
of two hundred and something people 'Minister says we must blow COTSA House up, looking for 
volunteers.' It didn't work like that, you know, we were told what was going to happen on one-on-one 
conversations, started to plan the thing and eventually the job was done. 
Amanda: Do you think within groups, you sort of get compelled to do things; you almost don't have to 
think about it. 
Paul: la, that's right, group identity. I do have a pretty good analogy once, I read the history of the 
Hell's Angels, the bikers' background. It was this thing of showing class, you gave what 400 tough 
guys motorbikes or whatever and they first, the Hell's angels started with everyone trying to outdo the 
other one by doing something spectacularly, not necessarily ... something spectacular, something 
innovative. Which I always was, quite entrepreneurial. Lot of the things that I was the architect of were 
pretty well thought out, effective, ja, I was making a name for myself. Like standing up above the 
crowd. I mean this forging letters and cheques business, I became so bloody good at it, that that's 
actually where I got this one commendation from. Everybody thought this was fucking amazing, you 
know, it's the type of shit you read about in books. 
Amanda: And how did that make you feel? 
Paul: In my case as well there were these problems of this promotion- that's another whole story on it's 
own but I was given certain merits for performance secretly, I mean I ended up at the end of my career 
getting a salary that people that outranked me right to the top ... I was getting a hell of a salary. Then 
they brought in this merit thing so in that way I supposedly was, I was rewarded in that sense, although 
I didn't do it for that particular reason. I would say that was the added bonus. And then just to have 
elements of notoriety as well (inaudible) Invariably, word spread, you know. one of the guys would 
come and say' Aren't you the oke that did this?' 'Oh ja, you know.' 
Amanda: So you don't think that there was ever anything that could have gone above the call of duty? I 
mean you were actually rewarded for going further than what you were ordered. 
Paul: Yes, you were rewarded. I think you had ... to simplify it, you made a name for yourself, uh, I 
think Koevoet. .. just. .. the people of Koevoet ... .look it was encouraged all the way down the line. 
Amanda: And the excitement. ... 
Paul: la, people would go, they didn't talk about it. De Kock was just amazing (inaudible) his 
reputation preceded him, (inaudible) 
Amanda: Did people ever have to cover up for, especially higher up? 
Paul: They covered up 
Amanda: If you came to them with a problem how would they react? 
Paul: They covered it up. Once again, what I said to you earlier, there was never an arrest or 
conviction, questions asked in Parliament about the so-called third force. Not one of those cases ever 
went to court ... that I know of anyway. 
Amanda: Up to the point when things started changing, how had you seen the struggle from other sides 
of the divide-as a communist mentality? 
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Paul: Ja, urn, I started to get about 1987,88, Dylan's birth, a lot of problems, I started to actually suffer 
from depression, I wanted to get out the year of Dylan's birth 87, I really wanted to start a business, I 
just couldn't take it anymore, It was this frustration because there was a lot of areas where ... you know 
I think Botha's Rubicon speech had a lot to do with it as well. Because even in Intelligence there was a 
lot of things about the realisation that certain changes had to come about, because you know, .. we were 
outnumbered, outgunned, the sheer weight of the problem facing us that's when I started to become 
probably maybe more despondent, more depressed this trancidience,., I mean my days in Stratcom I 
had, I had to still be locked into Military service, the system, the command structures, The guy that was 
the actual the head ofStratcom in Jo'burg, Amanda, this guy was so totally stupid. You know, I went 
berserk, he was a bodybuilder. I went into his office the one day having pulled off, for this I got a huge 
commendation, I started getting propaganda materials in John Major's hands and he didn't know who 
John Major was! And I went and he said 'No, Wie is die fokken ou?' I said 'He's the fucken Prime 
Minister of fucking England' and I grabbed stuff on his desk and I went berserk, like. You know when 
I calmed down he came to me and he said "go away for a day or two, working too hard.' I mean, it was 
just something that books were written about, John Ie Carre or something like that. Now that could 
have been built on, there was so much potential. (Long pause) Ja, anyway, getting back to it, I wanted 
out, urn there was like nowhere to go. Another little insidious, or invidious side came into it around 
about that time when things started getting hectic. And it was that you couldn't leave because you 
knew too much. Not that I was ever threatened, but I mean at times I threw my toys out of my cot, like 
when Dylan was born. I was drunk everyday. It was the life. On top of that, Amanda, I was working 
like an I8-hour day, running all these bloody operations. I had I think the second most informers or 
agents that I was running of the Security Branch, there was endless crap, these people had to be 
supported the whole time. They were seeing the writing on the wall faster than what we were. Shit was 
going on, people were dying. The one thing Stanza (?) I didn't honest to god didn't know till the one 
officer that I mentioned came to me the one day and she was involved in this organisation and they 
were going on about this, the whole ofthis fear. And she said to me 'You guys killed him.' Jesus I gave 
her a slap, I said 'I'm not a murderer.' And I truly believed it. That only came out in the TRC, that 
Stanza was murdered by, in fact killed by one of my colleagues. Beat the guy to death, tossed his body 
down the mineshaft. I don't even know the circumstances. So it was like being in this pressure cooker 
you know and I genuinely wanted to get out, but I mean I would have had to start, I would have had to 
start my life again. We had lost our house, my medical aid was the most important thing, and Dylan's 
mom wanted me out. She was starting to ... I had a wonderful marriage, the cracks were starting to 
appear then. I came home the one day, to give you an example, I had been awake for three solid days 
and I came home and she smelt alcohol on my breath and we had a fight that night, I nearly killed her. 
When I came to my senses, I was on top of her and I pressed this gun against her. I mean, it was hectic. 
Amanda: Do you think that there were some of your colleagues that were less affected? 
Paul: Most of them weren't affected. They came to work at eight o'clock in the morning and buggered 
off at four o'clock, type of attitude. A lot of them. I mean the Security Branch in Jo'burg was a huge 
body of people (pause) But I think one of the problems, and we hear this today in the police, is that the 
more you do, the more shit you do, the less time you have got for yourself because you cannot confine 
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police work in an 8-4 job. I mean with everything with informers and then these Stratcom things that 
started to happen, break-ins and that type of thing, I was just never around, I mean, how far would you 
carry on with it? Started to develop, like I told you, I went to see a psychologist, not that he said .. He 
said 'Tell me what you do' I mean I couldn't tell him. 
Amanda: So did you even talk to him about what you ... 
Paul: Uh uh, Like I said I worked too hard (inaudible) And even on the strength of that, ifhe had 
known what I did it probably would have killed him, and I would have been breaking the Official 
secrets act. 
Amanda: Was that something you were worried about? 
Paul: AmI, in the Security Branch, never mind the police force, you never went, if anyone ever heard 
that you had gone for counselling, psychiatric help, you were regarded as a threat. I tell you, any 
menial job that was done by the Security Branch, the security clearances of people in sensitive areas, 
all of them were done by the security branch. You know, Amanda applies for this job at the old Atomic 
Energy Board, regarded as a key ... (inaudible) There five hundred and something so called National 
key points, SASOL. ... various areas of not necessarily government but private enterprise. One of the 
questions on that security questionnaire, a form you had to fill in "Have you ever had psychiatric help, 
if so provide details." A person was given a negative clearance and only when the client was done on 
like. if that client was of importance they had to go back to them and say what was the nature of this, 
who was the Doctor, you know, see if the person was in any way, you know the system regarded it as a 
fact you know, you couldn't trust them. 
Amanda: And do you think for that reason some people got into positions whilst not having, you know, 
almost. .. from what you say, you came from a normal mindset, but do you thing there were others who 
did not have a normal psychological make-up. 
Paul: There was, there were people, I mean, I talk for myself that I was terrified of. I wasn't scared of 
Gene with his imperial temper, personality .. ,. 
(tape ends) 
They had to go to Police College for a whole year and influenced like I was, four and a half months 
training. And then propaganda side, on the police forces side, there was a subject called 'Criminology 
and Ethnology.' And it was compulsory, I've got that book. You've got to see it, it's unbelievable. 
Generation after Generation of policemen turned out with that garbage-you wonder where racial hatred 
and all these preconceptions, things that we all grew up with came from. But this, that famous book, 
um, eventually somebody got hold of a copy and gave it to Helen Suzman and all the guys in 
Parliament and they pulled it. And as usual I've managed to (inaudible). Or maybe somewhere along 
the line I thought 'Jesus, one day this will come in handy.' I've got one of the only ones, [think that 
exists, that old Criminology and ethnology book. It is unbelievable, it's Victorian, taken from the old 
English police force, and then of course with all the racial shit as well, I'll just give you an example 
that comes to mind, um ... 'Why are Indians in South Africa involved in politics?' And then the answer 
is 'The Indians and Pakistanis in South Africa are forming the frontline groups involved in politics. 
They want to topple the Nationalist government so that they can open the doors to the excess 
population for India and Pakistan to come live in our country.' Now if you've got a standard six 
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education and you knew fuck-all about life and here is a fact, told to you like that, obviously, you 
know ... that is the way that all policemen were trained. 
Amanda: Obviously it played a large role for most people, but do you think that there were some 
people perhaps that maybe didn't even need the ideology. I was just wondering about what you said 
earlier, that there was no screening, so do you think that for some people perhaps and I wouldn't even 
want to begin trying to give examples, but that it was a good opportunity almost or would that be in 
fair? 
Paul: I think that might be a bit unfair. You see there was times when phenomena like that happened, 
was where real all-time action heroes joined the police force, they wanted to get into Koevoet or 
something like that, and after the fall of Rhodesia you had that phenomena, in fact my job was to 
screen a lot of these guys, because everyone of them arrived in South Africa, they were all Selous 
scouts, the bullshit was just unbelievable, the whole thing ... and a lot of them wanted to get into police 
or military structures, South Africa was simply a good place for this to help you. And a lot of them did, 
urn, you know I think, quite a lot of them, certainly some of the guys that I've met were totally 
bushwhacked, you know they'd been fighting the bloody war for ages, but I think, ja, they were 
probably more into that category of disturbed people that wanted to carry on. 
Amanda: But for the large majority? 
Paul: Blindies to the national party, Afrikaners in this country was just, I suppose another thing of 
sheltered employment. Like the railways used to uplift the volk of the Boer war, that sort of thing. 
Amanda: You mentioned Jacques Pauw, and I don't think explicitly he differentiates, but he speaks 
about Ferdi for example, and what were your thoughts on that? 
Paul: Jesus, a hectic person. There's another guy that I was scared of. I think everybody was. His 
reputation preceded him, as well. I don't know ifyou've seen in Jacques book, he was never in the 
security branch he was a drug squad cop. 
Amanda: Which is ironic considering ... 
Paul: Ja, where he ended up. (?) told me that he had a 2000 rand a day habit of coke. 
Amanda: Gosh 
Paul: With that huge body, taking cocaine like ... you know and with that temper. But his story I think 
started with, he was charged (inaudible) He laid outside one of the clubs in Hillbrow and he was 
convicted and then got off, and then somebody obviously made some enquiries, it was once again 
wheels within deals, his little section started ... only Vlakplaas was an extension of C-I, that's where the 
physically huge guys, calla Botha, Bonner, that so called-C-I, it's changed names, fell under (?) 
Ja, a guy like him was capable of killing somebody, definitely, I mean he was earmarked for it, done it 
before, he had the right persona, the right physical attributes. I mean Ferdi's big thing in the police 
force, he never, long before he was absorbed into the Intelligence structures, was that he would go to 
bars and for the hell of it, you know out of sheer boredom, take on the whole place, knock the hell out 
of the bar, he was that sort of guy. Fearsome, awesome guy, urn ... ja, he would be another one I'd say, I 
don't have a shadow of a doubt, in fact, I've heard stories that even de Kock was scared of him. And 
then I heard converse stories once again, compliments of Dr Pretorius. He said that Ferdi said that the 
only people he was scared of was EuGene de Kock. 
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Amanda: Oh really? 
Paul: Ja, so, The fact that EuGene didn't like him, I think possible EuGene being a pretty bright guy ... 
Amanda: But you were never scared of EuGene ... ? 
Paul: I wasn't scared of him in the sense that he liked me, um, we spoke a lot and in Ovamboland I 
remember sitting with him drinking the one night, in fact we got him out of a fight he nearly thrown 
right out of the police force. He saw in me somebody that did very well, a goody guy. And also 
somebody that didn't just sit in the police force, I mean I went out on my own volition, I read Marx, 
Lenin, but de Kock was like that and [ think he valued that in me. I certainly appreciated it in him, he 
wasn't like my boss who didn't know that John Major was the Prime Minister. But I knew the 
boundaries. [ was with him in a in a fight type situation and you played by his rules and that was it, if 
you got in the way he would probably kill you. And it wasn't that he had a temper, he was just more he 
was just different- a no-nonsense guy. F erdi [ think was just, he'd take pleasure [ think out of, like 
being destructive. [ can honestly say that I didn't see that in EuGene. Um, different people. What was 
the name of that journalist who came to see me about EuGene de Kock? Whose father was killed? Urn, 
Turner, Rick Turners daughter. You know this neighbourhood that they hung out in, Prime Evil sticks 
in my claw (?) as well. He was just, in a military sense one of the finest soldiers in this country, um. He 
certainly had better qualities than the desk or office police that led from the front which anyone who 
respects anybody for military, and I would certainly respect him. Never a guy that sat down at a desk 
like, and said 'Amanda, you go do this and come tell me afterwards what happened.' I think that's 
actually the thing that made him so much of a legend, you know a brave man, it's terrible. 
Amanda: Although now they are thinking of pardoning him? 
Paul: [ worked very hard for that [ really did. I went, in fact tried to start something, a support group, 
EuGene de Kock group, and every time I made a statement (inaudible) 
Amanda: Because he can be seen as a scapegoat, because we try to appease everyone by saying that 
everything falls down to him, but it's more complex than that? 
Paul: Can [ tell you something and [ am going to ask you to switch your tape oft: 
(Tape switched off, and then on resumption) 
Amanda: What did you think of all your bosses? 
Paul: Most of them [treated with contempt, a lot of them, Stratcom, that guy was ajoke (laugh). Um, I 
hate to say this but I always regarded myself as being intellectually superior to many of, of. .. I knew 
more about what I was doing and the subject than ... um.,.and more about life than a lot of these guys, it 
was just, I think [ was more committed. For a lot of them it was just another job. 
Amanda: With regards to the TRC, when everything started happening, what did you think about that? 
Paul: Well [ knew it was coming and in a bizarre way I possibly helped father the TRC! With 
Goldstone, those cases were crapped out. They drew up that report which was an agreement by de 
Klerk and Nelson Mandela. and you got to read that. It's horrendous. And I quote him: 'Reading 
through Erasmus's casebooks is a depressing ... ' he says, a 'shocking, depressing whatever. Page after 
page of documented violence. (inaudible) 
Um, look they had to do something after the Goldstone era. 
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Amanda: A lot of people resented the whole TRC process but you came forward even before that, so 
for you ... ? 
Paul: I had misgiving about it because I thought that, I didn't think much about it, like before the 
Generals came together in Pretoria planning ... how they could apportion blame, and that kind of thing 
but at the outset I think it was the only way to go. And I think what they achieved, one can throw 
criticisms as a lot of people have done ... I think that if they failed in any area society's sense of just ice 
might have better been served if they had charged Botha, not just dragging him in front of the court 
here, you know threat or whatever. Um, to not have had a TRC would have prolonged the hatred. It 
was a way of exposing, excising, I spose. 
Amanda: Do you think that you began to understand more what the other side of the struggle was about 
as that all came out? 
Paul: Definitely. I mean I went to a lot of the hearing and gave evidence and um, I got discredited a lot 
along the way for a lot of it which spose I understand why. , don't hold anybody against what they said 
about me, , never saw myself as a hero. I just didn't have a choice. But the one thing I am proud of, I 
never ever pushed the blame down, , never ever spoke about anybody that was lower than me, but' 
wasn't a General. (Laugh) Ja, I think a lot of the guys sold short on them. like Johann Coetzee. To sit in 
front of that hearing and say (coz we had all agreed he was probably the most educated policemen) he 
sat there and he said no he had used the term permanent removal from society and it was misinterpreted 
by the people out there. In other words these fucking idiots weren't capable of determining .... And that 
you know he was never ... and that was where the TRC fell short. 
Amanda: What did you think about the people underneath you? 
Paul: Well they were carrying out the orders as much as , was carrying out the orders from above. 
There was no ways' was ever going to sit in any forum and say ... you know, , felt I was talking to the 
hard timers of the country (?). I dragged a lot of people into these things like de Kock and a lot of them, 
a great friend of mine. he (?) by looking at my surveillance. I'd love to see him, just to clear the air. 
And' heard, Amanda, about six months ago, you can't even mention my name. He goes into things 
like, I'm a traitor, , nearly got him jailed. I never mentioned him in any forum whatsoever, even when I 
cut deals, well not deals. I spoke to Judge Goldstone, , said 'Judge, I am not going to sit here and say, 
these are the guys, , gave them orders. They arrived eventually, , mean in droves from the security 
branch to make a statement a certain quality and then they were done. The last couple of years, 
psychometric testing or whatever, , had a staff of' think 26, male or female that got dragged along on 
some of these things, that were involved in these operations, they were just ... (inaudible) 
Amanda: What do you think you would have done if they hadn't followed orders? 
Paul: There ,!"as some cases like that. . There were some people that got sidelined into an office job, 
they were replaced and nothing ever happened, somebody kept an eye on them. 
Amanda: 'fwe think of the Nuremberg Trials where it was not good enough to say that you were 
following orders, what do you think about that? Do you think that it does playa role? Do you think that 
it diminishes your responsibility? 
Paul: Jesus, this is a very interesting topic. But it's even hard to give an answer. I read everything' 
possibly could about the Nuremberg trials. This big debate goes into the police force section of the 
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Police Act which says 'All members are to carry out an order, by your superior. If you were a constable 
that superior was to be decided full stop. If they are unhappy with the orders that are carried out they 
have the right to unquestionable privacy. Aftenvards they must submit in writing why they are unhappy 
and they have got to give them to (listen to this) the person that gave them that order before they give 
to a person of higher authority. So that's it, ja, I'm not going to hide behind it, there' s this famous test 
case of South African law-the State versus Arlo. Arlo was under investigation, having already shot 
black (?), looking for the famous serial killer in Pretoria and he saw the constable who's got a gun 
driving to this place, black guy sees the police van so he runs away so what does Arlo go and do, he 
says to the cops (shakes head) , the constable carries on, shoots him, the two get charged with murder. 
Constable defends himself on the fact that he given an order by a superior, under that Police act. That 
became a very famous case. That piece of legislation stayed on the books right up until they rebuked 
the police act and all that crap that came out of it. I don't think personally that that it a grounds of 
justification, which it was. In South African criminal law there were seven grounds for justification, 
one of them was acting on the border. What the Supreme Court eventually held, was that acting, they 
had to be lawful. If the order was obviously unlawful, it was your duty to just not obey them. Apply 
that in a Security Branch sense, look how we saw things, there was no legal way of fighting somebody 
or controlling them or whatever. .... 
(Dylan interrupts, on resumption) 
Paul: .... the country won it's freedom but at what cost? It's all, you know the last forty years of history 
in this country has been a senseless waste. I take it from my life sort of, where I saw things ... .I took an 
oath that this guy, my son, will never ever carry a gun. I mean we keep guns, we live on a farm 
but. ... but with great circumspection. But to put on a uniform, never. I dunno, you know I watched 
those planes fly into the towers and I had a rethink on that, I dunno, it's the old question of violence 
and non-violence, the old just and unjust war theory. 
Amanda: Before you left off you were talking about orders and you were about to tell me how things 
worked from the Security branch perspective. 
Paul: la, I never ever said and will say 'Don't blame me, I was simply following orders.' I think the 
whole thing personally and especially, I always tell friends and colleagues I reckon this whole thing of 
global tyranny. Talking about Nuremberg, I read, I've got the book here, several times 'The purge of 
the Swastika' by Lord Russell of Liverpool. Excellent book. And after Nuremberg the same question 
arose about accountability and the guys had stood up there and said we were acting under orders, legal 
orders of legitimate sovereign authority. And what Lord Russell attacked was the question of 
accountability of the German people as a whole. Because, after the First World War. the League of 
Nations caused the Second World War thank you very much, they had to pay reparations. But the 
infant mortality rate in those years was I in 3, they died like flies, so they didn't solve anything, they 
just created another Adolf Hitler and another world war. But what he looked at was this whole question 
of accountability and he sets out to prove in the book and subsequent writing that the German people 
knew what was happening. The sheer immensity and the scope of the way people were disappearing 
and the camps, it gets bigger, bigger and bigger. I mean you can't really compare that to South Africa 
but it's interesting. 
00 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Amanda Lucey 
Amanda: And in South Africa, the TRC never dealt with things like the beneficiaries of apartheid, it 
was very confined, especially the Amnesty Committee, confined to specific acts. 
Paul: Ja, well look a lot of the government, the old government, when the Nats made their submission 
said sorry. 
Amanda: But from your point of view what do you think justice is? 
Paul: (Long pause, sigh) Ok, regarding the TRC I think that South Africa came out with a fantastic 
solution because to the contrary, I once spoke to Winnie Mandela, who said to me before the TRC, she 
said, we will be happy to negate when they are hanging from lamp boxes. The violence would have 
carried on and I mean, I don't know. I discussed this afterwards with her and said to her like 'Don't 
you think that (inaudible), then I told her all about EuGene .... 
I think even she respected him for his military something, but I think it was an admirable process and 
the other processes. I must tell you that it worries me, this thing about reopening some of the cases. 
Amanda: Do you take the point of view that now it's over, that South Africa to a large extent has 
moved on? 
Paul: la, but there's another side to that as well, you see like, Niewould's case. I mean not only did he 
not apply for amnesty but he lied as well. Terrible tragedy because the guys that were with him, he 
convinced them to lie as well. And now he can't speak because he died of cancer, those guys, I think 
the case will be placed on the wrong people. I would have said that he should have been in the cells 
next to EuGene. And there's others, there's a lot of cases, which I think are terrible. 
Amanda: But from your point of view, and I don't want to put words in your mouth, it was a good 
opportunity to reconcile? 
Paul: Absolutely 
Amanda: And I wanted to know what you thought of reconciliation. 
Paul: It was a fantastic process, I mean, the mere fact that you are sitting in this house, if I consider the 
hatred I had for your dad at that time ... (uh) With your dad it was interesting because the music side-I 
loved it, I still do. Although I must tell you that I don't like some of the new stuff, it just hasn't got 
the ... 
Amanda: Anger? 
Paul: Same ... But I mean the mere fact that we can sit here today (inaudible) ... amazing. I met hundreds 
of people, former enemies of the State-terrorists, MK commanders ... (inaudible) I wanted to kill them 
all. I had John Allen here, spent two days here and I said it to his face "you know isn't it ironical that 
the man that I once planned to kill actually ended up saving my life?" Coz if it wasn't for those guys, 
and John Allen says it straight: Desmond went to Nelson over this whole question, the Codessa talks 
were still ongoing and even Nelson said they must pay for what they've done. But they envisaged at 
that time that the hierarchy of the ANC would look at that straight Nuremberg type situation, court 
cases, you know, and then they said 'we can't carry on like this, we've got to cut this off somehow or 
the country will carry on bleeding and bleeding and bleeding. And I mean here John Allen sits, I even 
show him his father up there in my case books (laughing) and he tells me this. (pause) staggers the 
mind but 
Amanda: Tutu was amazing 
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Paul: Amazing guy, irritated me. Your dad, I sat at night at Mangles listening to his music, you know 
his whole sort offashion (inaudible) 
Amanda: So what do you see the future of South Africa? 
Paul: You knO\v, I am very positive. I've been through this quite a few times. I had the opportunity to 
stay overseas as part of the security programme. But I think when you investigate all of it, the one thing 
we all had in common ... was we all fought for this bloody old place so let's make a go of it. I"m very 
positive. I had to rebuild my life, I was on drugs, I was hospitalised 14 times for stress, I"m not 
complaining there, I mean I"m here running a business, providing employment for people. 
Amanda: and now 
Paul: I grow South African botanicals and use them for cosmetics that I developed. 
(both laugh) 
Amanda: Oh, ok 
Paul: They are now being sold all over the world. 
Amanda: What kind of cosmetics? 
Paul: I"ll give you some when you go! The famous African potato, the supposed hypoxias which cures 
AIDS ... I got quite fascinated by the whole thing a couple of years ago. After my divorce, I got, 
regained custody of Dylan, went back to George, to my roots, and I started teaching art, which I always 
wanted to do, and then I got into this bloody wonder plant, started selling them in brown paper bags to 
farmers weekly. So I started with that and it's basically worked out. 
Amanda: And you enjoy it? 
Paul: Ja, Ja its creative, innovative, entrepreneurial. .. ja. 
Amanda: So if you look at the police today what do you think their role is? 
Paul: Straight community policing, failing dismally, it's not that ... I 've got a lot of cop friends, not even 
from the old days but some who have been around for thirty years, say it's the same frustration, too, 
little pay. If I listen to these guys, it's almost like it's worse. You know, so much has been done to 
correct the old situation, now they are getting other stuff like reverse racism, promotions, um a guy 
with 15 or twenty years experience and there's a young guy with a different colour and face with 
authority over him, you know a General lack of interest. 
Amanda: and I know from Mowbray that the police understandably are scared for example of the taxis, 
I'd say it"s quite terrifying to want to be in the police in South Africa. 
Paul: Absolutely, I think the whole country is awash with violence, it"s become like a national sport. 
Amanda: A violent society 
Paul: It's amongst whites, across the colour, but I don't know, my personal opinion, we need zero 
tolerance, we can't fight crime on the scale that they do, I mean what happened in New York when 
they forgot about all those specialised units, you broke a window and you were arrested and charged 
and that was it. (inaudible) don't exist George, I'll take you there now, Amanda, half the kids ... the 
police need to clear those kids up, there gangs there now, why are those children not in school (ok, now 
it"s school holidays but still) Terrible, terrible (Inaudible) That"s where it starts. 
Later ... whites are starting to now, finding a town like George if 1 try to verbalise it, more conservative, 
Afrikaans, they now feel threatened, they've got this victim mentality, they are being discriminated 
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against and it's crap. I mean here, I am busy starting a business for Dylan who is 18, remedial 
background, he's got opportunities, for a child with no formal education, and I tell people that across 
the board. They say 'Nah' People believe and react in ways that they want to or the way that they have 
been conditioned to. I mean I would probably never have a black girlfriend. I might, but why? It was 
the way we were brought up. 
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Notes to Chapter 4 
I 'Babalas' is a term for a severe headache following a bout of heavy drinking. 'Terr' is an abbreviation 
of the term 'terrorist.' 'Skinner' refers to gossip. 
II 'Stratcom' was short for 'strategic communications' and was part of the State Security Council. Its 
main function was to gather intelligence and be responsible for dirty tricks. 
Iii Reverend Frank Chikane was the leader of the South African Council of Churches (SACC). 
IV The Soweto riots were a revolt by students against Bantu Education imposed by the apartheid state. 
\ EuGene De Kock was sentenced to 212 years in prison for the deaths of 11 people during his running 
of Vlakplaas, the death Squad of the Security Branch. He was nicknamed 'Prime Evil' in South Africa. 
P.W. Botha was the former State President in the 1980s. He denied all responsibility for actions under 
apartheid and was never prosecuted. 
\1 The Pass Laws dictated that black South Africans had to carry a pass to be allowed into certain areas 
of the country and were only allowed out at certain times. 
viI David Webster was a social anthropologist and anti-apartheid activist at the University of the 
Witwatersrand and was killed in 1989. 
'Ill Neil Aggett was a left-wing activist and medical doctor who was killed during interrogation by the 
Security Police in 1981. The security police claimed this was a case of suicide by hanging. 
IX 'Gene' refers to EuGene de Kock 
x Former British Prime Minister 
XI Ovamboland refers to the Namibian outback 
XII SWAPO (South West People's Organisation) was formed in 1960 with the aim of gaining 
independence for Namibia. 
XIiI Koevoet (Afrikaans word meaning crowbar) was the anti-terrorist unit of the Security Branch. It 
operated primarily on the border of Namibia and was responsible for finding and interrogating 
terrorists. 
XI\ Ferdi Barnard was a member of the Former Civil Co-Operation Bureau (CCB), a hit squad of the 
South African Defence Force. 
" 'slapgaf literally means 'lazy arse' and is taken to mean 'laissez-faire 
xvi A 'joller' is someone who likes to frequently go out and have fun. 
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